

Globalization and Democracy: Four Paradigmatic Views

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1. Introduction

Any adequate analysis of the relationship between globalization and democracy necessarily requires a fundamental understanding of the worldviews underlying the views expressed with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy. Four general views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy, corresponding to four broad worldviews, are discussed. These four views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy are equally scientific and informative; each looks at the relationship between globalization and democracy from a certain paradigmatic viewpoint; and together they provide a more balanced view of the phenomenon.

These different perspectives should be regarded as polar ideal types. The work of certain authors helps to define the logically coherent form of a certain polar ideal type. But, the work of many authors who share more than one perspective is located between the poles of the spectrum defined by the polar ideal types. The purpose of this paper is not to put people into boxes. It is rather to recommend that a satisfactory perspective may draw upon several of the ideal types.

The ancient parable of six blind scholars and their experience with the elephant illustrates the benefits of paradigm diversity. There were six blind scholars who did not know what the elephant looked like and had never even heard its name. They decided to obtain a mental picture, i.e. knowledge, by touching the animal. The first blind scholar felt the elephant's trunk and argued that the elephant was like a lively snake. The second blind scholar rubbed along one of the elephant's enormous legs and likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The third blind scholar took hold of the elephant's tail and insisted that the elephant resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth blind scholar felt the elephant's sharp tusk and declared it to be like a great spear. The fifth blind scholar examined the elephant's waving ear and was convinced that the animal was some sort of a fan. The sixth blind scholar, who occupied the space between the elephant's front and hind legs, could not touch any parts of the elephant and consequently asserted that there were no such beasts as elephant at all and accused his colleagues of making up fantastic stories about non-existing things. Each of the six blind scholars held firmly to their understanding of an elephant and they argued and fought about which story contained the correct understanding of the elephant. As a result, their entire

community was torn apart, and suspicion and distrust became the order of the day.

This parable contains many valuable lessons. First, probably reality is too complex to be fully grasped by imperfect human beings. Second, although each person might correctly identify one aspect of reality, each may incorrectly attempt to reduce the entire phenomenon to their own partial and narrow experience. Third, the maintenance of communal peace and harmony might be worth much more than stubbornly clinging to one's understanding of the world. Fourth, it might be wise for each person to return to reality and exchange positions with others to better appreciate the whole of the reality.¹

According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), social theory can usefully be conceived in terms of four key paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are founded upon different assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each generates theories, concepts, and analytical tools which are different from those of other paradigms.

All theories are based on a philosophy of science and a theory of society. Many theorists appear to be unaware of, or ignore, the assumptions underlying these philosophies. They emphasize only some aspects of the phenomenon and ignore others. Unless they bring out the basic philosophical assumptions of the theories, their analysis can be misleading; since by emphasizing differences between theories, they imply diversity in approach. While there appear to be different kinds of theory, they are founded on a certain philosophy, worldview, or paradigm. This becomes evident when these theories are related to the wider background of social theory.

The functionalist paradigm has provided the framework for current mainstream academic fields, and accounts for the largest proportion of theory and research in academia.

In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should be fully aware of assumptions upon which their own paradigm is based. Moreover, to understand a new paradigm one has to explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. No attempt should be made to criticize or evaluate a paradigm from the outside. This is self-defeating since it is based on a separate paradigm. All four paradigms can be easily criticized and ruined in this way.

These four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject. Each of the four paradigms implies a different way of social theorizing.

¹ This parable is taken from Steger (2002).


Before discussing each paradigm, it is useful to look at the notion of “paradigm.” Burrell and Morgan (1979)² regard the:

... four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorizing and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasize the commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same problematic. The paradigm does ... have an underlying unity in terms of its basic and often “taken for granted” assumptions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental way from theorists located in other paradigms. The “unity” of the paradigm thus derives from reference to alternative views of reality which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarily even be recognized as existing. (pages 23–24)

Each theory can be related to one of the four broad worldviews. These adhere to different sets of fundamental assumptions about; the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change), as in Exhibit 1.³

Exhibit: The Four Paradigms

Each paradigm adheres to a set of fundamental assumptions about the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change).



² This work borrows heavily from the ideas and insights of Burrell and Morgan (1979).

³ See Burrell and Morgan (1979) for the original work. Ardalan (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) and Bettner, Robinson, and McGoun (1994) have used this approach.

Assumptions related to the nature of science are assumptions with respect to ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology.

The assumptions about ontology are assumptions regarding the very essence of the phenomenon under investigation. That is, to what extent the phenomenon is objective and external to the individual or it is subjective and the product of individual's mind.

The assumptions about epistemology are assumptions about the nature of knowledge - about how one might go about understanding the world, and communicate such knowledge to others. That is, what constitutes knowledge and to what extent it is something which can be acquired or it is something which has to be personally experienced.

The assumptions about human nature are concerned with human nature and, in particular, the relationship between individuals and their environment, which is the object and subject of social sciences. That is, to what extent human beings and their experiences are the products of their environment or human beings are creators of their environment.

The assumptions about methodology are related to the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain knowledge about the social world. That is, to what extent the methodology treats the social world as being real hard and external to the individual or it is as being of a much softer, personal and more subjective quality. In the former, the focus is on the universal relationship among elements of the phenomenon, whereas in the latter, the focus is on the understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies, and interprets the situation which is experienced.

The assumptions related to the nature of society are concerned with the extent of regulation of the society or radical change in the society.

Sociology of regulation provides explanation of society based on the assumption of its unity and cohesiveness. It focuses on the need to understand and explain why society tends to hold together rather than fall apart.

Sociology of radical change provides explanation of society based on the assumption of its deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination, and structural contradiction. It focuses on the deprivation of human beings, both material and psychic, and it looks towards alternatives rather than the acceptance of *status quo*.

The subjective-objective dimension and the regulation-radical change dimension together define four paradigms, each of which share common fundamental assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each paradigm has a fundamentally unique perspective for the analysis of social phenomena.

The aim of this paper is not so much to create a new piece of puzzle as it is to fit the existing pieces of puzzle together in order to make sense of it. Sections II to V, first, each lays down the foundation by discussing one of the four paradigms. Then, each presents the relationship between globalization and democracy from the point of view of the respective paradigm. Section VI concludes the paper.

2. Functionalist Paradigm

The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete existence and follows certain order. These assumptions lead to the existence of an objective and value-free social science which can produce true explanatory and predictive knowledge of the reality "out there." It assumes scientific theories can be assessed objectively by reference to empirical evidence. Scientists do not see any roles for themselves, within the phenomenon which they analyze, through the rigor and technique of the scientific method. It attributes independence to the observer from the observed. That is, an ability to observe "what is" without affecting it. It assumes there are universal standards of science, which determine what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is observed. It assumes there are external rules and regulations governing the external world. The goal of scientists is to find the orders that prevail within that phenomenon.

The functionalist paradigm seeks to provide rational explanations of social affairs and generate regulative sociology. It assumes a continuing order, pattern, and coherence and tries to explain what is. It emphasizes the importance of understanding order, equilibrium and stability in society and the way in which these can be maintained. It is concerned with the regulation and control of social affairs. It believes in social engineering as a basis for social reform. The rationality which underlies functionalist science is used to explain the rationality of society. Science provides the basis for structuring and ordering the social world, similar to the structure and order in the natural world. The methods of natural science are used to generate explanations of the social world. The use of mechanical and biological analogies for modeling and understanding the social phenomena are particularly favored.

Functionalists are individualists. That is, the properties of the aggregate are determined by the properties of its units.

Their approach to social science is rooted in the tradition of positivism. It assumes that the social world is concrete, meaning it can be identified, studied and measured through approaches derived from the natural sciences.

Functionalists believe that the positivist methods which have triumphed in natural sciences should prevail in social sciences, as well. In addition, the functionalist paradigm has become dominant in academic sociology and mainstream academic fields. The social world is treated as a place of concrete reality, characterized by uniformities and regularities which can be understood and explained in terms of causes and effects. Given these assumptions, the individual is regarded as taking on a passive role; his or her behavior is being determined by the economic environment.

Functionalists are pragmatic in orientation and are concerned to understand society so that the knowledge thus generated can be used

in society. It is problem orientated in approach as it is concerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems.

In Exhibit 1, the functionalist paradigm occupies the south-east quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Objectivism, Social System Theory, Integrative Theory, Interactionism, and Social Action Theory. Functionalist paradigm's views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy are presented next.⁴

Democracy is a system of government in which the people choose their leaders at regular intervals through free, fair, and competitive elections. Democratization has expanded dramatically in the world. It promotes political transformation, freedom, the rule of law, and good government. The full global triumph of democracy is not yet attained, but it has never been more attainable. Democracy will continue its worldwide expansion if the process of global economic integration and growth is sustained and in addition freedom is made an important priority in international diplomacy, aid, and other engagements.

In order to understand the nature of democratic progress, and its limits, in the third wave of global democracy, it is useful to consider democracy in terms of two thresholds. Countries above the first threshold consist of electoral democracies that meet only the minimal standards of democracy and that their principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, fair, and competitive (and therefore multiparty) elections.

Of course, the goal for every country should be liberal democracy: a political system that combines democracy with freedom, the rule of law, and good government. Liberal democracy not only encompasses the electoral arena, but also the rule of law with an independent and nondiscriminatory judiciary; individual freedoms of belief, speech, publication, association, assembly, etc.; protections for the rights of ethnic, cultural, religious, and other minorities; a pluralistic civil society, which provides citizens with a variety of means outside of the electoral mechanism by which to participate and express their interests and values; and civilian control over the military.

To assess the worldwide potential of democracy it seems logical to discuss the following four questions. First, what has been the driving force behind democratization in the third wave? Second, why only a few of these new democracies have been reversed in the last quarter-century? Third, why do non-democratic regimes stay in power? Fourth, can non-democratic countries become democratic?

A. The following four forces have been driving the third wave of global democratization:

⁴ For this literature see Diamond (2008), Doyle (1999), Frederick (1993), Friedman, T.L. (2000), Fukuyama (1992), Haas (1990), Karatnycky (1999), Kindleberger (1969), Long (1995), Ohmae (1990), Reinecke (1997), and Rosow (2000). This section is based on Diamond (2003).

1. Economic development: Economic development has been a major driving force behind democratization in the third wave. More specifically, increases in national wealth increase pressures for democratization through their effects on: rising levels of education; the creation of a complex and diverse middle class that is independent of the state; the development of a more pluralistic, active, and resourceful civil society; and the combination of all these changes leads to the emergence of a more questioning, assertive, pro-democratic political culture. Economic development, that broadly affects the social structure and culture of a society, generates strong pressures for democratization. The authoritarian rulers capable of manipulating this process of social and economic change are very rare.
2. Economic performance: The second driving force behind democratic change during the third wave has also been economic, but in the opposite direction: economic crisis, or poor governance performance in general. Conventional authoritarian regimes justify their rule on moral and political grounds: performance achievements and imperatives. Their justification is that their rule is necessary to clean up corruption, fight subversion, unify the country, and generate economic growth. However, authoritarian regimes face a dilemma. If they fail to deliver on their promises, then they lose their legitimacy and therefore they have to give up their rule. If they implement what they have promised, then again they have to give up their rule because they have served their purpose, and in addition people do not value dictatorship but democracy.
3. International actions and pressures: The third driving force behind the third wave of democratization is the new policies, actions, and expectations of the established democracies as well as regional and international organizations. Beginning with the emphasis on human rights, and then continuing with the emphasis on democracy promotion, the U.S. and European Union pressed for democratic change and provide advice, assistance, and encouragement to democratic movements, civic organizations, interest groups, parties, and institutions. More recently, international election observation has become very active.
4. Changing international norms and conventions: The fourth driving force behind the third wave is the normative support given to human rights – and to democracy as a human right – in international discourse, treaties, law, and collective actions. People all over the world are increasingly developing a shared belief that all states should govern with the consent of the governed. In other words, citizens should be legally entitled to the right to democratic governance. This right is implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It has been included in more and more documents of regional organizations and confirmed by the growing number of interventions

by those organizations and by the United Nations. This has empowered domestic advocates of democracy and human rights.

- B. The following three factors explain why only a few of the new democracies have been reversed in the last quarter-century:
1. Some countries became democracies after they had become relatively rich. They became richer than any country that had ever experienced a breakdown of democracy.
 2. The second factor is public opinion and beliefs within countries. People in many of the democracies that have been formed during the past two decades are not generally happy with the performance of their political system and distrustful of many of its institutions, especially parties and politicians. Yet they do not have an alternative to democracy. The only alternative is the loss of confidence and withdrawal. Of course, this is not good for democracy, but it is better than people actively searching for an authoritarian rule. In the past several decades, countries have almost exhausted all forms of nondemocratic government. Increasingly they have favored democracy. They recall their experience with the other forms of rule and they do not want to go back.
 3. The third factor has been the unfavorable regional and international climate. Mostly in Europe, and relatively less in Latin America, political and military leaders are aware of the high price they have to pay in terms of economic and political standing within their regions if they abolish democracy. Some leaders who attempted to reverse democracy were prevented from doing so by interventions from neighboring countries and from the United States.
- C. The major reason why non-democratic regimes have stayed in power is their authoritarian success. Most dictatorships in the world survive because their leaders not only enjoy an unchallenged power but also the ability to accumulate great personal wealth, as a result of that power. The principal obstacle to the expansion of democracy to these countries is their ruling elites who control the structures of state power and protect themselves inside. The predatory regimes that do not have natural resources heavily need foreign loans and aid. At this point, the sources of those loans can insist on democratic change.
- D. Non-democratic countries can become democratic if a global strategy is followed. For the whole world to become democratic the most powerful democracy can neither be passive nor can it transform the world alone. A global strategy must be prepared and followed:
1. The closed societies of the world need to open up to the rest of the world. They have no understanding of how the rest of the world lives. However, once they find out, the regime will change very quickly.
 2. There is a need for a new arrangement to be made in foreign aid and debt relief. This is because resources continue to flow to dictatorships and therefore sustain them.

The fully global triumph of democracy has not been attained. However, it has never been more attainable.

3. Interpretive Paradigm

The interpretive paradigm assumes that social reality is the result of the subjective interpretations of individuals. It sees the social world as a process which is created by individuals. Social reality, insofar as it exists outside the consciousness of any individual, is regarded as being a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings. This assumption leads to the belief that there are shared multiple realities which are sustained and changed. Researchers recognize their role within the phenomenon under investigation. Their frame of reference is one of participant, as opposed to observer. The goal of the interpretive researchers is to find the orders that prevail within the phenomenon under consideration; however, they are not objective.

The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the world as it is, at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanations within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity. Its analysis of the social world produces sociology of regulation. Its views are underwritten by the assumptions that the social world is cohesive, ordered, and integrated.

Interpretive sociologists seek to understand the source of social reality. They often delve into the depth of human consciousness and subjectivity in their quest for the meanings in social life. They reject the use of mathematics and biological analogies in learning about the society and their approach places emphasis on understanding the social world from the vantage point of the individuals who are actually engaged in social activities.

The interpretive paradigm views the functionalist position as unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, human values affect the process of scientific enquiry. That is, scientific method is not value-free, since the frame of reference of the scientific observer determines the way in which scientific knowledge is obtained. Second, in cultural sciences the subject matter is spiritual in nature. That is, human beings cannot be studied by the methods of the natural sciences, which aim to establish general laws. In the cultural sphere human beings are perceived as free. An understanding of their lives and actions can be obtained by the intuition of the total wholes, which is bound to break down by atomistic analysis of functionalist paradigm.

Cultural phenomena are seen as the external manifestations of inner experience. The cultural sciences, therefore, need to apply analytical methods based on "understanding;" through which the scientist can seek to understand human beings, their minds, and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions. The notion of "understanding" is a defining characteristic of all theories located within this paradigm.

The interpretive paradigm believes that science is based on “taken for granted” assumptions; and, like any other social practice, must be understood within a specific context. Therefore, it cannot generate objective and value-free knowledge. Scientific knowledge is socially constructed and socially sustained; its significance and meaning can only be understood within its immediate social context.

The interpretive paradigm regards mainstream academic theorists as belonging to a small and self-sustaining community, which believes that social reality exists in a concrete world. They theorize about concepts which have little significance to people outside the community, which practices social theory, and the limited community which social theorists may attempt to serve.

Mainstream academic theorists tend to treat their subject of study as a hard, concrete and tangible empirical phenomenon which exists “out there” in the “real world.” Interpretive researchers are opposed to such structural absolutism. They emphasize that the social world is no more than the subjective construction of individual human beings who create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning, which is in a continuous process of reaffirmation or change. Therefore, there are no universally valid rules of science. Interpretive research enables scientists to examine human behavior together with ethical, cultural, political, and social issues.

In Exhibit 1, the interpretive paradigm occupies the south-west quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From left to right they are: Solipsism, Phenomenology, Phenomenological Sociology, and Hermeneutics. Interpretive paradigm’s views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy are presented next.⁵

Liberal democracy claims universal validity and to the extent that any political system deviates from it is improperly constituted and defective. In the history of the west, Athenian democracy was the first and for nearly two millennia almost the only example of democracy in action. It flourished between 450 BC and 322 BC. Liberal democracy arrived on the scene nearly two millennia after the disappearance of its Athenian cousin. Therefore, it is a historically specific form of democracy.

Liberalism is a complex combination of ideas that has gained intellectual and political importance in different parts of Europe since the seventeenth century. In contrast to the Greeks and all the pre-modern societies which took the community as their point of departure and defined the individual in terms of it, liberalism defines the individual as the ultimate and irreducible unit of society and explains society in terms of it. That is, society consists of individuals and their relationships. Individual is conceptually and ontologically prior to society and can be

⁵ For this literature see Carr (1981), Carter (2002), Cohen (1989), Gladdish (1996), Hirst (2001), Huntington (1996), Krasner (1995), Lijphart (1984), Lipset (1996), Low (1997), Morgenthau (1948), and Waltz (1979). This section is based on Parekh (1993).

conceptualized and defined independently of society. This is called individualism and lies at the core of liberal thought and shapes its political, legal, moral, economic, methodological, epistemological, and other aspects.

Although liberal democracy is partly similar to Athenian democracy, the two are quite different in terms of their ideological bases, structures, and central concerns. This is because each arose within a specific historical context and culture. Therefore, liberal democracy cannot be regarded as a degenerate form of "true" democracy. Athenian democracy is a source of inspiration and a useful corrective, but it is neither a model nor a standard of judgment. As any other historical forms, liberal democracy both misses out some of the important insights of its Athenian democracy and adds new ones of its own.

In western history, democracy preceded liberalism. In the modern age, liberalism preceded democracy by nearly two centuries and created a world to which the latter had to adjust. Liberal democracy is a liberalized or liberally-constituted democracy. That is, democracy is defined and structured within the framework set by liberalism. In liberal democracy, liberalism is its absolute foundation and penetrates its democratic character.

The liberalization of democracy occurred differently in different western societies, depending on their history, traditions and social structures. Thus, liberal democracy has taken different forms in different societies. For instance, in Britain, liberalism has long been the dominant partner and democracy has accepted its subordinate position. In France, democracy used its negotiating power and extracted significant concessions. The U.S., Canada, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, and others represent yet other forms of liberal democracy. In spite of their differences they are all liberal democracies and share some common features.

Liberal democracy is a democracy defined within the bounds of liberalism and represents one way of combining liberalism and democracy. Another political system may combine them differently. It might treat them as equally important and use each of them to limit the excesses of the other. This can be done by insulating the government against popular pressure and providing ways of making it more responsive to popular demand. It can also be done by safeguarding the government's right to govern and providing a greater network of channels for popular participation. It can also be done by recognizing the importance of protecting basic human rights and defining and limiting them in the light of a constantly evolving democratic consensus. Alternatively, a political system may be democratically liberal rather than being liberally democrat. That is, it can make democracy the dominant partner by defining liberalism within the framework set by democracy. Similar to liberal democracy, such a political system cherishes and respects individuals, but treats them and their rights in social terms. It strikes a different balance between the individual and the community. It aims at a more equal distribution of the opportunities

required for the personal development of citizens. It extends citizens' participation to major areas of economic and political life, and creates new centers of power. The early socialists and many European socialist parties have advocated this type of democratic liberal polity as opposed to liberal democracy. Democratic liberalism is pretty close to social democracy and constitutes a partial dominance over liberalism.

The way a polity combines liberalism and democracy, i.e., how liberal and democratic it decides to be, depends on its history, traditions, values, problems, and needs. A polity is not a random collection of individuals, but it has a history and a character, and therefore it approaches its political decisions in its own distinct way. For instance, the Athenian democracy could not be replicated in modern times, and modern western societies had to develop their own distinct forms of democracy. This phenomenon not only applies to the west but also to the rest of the world. To believe in the universality of liberal democracy is to overlook the historical experiences of the West and to neglect the liberal principles of mutual respect and appreciation of cultural diversity. Such belief imposes on other countries a system of government that does not suit their talents and skills, destroys the coherence and integrity of their ways of life, and reduces their dignity unable to be true either to their own traditions or to the imported alien norms. The imposition of liberal democracy on other countries creates dangers similar to the cultural havoc caused by colonialism.

Liberal democracy is a product of, and designed to be applied to, the political problems generated by the individualist society of the seventeenth century and thereafter. As such its relevance is considerably limited in at least two types of polity that have cohesive polities and a strong sense of either community or multi-communal polities.

There are polities in the world with a strong sense of community based on a widely shared and deeply held view of good life. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and several Middle Eastern and African polities belong to this category. They define the individual in communal terms and do not consider the atomic liberal individual as the basic unit of society. Different societies define and individuate people differently. Accordingly, they define freedom, equality, rights, property, justice, loyalty, power, and authority differently. In short, liberal ideas and principle, such as individuation, are culturally and historically specific. Consequently, a political system based on them cannot claim universal validity.

The non-liberal, but not necessarily illiberal, societies which have been under consideration above appreciate and wish to preserve their ways of life. Similar to most pre-modern societies, they are communally orientated and are of the belief that the rights of their members are legitimately restricted in the interest of the traditional communal way of life. Most of them respect freedom of speech and expression, but do not allow the freedom to lampoon their sacred texts, practices, beliefs, and rituals. They restrict the right to property, trade, and commerce

because they undermine social solidarity and communal obligation that are at the foundation of their ways of life. Based on the same reasons, they restrict travel, immigration, and the freedom to buy and sell land. Liberals oppose such restrictions, but most members of traditional societies do not. Unless liberalism is assumed to represent the final truth about human beings, it is not appropriate to indiscriminately condemn societies that do not conform to it. This is particularly the case nowadays that the liberal societies are concerned whether they have not carried individualism too far, and are looking for ways to create genuine communities without which individuals lack roots and stability. Community means shared values and a common way of life, and contradicts the unrestrained rights of its members to do as they please. Some traditional societies have grossly unacceptable practices and customs which need to be changed by internal forces and in extreme cases by a judiciously applied external pressure. When their forms of government are legitimately acceptable to their people and meet the basic requirements of good government, then they are entitled to plan and implement their political destiny themselves. Whether they adopt liberal democratic institutions or not is their decision and no one else's.

4. Radical Humanist Paradigm

The radical humanist paradigm provides critiques of the status quo and is concerned to articulate, from a subjective standpoint, the sociology of radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality. Based on its subjectivist approach, it places great emphasis on human consciousness. It tends to view society as anti-human. It views the process of reality creation as feeding back on itself; such that individuals and society are prevented from reaching their highest possible potential. That is, the consciousness of human beings is dominated by the ideological superstructures of the social system, which results in their alienation or false consciousness. This, in turn, prevents true human fulfillment. The social theorist regards the orders that prevail in the society as instruments of ideological domination.

The major concern for theorists is with the way this occurs and finding ways in which human beings can release themselves from constraints which existing social arrangements place upon realization of their full potential. They seek to change the social world through a change in consciousness.

Radical humanists believe that everything must be grasped as a whole, because the whole dominates the parts in an all-embracing sense. Moreover, truth is historically specific, relative to a given set of circumstances, so that one should not search for generalizations for the laws of motion of societies.

The radical humanists believe the functionalist paradigm accepts purposive rationality, logic of science, positive functions of technology, and neutrality of language, and uses them in the construction of "value-free" social theories. The radical humanist theorists intend to demolish

this structure, emphasizing the political and repressive nature of it. They aim to show the role that science, ideology, technology, language, and other aspects of the superstructure play in sustaining and developing the system of power and domination, within the totality of the social formation. Their function is to influence the consciousness of human beings for eventual emancipation and formation of alternative social formations.

The radical humanists note that functionalist sociologists create and sustain a view of social reality which maintains the *status quo* and which forms one aspect of the network of ideological domination of the society.

The focus of the radical humanists upon the "superstructural" aspects of society reflects their attempt to move away from the economism of orthodox Marxism and emphasize the Hegelian dialectics. It is through the dialectic that the objective and subjective aspects of social life interact. The superstructure of society is believed to be the medium through which the consciousness of human beings is controlled and molded to fit the requirements of the social formation as a whole. The concepts of structural conflict, contradiction, and crisis do not play a major role in this paradigm, because these are more objectivist view of social reality, that is, the ones which fall in the radical structuralist paradigm. In the radical humanist paradigm, the concepts of consciousness, alienation, and critique form their concerns.

In Exhibit 1, the radical humanist paradigm occupies the north-west quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From left to right they are: Solipsism, French Existentialism, Anarchistic Individualism, and Critical Theory. Radical humanist paradigm's views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy are presented next.⁶

Globalization has had implications for democracy. To assess the relationship between globalization and democracy, there is a need to define democracy. Democracy prevails when the members of a polity determine – collectively, equally, and without any arbitrarily imposed constraints – the policies that form their destinies. That is, people make joint decisions through processes that are open to all and free of any peremptory, top-down exercise of power. Democratic governance is participatory, consultative, transparent, and publicly accountable.

In practice, different people have devised many different ways to satisfy the general requirements of democracy. No single model of democratic customs and institutions is relevant and workable at all times and at all places. The way that a society conducts democratic governance is historically and culturally contingent.

Democracy, as a general condition, should to be distinguished from liberal democracy, which is currently the dominant approach to the "rule

⁶ For this literature see Archibugi and Held (1995), Barber (2001), Connolly (1991), Cox (1999), Ekins (1992), Elster (1998), Gill (1996), Held and McGrew (2002), Patomaki (2000), Robinson (1996), Sakamoto (1997), and Warren (2002). This section is based on Scholte (2000).

by the people". The liberal formula of democracy is only one model of democracy. This approach is most probably not suitable – or optimal – in all social-historical contexts. Most importantly, if liberal-democratic practices are pursued in inappropriate circumstances, it can mask and sustain authoritarian conditions.

Since democracy is contingent, and since globalization has made significant changes in governance, then it might follow that liberal democracy has become inadequate. This is because the conception of liberal democracy has centered on the national state. That is, it is centered on the Westphalian international system, where people group themselves as separate nations, who live in different territories, and are ruled by sovereign states that are subject to popular control. However, globalization has promoted both national and non-national communities. Globalization has transcended both territory and territorially-based state sovereignty. In this way, globalization has undermined liberal democracy through the state such that there is a need for supplementary – and in the long run some entirely different – democratic mechanisms.

Contemporary globalization has both encouraged some innovations in democratic practices, and has made governance as a whole less democratic. Currently, there are democratic deficits in the sub-state, regional, and trans-world realms of post-sovereign governance. However, the detrimental effects of globalization on democracy have not been inherent to supra-territoriality. Such negative effects on democracy have been the result of the prevailing ways by which globalization has been handled. There are alternative approaches that could be more democratic.

To neoliberals, the accelerated globalization of recent decades is associated with the expansion of liberal democracy to many countries, in which it was previously absent. To them, their "third wave" of global democratization refers to the expansion of liberal democracy to much of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet bloc, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1998, Freedom House reported that 117 of the world's 191 countries held regular competitive multiparty elections.

Their argument is based on several connections that can be made between supra-territorial relations and the spread of liberal democracy. Global human rights campaigns and other trans-border civic associations demanded the abolishment of many authoritarian governments, such as communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and military regimes in Latin America. Global mass media were supportive of democracy movements in China, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and elsewhere. Trans-world and regional agencies have variously supported democracy: civil society development through EU programs; election monitoring through the UN; and "good governance" promotion through the Bretton Woods institutions. Accordingly, neoliberal theorists and politicians have concluded that their policies of economic globalization encourage the democratization of the state.

However, these connections between globalization and democratization are open to the following criticisms. First, globalization has not been the only driving force behind the "third wave" of democratization. The vital strength in each case of transition to a multiparty regime with "free and fair" election has drawn from the locally-based movements for change. The second criticism of the connection between globalization and democracy is that many, if not most, of the newly adopted liberal mechanisms and institutions are superficial. The third criticism of the connection between globalization and democracy is that liberal democracies are inherently deficient. The fourth criticism of the connection between globalization and democracy is that the state is territorially grounded and therefore cannot by itself act as an agent of democracy under current historical conditions that many social relations are substantially supra-territorial.

Liberal democracy has not adequately democratized the state's relations with global agents. The state serves not only the entities within its territory, but also supra-territorial entities such as global companies, global financial markets, and global civic associations. National democratic mechanisms implemented by each state in isolation do not bring trans-border actors and flows under the popular control of those affected. Furthermore, the territorial state is not a suitable means – certainly by itself – to extend democracy to the non-territorial entities that have grown with globalization. This is because democracy through the state places first priority on participation by, consultation of, transparency for, and public accountability to the nation, and therefore it may not give due consideration to trans-border peoples, such as homosexuals, nomads, or women.

Regulation in world politics takes place not only through states, but also through local, regional, and trans-world actors. The state has remained the most significant arena of governance. However, this does not hold equally for all states, for all issues, or on all occasions. Often local, regional, and trans-world governing bodies have acquired a significant degree of autonomy from states. In these situations the lack of democracy that may arise cannot be remedied by the state alone. Additional modes of democratic participation, consultation, transparency, and accountability are then needed.

In principle, the expansion of multilayered governance and the reduction of state sovereignty should be helpful to the development of democracy. This is because, state sovereignty means supreme, unqualified, comprehensive, and exclusive power; however, democracy generally means decentralization, checks on power, pluralism, and participation. Therefore, the retreat of state sovereignty should help the advance of democracy. In practice, however, the relationship has been the opposite. Indeed, in many cases, post-sovereign governance has been decidedly less democratic.

In sum, although liberal-democracy has proliferated in states across the world, democracy has not become that much stronger. Liberal democracy has some inherent limitations, and the practice of liberal

democracy has been tempered within many countries. Liberal democracy, which is territorialized and state-centric, is inadequate in a globalizing world, where social relations have increasingly become supra-territorial. Global democracy needs more than a democratic state. This unhappy balance sheet is not predetermined and unchangeable. Globalization is not inherently undemocratic. Globalization and democratization can be complementary. Several political theorists and practitioners have begun to explore alternative concepts of democracy such as: devolution, the development of global communications for democratic purposes, and the expansion of global civil society.

5. Radical Structuralist Paradigm

The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete, as it is rooted in the materialist view of natural and social world. The social world, similar to the natural world, has an independent existence, that is, it exists outside the minds of human beings. Sociologists aim at discovering and understanding the patterns and regularities which characterize the social world. Scientists do not see any roles for themselves in the phenomenon under investigation. They use scientific methods to find the order that prevails in the phenomenon. This paradigm views society as a potentially dominating force. Sociologists working within this paradigm have an objectivist standpoint and are committed to radical change, emancipation, and potentiality. In their analysis they emphasize structural conflict, modes of domination, contradiction, and deprivation. They analyze the basic interrelationships within the total social formation and emphasize the fact that radical change is inherent in the structure of society and the radical change takes place through political and economic crises. This radical change necessarily disrupts the *status quo* and replaces it by a radically different social formation. It is through this radical change that the emancipation of human beings from the social structure is materialized.

For radical structuralists, an understanding of classes in society is essential for understanding the nature of knowledge. They argue that all knowledge is class specific. That is, it is determined by the place one occupies in the productive process. Knowledge is more than a reflection of the material world in thought. It is determined by one's relation to that reality. Since different classes occupy different positions in the process of material transformation, there are different kinds of knowledge. Hence class knowledge is produced by and for classes, and exists in a struggle for domination. Knowledge is thus ideological. That is, it formulates views of reality and solves problems from class points of view.

Radical structuralists reject the idea that it is possible to verify knowledge in an absolute sense through comparison with socially neutral theories or data. But, emphasize that there is the possibility of producing a "correct" knowledge from a class standpoint. They argue

that the dominated class is uniquely positioned to obtain an objectively "correct" knowledge of social reality and its contradictions. It is the class with the most direct and widest access to the process of material transformation that ultimately produces and reproduces that reality.

Radical structuralists' analysis indicates that the social scientist, as a producer of class-based knowledge, is a part of the class struggle.

Radical structuralists believe truth is the whole, and emphasize the need to understand the social order as a totality rather than as a collection of small truths about various parts and aspects of society. The financial empiricists are seen as relying almost exclusively upon a number of seemingly disparate, data-packed, problem-centered studies. Such studies, therefore, are irrelevant exercises in mathematical methods.

This paradigm is based on four central notions. First, there is the notion of totality. All theories address the total social formation. This notion emphasizes that the parts reflect the totality, not the totality the parts.

Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus is upon the configurations of social relationships, called structures, which are treated as persistent and enduring concrete facilities.

The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, or social formations, contain contradictory and antagonistic relationships within them which act as seeds of their own decay.

The fourth notion is that of crisis. Contradictions within a given totality reach a point at which they can no longer be contained. The resulting political, economic crises indicate the point of transformation from one totality to another, in which one set of structures is replaced by another of a fundamentally different kind.

In Exhibit 1, the radical structuralist paradigm occupies the north-east quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Russian Social Theory, Conflict Theory, and Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism. Radical structuralist paradigm's views with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy are presented next.⁷

Liberal-democracy and capitalism go together. Liberal-democracy prevails in countries whose economic system is entirely or mostly that of capitalist enterprise. Conversely, with few and mostly temporary exceptions, each capitalist country has a liberal-democratic political system. This close correspondence between liberal-democracy and capitalism is not coincidental.

The concept of democracy has undergone one major change in Western societies. This change in the concept of democracy came from the liberal society. In Western societies, democracy was installed after the liberal society and when the liberal state was firmly established.

⁷ For this literature see Bromley (1993), Frank (1969), Moore (1996), O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), Potter (1993), Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Skocpol (1979), Therborn (1997), Walker (1988), and Wallerstein (1974b, 1979b, 1984, 1991a). This section is based on Macpherson (1982).

Democracy came as an addition. It had to adjust itself to the society that had already been operating on the basis of the competitive, individualist, market society, and the liberal state, which served that society through a system of freely competing though not democratic political parties. Indeed, the liberal state became democratized, and in the process, democracy became liberalized.

Originally, democracy meant the rule by the common people. It had a strong class orientation: it meant the authority of the lowest class. This is why it was feared and rejected by men of learning, men of substance, and men who valued civilized ways of life.

The extension of the coverage of democracy and the progress towards democracy by the present liberal-democracies would not have been possible if those countries had not gotten a solid basis of liberalism first. Current liberal democracies were liberal first and became democratic later.

In the liberal society as a whole – that is, in all relations between individuals other than the political relation between the rulers and the ruled – the principle of freedom of choice was acknowledged and even insisted upon. Individuals were free to choose their religion, their pattern of life, their marriage partners, and their occupations. They were free to make their best arrangements, and their best bargain they could, in everything that affected their living. They offered their services, their products, their savings, or their labor, on the market and received the market price, which was determined by all of their independent and separate decisions. With respect to the income they received, they made several choices: how much to spend, how much to save, what to spend on, and what to invest in. They made all these decisions subject to the going prices, and in turn their decisions determined the prices. These prices determined what would be produced, that is, they determined how the resources and accumulated capital of the whole society would be allocated among different possible uses.

This is known as the market economy. Its fully-developed form is known as the capitalist market economy. This exists when most individuals offer their labor on the market to the owners of accumulated capital, on which other people's labor can be employed. It was established between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries in those countries that are now advanced industrial countries. It was an enormously liberalizing force. It changed not only the economic arrangements but also the entire society. Instead of a society based on custom, on status, and on authoritarian allocation of work and rewards, there came a society based on individual mobility, on contract, and on impersonal market allocation of work and rewards reflecting individual choices. Every individual was absorbed into the free market, and all their social relations were increasingly converted to market relations.

Previously, people were members of ranks or orders or communities, but they were not individuals. They had a fairly fixed place in a customary society that gave them some security but little freedom.

Now, people started to think of themselves as individuals who were free to choose. Indeed, they were compelled to be free.

This liberal society which was based on the freedom of choice of individuals had of course some drawbacks. There necessarily was great inequality. This is because in a capitalist market society some people have got accumulated capital and a great many others either have none or have so little that they cannot work on their own and therefore have to offer their labor to others. This means inequality in freedom of choice. That is, all are free to choose but some are freer than others. Nonetheless, in the capitalist system, productivity was much higher than in any previous system, and the chance of moving up (as well as down) was higher as well, and inequality was not a new phenomenon, therefore the new freedom was believed to be a net gain. In any case, the new system expanded and made up the liberal individualist society. It was liberal, but there was nothing democratic about it, in any sense of equality of real right.

In order for this society to operate, there was a need for a non-arbitrary, responsible system of government. And this was provided by revolutions in England in the seventeenth century, in America in the eighteenth century, in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and by other methods in most other Western countries sometime during those centuries. They established a system whereby the government was regarded in a market situation. The government was expected to act as the supplier of certain political goods – not just the general political goods of law and order, but the specific political goods demanded by those who dominated the society. What they needed were the laws and regulations, and tax structure, that would make the market society work; and state services that were thought necessary to make the system run efficiently and profitably – such as defense, and even military expansion; education; sanitation; and various assistances to industry, like tariffs and grants for railway development. The way to make the government responsive to the choices of this dominant group and satisfy their demands was to put governmental power into the hands of individuals who were elected periodically through a choice of candidates and parties. The election did not need to be democratic, and generally it was not. The electorate consisted of the men of substance, so that their government would be responsive to their choices.

In order to make this political system an effective one, certain other liberties were necessary. Freedom of association was necessary. That is, freedom to form political parties; and freedom to form pressure groups, whose purpose is to place on parties and on governments the combined pressure of the interests they represent. Freedom of speech and publication was also necessary, because without these the freedom of association is meaningless. These freedoms could not be limited to men of the dominating classes. They had to be given to everyone. This involved the risk that the others would use them to get a political voice. However, it was a risk that had to be taken.

This is the liberal state. In essence, it was the multi-party system whereby governments could be held responsible to different sections of the class or classes that had a political voice. This responsible party system was not necessarily democratic. In the country of its origin, i.e., England, it was well established and working well about a century before it became at all democratic. This was expected, because the goal of the liberal state was to maintain and promote the liberal society, which was not a democratic or an equal society. The aim of the competitive political system was to support the competitive market system. This was done by keeping the government responsive to the changing interests of those who were running the market society.

However, it was the market society that produced an irresistible pressure for democracy. Those who had no political vote noticed that they did not play any role in the political market place, i.e., they had no political purchasing power. They noted that due to their lack of political purchasing power, by the logic of the system, their interests were not consulted. Accordingly, they utilized the general right of association to demand the vote for themselves. With the logic of the system, there were no defensible grounds for withholding the vote from them. More specifically, the liberal society had always portrayed itself as providing equal individual rights and equal opportunity to everyone. In this way, the democracy was introduced into the liberal state.

6. Conclusion

This paper briefly discussed four views expressed with respect to the relationship between globalization and democracy. The functionalist paradigm views the relationship between globalization and democracy as complementary and universal, the interpretive paradigm views the relationship between globalization and democracy as socially constructed, the radical humanist paradigm views the relationship between globalization and democracy as multifaceted and multilayered, and the radical structuralist paradigm views the relationship between globalization and democracy as economically and class determined.

The diversity of theories presented in this paper is vast. While each paradigm advocates a research strategy that is logically coherent, in terms of underlying assumptions, these vary from paradigm to paradigm. The phenomenon to be researched is conceptualized and studied in many different ways, each generating distinctive kinds of insight and understanding. There are many different ways of studying the same social phenomenon, and given that the insights generated by any one approach are at best partial and incomplete,⁸ the social researcher can gain much by reflecting on the nature and merits of different approaches before engaging in a particular mode of research practice.

⁸ For instance, the mainstream Economics and Finance limit their perspective to the functionalist paradigm. On this matter see Ardalan (2008).

All theories are based on a philosophy of science and a theory of society. Many theorists appear to be unaware of, or ignore, the assumptions underlying these philosophies. They emphasize only some aspects of the phenomenon and ignore others. Unless they bring out the basic philosophical assumptions of the theories, their analysis can be misleading; since by emphasizing differences between theories, they imply diversity in approach. While there appear to be different kinds of theory, they are founded on a certain philosophy, worldview, or paradigm. This becomes evident when these theories are related to the wider background of social theory.

In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. The four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject.

Scientists often approach their subject from a frame of reference based upon assumptions that are taken-for-granted. Since these assumptions are continually affirmed and reinforced, they remain not only unquestioned, but also beyond conscious awareness. The partial nature of this view only becomes apparent when the researcher exposes basic assumptions to the challenge of alternative ways of seeing, and starts to appreciate these alternatives in their own terms.

Researchers can gain much by exploiting the new perspectives coming from the other paradigms. An understanding of different paradigms leads to a better understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon researched. Although a researcher may decide to conduct research from the point of view of a certain paradigm, an understanding of the nature of other paradigms leads to a better understanding of what one is doing.

The plea for paradigm diversity is based on the idea that more than one theoretical construction can be placed upon a given collection of data. In other words, any single theory, research method, or particular empirical study is incapable of explaining the nature of reality in all of its complexities.

It is possible to establish exact solutions to problems, i.e., truth, if one defines the boundary and domain of reality, i.e., reductionism. For instance, functionalist research, through its research approach, defines an area in which objectivity and truth can be found. Any change in the research approach, or any change in the area of applicability, would tend to result in the break-down of such objectivity and truth. The knowledge generated through functionalist research relates to certain aspects of the phenomenon under consideration. Recognition of the existence of the phenomenon beyond that dictated by the research approach, results in the recognition of the limitations of the knowledge generated within the confines of that approach.

There is no unique evaluative perspective for assessing knowledge generated by different research approaches. Therefore, it becomes necessary to get beyond the idea that knowledge is foundational and can be evaluated in an absolute way. Researchers are encouraged to explore what is possible by identifying untapped possibilities. By comparing a favored research approach in relation to others, the nature, strengths, and limitations of the favored approach become evident. By understanding what others do, researchers are able to understand what they are not doing. This leads to the development and refinement of the favored research approach. The concern is not about deciding which research approach is best, or with substituting one for another. The concern is about the merits of diversity, which seeks to enrich research rather than constrain it, through a search for an optimum way of doing diverse research. The number of ways of generating new knowledge is bounded only by the ingenuity of researchers in inventing new approaches.

Different research approaches provide different interpretations of a phenomenon, and understand the phenomenon in a particular way. Some may be supporting a traditional view, others saying something new. In this way, knowledge is treated as being tentative rather than absolute.

All research approaches have something to contribute. The interaction among them may lead to synthesis, compromise, consensus, transformation, polarization, completion, or simply clarification and improved understanding of differences. Such interaction, which is based on differences of viewpoints, is not concerned with reaching consensus or an end point that establishes a foundational truth. On the contrary, it is concerned with learning from the process itself, and to encourage the interaction to continue so long as disagreement lasts. Likewise, it is not concerned with producing uniformity, but promoting improved diversity. The functionalist paradigm regards research as a technical activity and depersonalizes the research process. It removes responsibility from the researcher and reduces him or her to an agent engaged in what the institutionalized research demands. Paradigm diversity reorients the role of the researchers and places responsibility for the conduct and consequences of research directly with them. Researchers examine the nature of their activity to choose an appropriate approach and develop a capacity to observe and question what they are doing, and take responsibility for making intelligent choices which are open to realize the many potential types of knowledge.

It is interesting to note that this recommendation is consistent, in certain respects, with the four paradigms: (1) It increases efficiency in research: This is because, diversity in the research approach prevents or delays reaching the point of diminishing marginal return. Therefore, the recommendation is consistent with the functionalist paradigm, which emphasizes purposive rationality and the benefit of diversification. (2) It advocates diversity in research approach: This is consistent with the interpretive paradigm, which emphasizes shared

multiple realities. (3) It leads to the realization of researchers' full potentials: This is consistent with the radical humanist paradigm, which emphasizes human beings' emancipation from the structures which limit their potential for development. (4) It enhances class awareness: This is consistent with the radical structuralist paradigm, which emphasizes class struggle.

Knowledge of Economics and Finance, or any other field of the social sciences ultimately is a product of the researcher's paradigmatic approach to the multifaceted phenomena he studies. Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of social science is seen as much an ethical, moral, ideological, and political activity as a technical one. Since no single perspective can capture all, researchers should gain more from paradigm diversity.

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