Brazilian Cooperation causal mechanisms in Africa
(2003-2010)

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to address the Brazilian cooperation causal mechanisms in Africa between 2003 and 2010. Process-tracing methods are tools for studying causal mechanisms in a single-case research design, such as this period in Brazilian cooperation in Africa, given the historical oscillations of Brazilian policy toward this continent. The first part of the article will present the methodological aspects of the research through an analysis of theory-building process-tracing. A literature review is presented from which emerges the main empirical explanations of the process of establishing cooperation projects, in order to identify the different mechanisms pointed out by the literature. In the second part, the analysis of the causal mechanisms that would influence the process through the dialogue between theory and data is reported. According to the data found so far, it can be observed that the institutionalization of multilateral agencies with strategic states for Brazil, such as the CPLP, and their use by Presidential Diplomacy constitute the causal mechanisms between the independent and dependent variables.

Introduction

The past decade witnessed a complex paradigmatic shift between the North and South hierarchies. Traditional donors from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC / OECD) continue to exercise substantial budgetary and structural influence on development cooperation projects. Non-DAC donors, however, such as China, Brazil, India, Turkey, and Indonesia, like their DAC counterparts, are motivated by the pursuit of geopolitical and soft power interests, but given their nature as rising states, they are positioned differently within regional and global power structures. They have thus been directed to different agendas in their development assistance, noting different aspects of simply giving and receiving.

This change is the result of the interaction between different trends, events and actors. The ideological and ontological challenge material of non-DAC partners coincided with the impacts of financial crises in various countries, leading to increasing public and political pressure to reduce or redefine foreign aid. While South-South assistance includes humanitarian and technical assistance in education, health and welfare, most Southern donors should prioritize the construction of energy and transport infrastructure, supporting agricultural modernization, and agricultural and statistical production (Mawdsley, 2017).

Studies that verify the development of cooperation-determining factors for Brazilian projects in Africa have different results (Dreher, Fuchs & Nunnenkamp, 2013; Dreher & Fuchs, 2015; Mwase, 2011; Lima, 2014; Semrau & Thiele, 2017; Albuquerque, 2018). Those came from the use of different databases, the application of different independent variables, non-standard measurements and different statistical models. The presence of the Portuguese language condition, however, is
This work addresses the mechanisms of Brazilian cooperation in Africa between 2003 and 2010, a period comprised of President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s two terms, which can be identified as a case study. The mechanisms are between the independent variable, the Portuguese language and the dependent variable, namely, the establishment of Brazilian cooperation projects in Africa.

Method

The Process-tracing method is a tool for the study of causal mechanisms in case studies, given the particularities of Brazilian cooperation projects in the proposed period. Process-tracing, in this sense, seeks to make within-case inferences about the presence or absence of causal mechanisms in unique case studies. The reliance on a continuous dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence, where decisions are required about which standards to sacrifice or adopt, makes process-tracing a good tool for finding a healthier balance between technical issues and research-qualitative case studies.

Although considered as a single method divided into two parts, it is considered in this work that there are three variations of this method, namely: theory-testing, theory-building and explanation of results (explaining outcome) (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). The theory-building process that will be used in the paper begins with empirical material and uses a structured analysis of this material to detect a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism by which X is bound to Y. This type of research, however, seeks to analyze the effects of causes in the formulation of inferences. Qualitative research, such as process-tracing, seeks the causes-of-effects in order to identify the causes and causal mechanisms of a given phenomenon (Rezende, 2011). In order to establish a causal inference about the Brazilian case, the concurrent explanations already provided by the existing literature on the subject must first be explored.

Figure 1 depicts a conceptual diagram of what would be a causal mechanism. The explanatory variable X produces the result Y through some mechanism M. In the causal chain $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$ there is a temporal sequence implication. The core of causal mechanism analysis is the drawing of figures illustrating causal or non-causal relationships. Finally, it would be the process by which an effect is produced (Goertz, 2017; Gerring, 2012).

![Causal mechanism concept (Goertz, 2017)](image)

Symbolic System and Cooperation Pragmatism

The gift theory examines foreign aid’s symbolic aspects in order to verify hierarchical similarities that characterize the dominant regime among different types of cooperation. Despite internal differences between both DAC and non-DAC states, the importance of this analysis refers to the foreign policy perspectives of states. The affirmation, in the motivations and conduct of cooperation, for the development of an alleged postcolonial solidarity between the South as opposed to the North is a matter of debate in political economy and international relations.

This symbolic regime is observed through statements, speeches, and ritualized performances of respect and equality in various high-level meetings and forums. This includes, for the buyer,
the business transaction element, which produces goods and benefits such as land, resources, market access, and investment opportunities. In contrast to the DAC donors, where cooperation is the dominant symbolic and performative regime, in South-South development cooperation, relations between partner countries are built on promise, offering diplomatic solidarity and economic opportunity.

Emma Mawdsley (2011) identifies five key characteristics for classifying symbolic regimes in the North-South Cooperation (NSC): charity; moral obligation to the unfortunate; experience based on superior knowledge, institutions, science and technology; friendliness towards the different and distant; and the virtue of the suspended obligation, where there is a lack of reciprocity.

South-South Cooperation (SSC) partners would be identified by the opportunity for both states; solidarity between developing countries; expertise based on similar experiences; empathy based on shared identity; rejecting the establishment of a hierarchy; the virtue of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

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<tr>
<th>Western donors</th>
<th>Southern development cooperation partners</th>
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<td>Charity</td>
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<td>Moral obligation to the unfortunate</td>
<td>Solidarity with other Third World countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expertise based on superior knowledge, institutions, science and technology</td>
<td>Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing development in poor-country circumstances</td>
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<td>Sympathy for different and distant others</td>
<td>Empathy based on a shared identity and experience</td>
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<td>The virtue of suspended obligation, a lack of reciprocation</td>
<td>The virtue of mutual benefit and recognition of reciprocity</td>
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Figure 2: Symbolic regime and bilateral cooperation. (Mawdsley, 2012)

The logic of mutual benefit establishes the recipient’s ability to respond and, therefore, the status it offers. It is not a mere receiver, but a participant in the process. The gift theory therefore suggests that the social bond created and maintained is not one of inferiority, which is naturalized over time by cycles of non-reciprocal aid, but that of equals.

The South-South cooperation discourse is strongly influenced by the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This rhetoric of mutual self-esteem can easily be dismissed as idealistic. But according to Mawdsley (2017), there are three problems that should be observed in this discourse.

The first problem concerns the existence, in all states, of the elites’ national interest projections, which decide much of the decision-making in Southern development cooperation projects, including the choice of recipients, their nature and conduct. The second problem is the repetitive invocation of solidarity that arises from an alleged shared postcolonial identity. In this sense, all historical differences between developing states are ignored. The third problem is that SSC actors are not immune to the aura that donor status seems to confer. Southern partners, like their developed counterparts, seek to increase soft power through elements of development cooperation. South-South development cooperation would reinforce the social hierarchies that it intends, in theory, to contest.
Criticism of emerging donors centers on their support of rogue states, or their determination to not engage in the politics of countries with which they relate. In addition, there are concerns about the potential for new debt through loans to low-income countries that have just received debt relief or forgiveness.

Another concern about emerging donors is that their investment offers allow poor countries’ governments to refuse conditionalities related to good governance and the appropriate environmental and social protections in development projects. Emerging donors, thus, would undermine international community efforts to introduce standards to protect the environment, indigenous peoples, natural habitats, and human rights.

Donors who adhere to "conditionality", where recipient governments must adopt specific economic policies and targets in their aid programs admit that this was not an effective way to bring change in the recipient countries. The multilateral aid system created by DAC donors seems, in this sense, increasingly dysfunctional. The proliferation of government agencies, within and among donors, has led to a fragmented system, where there is an exaggerated burden on aid-receiving countries. Each aid agency requires local authorities to respond to their demands or change the course of the project at the whim of the donor. The result is the suppression of local needs, priorities and institutions, as well as the imposition of large transaction costs that sometimes outweigh the value of aid (Woods, 2008).

The disappointment of developing countries is a powerful and important backdrop for the emergence of emerging donors. While established donors are still attached to an economic policy conditionality that their development partners are skeptical of, emerging donors are keen to provide and assist without such specific economic conditions.

In contrast, emerging donors advocate sovereignty and non-interference in their recipients’ policies. There may, however, be geopolitical conditionality that accompanies their assistance, such as requiring support for foreign policy from an emerging donor. Emerging donors offer help through trade and investment and in a context of internal growth in their economies. Alongside their assistance, they offer technology, advice and professional assistance, which for many aided countries is more useful and better suited to their needs than what’s provided by former donors. Unsurprisingly, then, emerging donors are entering into relationships as "development partners" of established donors.

Humanitarian, trade, political and strategic motives are often identified as the main factors driving the aid allocation process. This is consistent with the policy statements of key donors, stating that aid is motivated by a humanitarian concern to promote development and alleviate the need in the most disadvantaged countries.

**Conditions for Brazilian Cooperation Projects**

Conditions influence the decision-making dynamics of foreign policy. The bureaucratic development of state cooperation institutions, as well as the behavior of agents within this regulatory framework, influences policy stability, the pragmatism of actions and, consequently, the establishment of the conditions used.

Non-DAC donors, like those from the OECD, would differ from each other in their aid allocation decisions. Earlier case studies, respectively on China and India (Dreher & Fuchs, 2015), suggest that the allocation of aid by "new" and "old" donors seems to be more similar than one might suspect. Both donors, for example, do not indiscriminately support autocratic or poorly governed countries. Although the official Brazilian discourse emphasizes that cooperation is exclusively guided by altruistic reasons, the empirical analysis reveals that the allocation of aid from Brazil is partly motivated by considerations of need and merit of the recipient, and partly...
by self-interest. In this sense, export promotion is among the reasons for Brazil’s foreign aid. Like most other donors, through commercial interests, it gives more aid to poorer countries, where an exceptionally large share is spent in the social sector.

The theoretical perception is that Brazilian cooperation fits in with the typical institutions of South-South cooperation. Cooperation between emerging states must be understood at two levels: systemic, related to the international system; and the state, through foreign policy agenda. Systemic analysis looks at the historical legitimacy discourse, considering the colonial past and economic underdevelopment, in order to approach similarities in the perception of socioeconomic problems. State analysis perceives the opportunities that exist before the international system through the demanded policies that represent, at first, the bargain between partner states (Milani, 2016).

There are studies that observe determining factors in Brazilian cooperation projects. Those works intend to observe cooperation projects of Brazilian development in Africa through the formation of more robust research designs and, thus, to understand the process of expansion of Brazilian cooperative politics.

Mwase’s analysis (2011) looks at the behavior of BRIC countries en bloc and attempts to answer two questions: what are the determinants of the amount of BRIC loan financing for poor states, and the degree of grant of this financing. The importance of this article – despite looking at the bloc as a whole, which creates a budgetary bias given Chinese and Indian budgets for cooperation projects – is that it influenced further work in establishing the factors for Brazil’s cooperation with other states. Moreover, loan analysis, although not the subject of this paper, incidentally indicates the conditions for states to relate.

The author argues that BRIC lending is generally less favorable than Official Development Assistance (ODA/OECD) and more focused on country distribution, where it has raised concerns about the sustainability implications of poor states’ debt. The article, using a panel vector autoregression (VAR) model and a single equation dynamic panel estimate, uses variables of income levels, policy quality and institutional environments of the countries. In addition, it also looks at whether funding is sensitive to country size, trade ties, resource wealth, debt burden, and colonial / linguistic relations.

The main conclusions of the paper are that BRIC loan financing and the degree of lending are driven by commercial factors. BRICs would lend more to states with lower quality scores of institutions. The degree of lending is negatively correlated with the amount of funding, suggesting that BRIC funding could be based on commercial calculations, where there would be more risk, but the return could be higher. Accordingly, countries with better institutional indicators also received greater concessions.

The article also finds that government size, institutional quality and whether a country has an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program are the most important explanatory variables in the variation in BRIC financing. The amount of loan commitments and whether a country has a Fund program are the main variables driving change in the degree of lending. However, these variables would only explain about one third of the variation in BRIC funding and degree of lending, suggesting that other factors may be important in the direction of variation across countries.

Dreher, Fuchs and Nunnenkamp (2013) and Mwase (2011) included Brazil in their regressions, but only cover a very small subset of Brazil’s cooperation program. Their results may, at best, be considered suggestive. Lima’s (2014) work, however, is part of a larger mapping of data on Brazilian cooperation projects captured by reports from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, while previous work belongs to the Aid Data Initiative, which includes cooperation projects only from 2005 to 2010.

Lima’s (2014) dissertation verifies five conclusions regarding the standards of adoption of
cooperation projects by Brazil. Of these five conclusions, the first four are of interest to the present work. The first observes, by means of t-test of difference between averages, that Lusophone countries have 49 more projects than non-Lusophone countries; The second, through analysis of variance (ANOVA), found that South American countries require on average 38 projects or more, compared to countries on other continents.

The third and fourth conclusions conflict with previous findings of qualitative and quantitative work, stating that Brazil has few relations of cooperation projects with autocratic states. The third conclusion thus found that only six countries out of the 84 co-workers would be in the bottom two deciles of the Voice and Accountability indicator; The fourth conclusion, by means of Pearson’s r correlation, observed two statistically significant relationships at the 1% level. On one hand, the former notes a moderate-to-strong positive relationship and the level of Voice and Accountability. On the other hand, there is a strong and negative relationship between the number of projects in South American countries and per capita income, which indicates that the lower the income, the greater the demand for projects.

Semrau and Thiele's (2017) article, based on the Aid Data database, concludes that regional, historical and cultural ties with former Portuguese colonies and Latin American countries appear to be the main determinants of Brazil’s aid allocation. The empirical analysis suggests that Brazil would present selfish and altruistic motives in giving foreign aid. As a non-DAC donor, Brazil would not be exclusively seeking economic and political interests. This strengthens the conclusion that there is only a slight difference between the non-DAC donors and the DAC in terms of aid.

The results also indicate that institutional variables regarding the recipient’s merit, such as corruption control, governance efficiency and political stability, do not appear to influence Brazilian projects. This result, according to the authors, would be in accordance with a Brazilian policy of non-interference. Nevertheless, Brazil seems to prefer more democratic recipients, which may be related to its recent democratic transition.

Finally, the work presented by Albuquerque (2018) verified the analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of Brazilian cooperation projects in Africa between 2003 and 2010. Recent studies have looked at whether a country has Portuguese as its mother tongue, the degree of political stability, its GDP per capita and its food deficit. For this purpose, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis fuzzy-sets (QCAfs) analysis technique was employed.

This data analysis methodological technique, when studying social phenomena of complex causality, formulates the results in terms of set theory. The qualitative outcome approach addressed a gradation of the gap between potential partners and non-partners by analyzing projects and existing conditions. The cases 7, 40, 29, 2 and 29 are the Portuguese-Spoken African Countries.

Although the official Brazilian discourse emphasizes that cooperation is exclusively guided by altruistic reasons, the empirical analysis reveals that the allocation of aid from Brazil is partly motivated by considerations of need and merit of the recipient and partly by self-interest. In this sense, export promotion is among the reasons for Brazil’s foreign aid. Like most other donors, through commercial interests, it gives more aid to poorer countries, where an exceptionally large share is spent in the social sector.

Causal Mechanisms of Brazilian Cooperation in Africa (2003-2010)

Brazil is an historical advocate of the use of multilateral institutions in relations with other states. Although countries with less relative power cannot compete equally with the major powers, these multilateral mechanisms allow them to achieve some of their own interests in the international
system. Multilateral fora, given the relative difference in power among global powers, would be an ideal locus for expressing their interests, occasionally in agreement with other emerging states, formulating a new balance of world power (Valença, 2016).

Multilateral fora were also used for the establishment of cooperation projects. The creation of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), very close to the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOP), has enabled the use of an international organization in favor of Brazilian interests abroad.

The structure of international cooperation is a cause and consequence of state decision-making. Much like the processes of contagion and diffusion in democratization, investment, and elsewhere, the growth of bilateralism relates to commonalities that states have. The work of Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) demonstrates the importance of the construction of the CPLP, when it brings Brazil closer to African states through the common language, which can raise doubts as to whether this foreign policy is due to poverty level or if it is due to the location of most other Lusophone countries (Rowlands, 2008). The example of the entry of Equatorial Guinea in 2014, after adopting the Portuguese language in 2010, helps to understand the phenomenon. The creation, therefore, of international agreements and institutions directly affects cooperation efforts.

According to Semrau and Thiele (2017) empirical analysis reveals that the allocation of aid from Brazil to Africa is motivated by considerations of need and merit of the recipient and by Brazilian interest. According to the authors, like most other donors, and by the very nature of South-South cooperation, Brazil gives more aid to the poorest countries. With respect to African recipient institutions, Brazil rewards politically stable countries. Alongside the two regional foci, export promotion is Brazil’s main source of aid. When a dummy variable is included for Africa, the result is positive but not significant, and GDP per capita would lose significance. Thus, based on the authors’ regression, it is not possible to indicate whether GDP per capita is relatively low or if it is the geographical factor, as those countries are part of Africa, that determines Brazil’s

Figure 3: QCA’s Truth Table on Brazil-Africa cooperation projects. (Albuquerque, 2018)
Lima (2014), in relation to Brazilian cooperation in Africa, notes that there is no association of projects with income levels. The author’s Voice and Accountability indicator, however, shows a positive moderate-to-strong association of 0.459, as well as statistical significance at the 1% level. Thus, it could be stated that there is a positive relationship between Voice and Accountability levels and the number of projects.

The number of projects, as shown in Figure 04, is indicative of the initial importance of PALOP in the Brazilian insertion in the African continent. Portuguese Africa, in this sense, was the Brazilian initial movement within a strategy of insertion in the African continent after decades of oscillation in African foreign policy. Initially, these were modest projects that, over the years, developed as Brazil matured its African policy.

Figure 04 represents the comparison between the total number of projects in Portuguese and non-Portuguese Africa. From 2005, a large increase in the number of projects for non-Portuguese African states can be observed, which corroborates the argument suggested in the previous paragraph. Future work, despite the budgetary fluctuation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), should observe this diffusion of Brazilian projects. Factors manifest themselves through the simultaneous impacts of states’ internal political, economic and social characteristics, as well as regional influence channels, which identify the use of internal and external variables in the likelihood that a particular policy will be applied (Berry & Berry, 2006).

The oscillation of African politics in recent decades has been reflected in the construction of common goals in the rapprochement between Brazil and Africa. Since Brazil cannot deal with the economic and political power of the rival powers, emerging or not, the search for a common characteristic, the Portuguese language, and the non-subjection to democratic, income or even humanly necessary criteria, demonstrate a pragmatic choice of insertion on the continent. This oscillation can be observed by the importance of the Brazilian presence on the continent, including for the Lusophone states. The “Changing Atlantism” discourse identifies common features in this rapprochement, such as slavery, diplomacy and trade among emerging markets, social and cooperative South-South strategy, the repair of historical debt and historical space, and multiple ethnic identities.

The first causal mechanism of institutional origin, therefore, was the CPLP. As most Portuguese-speaking states are on African soil, this institution represented a permanent approach of Brazil with the continent, which determined a channel of stability. The possibility of uniting a socio-cultural character, language and all its historical framework, into an institutional framework was the formalization of a mature rapprochement with Africa.
The institutionalization of CPLP provides a larger structure for the demand of recipient states and their contact with the Brazilian government. The Brazilian Demand Driven model, in this sense, favored the PALOP, which had greater institutional proximity to Brazil and, consequently, the proposition of their projects. The CPLP’s general objectives are political-diplomatic concertation, namely to strengthen its presence on the international scene; cooperation in all fields, including education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public security, culture, sport and media; and the materialization of projects to promote and disseminate the Portuguese language.

It is noteworthy the direction taken in Brazil by the President of the Republic’s foreign policy, which usually go beyond his ex officio obligations. The President of the Republic, due to Brazil’s institutional background, is the foreign policy main decision-maker. The agent’s combination of capacity, interest, knowledge, sense of opportunity and urgency to deal with foreign affairs also derives from the commander’s command over the state bureaucracy in foreign affairs: the chancellery, the economic ministries, the military, and government agencies that interact with foreign countries (Danese, 2017).

In this sense, the President is a central figure in the foreign policy articulation through the Presidential Diplomacy. The institutional framework of ABC, given that it is linked to the Brazilian Foreign Office and is still not very institutionalized, enables the President and Chancellor to act in a more personal way.

The institutionalist approach demonstrates that participation in international institutions has the potential to alter the balance of power dynamics (Diniz, 2003). The CPLP’s timely use by Presidential Diplomacy as a locus for resuming an African policy reveals Brazil’s interpretation of its position in the international system.

It is no wonder that, in this period diplomacy, President Lula spent 55 days of his two terms on African soil through bilateral and regional political, economic, social and cultural negotiations. Brazilian cooperation for the continent has become an important insertion vector in the country. Data from the “Bridge over the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South-South Partnership for Growth” report show the President’s visits to the continent. PALOPs account for less than 10% of African states, but Chancellor Amorim, through former President Lula’s foreign policy training, also traveled extensively to Africa. The Chancellor had about 26% of his trips to the PALOP (IPEA; World Bank, 2011).

In this sense, the former President was a central figure in the articulation of foreign policy through Presidential Diplomacy. This, through CPLP’s consolidated structure, is the second causal mechanism, more immediate to the logical result of this work. Lula’s foreign policy took advantage of the foundations built in previous governments, despite the historical oscillation of Brazilian foreign policy in relation to Africa, and, through cooperation projects, mostly in Lusophone states, made a reintegration into the African continent of pragmatic and objective way.

Figure 5: Brazilian Cooperation Causal Mechanisms
Conclusion

Studies on South-South development cooperation have shown that there are different types of historical experiences involving multiple domestic and international actors, as well as various institutional projects designed by governments to implement their strategies.

The bureaucracy of bilateral cooperation agencies influences the formulation of foreign policy. Institutions have an impact on the development of different foreign policies of states. The agents behave within the possibilities of interaction allowed in the institutions.

The first part of the paper presented the methodological aspects of the research by analyzing the theory-building process-tracing. The second part presented a literature review from which emerged the main empirical explanations to the cooperation projects process, in order to identify the different mechanisms pointed out by the literature. In the third part, the analysis of the causal mechanisms that would influence the process through the dialogue between theory and empyria is reported. According to the data found so far, it can be observed that the institutionalization of multilateral agencies with strategic states for Brazil, such as the CPLP, and their use by Presidential Diplomacy, constitute as causal mechanisms between the independent and dependent variables.

Contextual conditions for the development of causal theories, where the causal relationship is expected to be maintained, must be made as explicit as possible. The theory, in this sense, should indicate the causal mechanism that links X to Y and, similarly, should point out the important parts of the mechanisms that link the independent and dependent variables, through a clear causal explanation (Beach & Pedersen, 2016).

The institutionalization of the CPLP, and its immediate use by Presidential Diplomacy were the causal mechanisms identified by the present work. Other future work may verify other causal mechanisms. The importance of Presidential Diplomacy has already been presented in other works, but its “place” in causation among the factors influencing cooperation projects with Africa has never been observed methodologically.

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Notes

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