Populist Attitudes in South Korea: Implications and Definitions

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Abstract: The study of populist attitudes has become increasingly relevant over the past decade, and researchers have struggled to find a model to study these political attitudes more accurately. In this paper, I investigate a strong tendency toward inclusive populist democracy in South Korea that seems to stray from the common black and white thinking associated with populism elsewhere. I find that this profile in Korea is most common among undergraduate educated individuals who are likely to protest and believe that South Korea does not run on meritocracy. I also find that there is virtually no difference in the level of populist attitudes in those who believed the Moon administration was successful in rooting out corruption compared with those who did not. My findings suggest that theories of the causes and consequences of populism, especially around the assumption that it rises from the uneducated masses and must bifurcate society, should be reexamined.

Introduction

As social scientists we hope to investigate why democratic political systems give way to corruption and dictatorship, and history has illustrated that populist movements are especially susceptible to such phenomena. In South Korea, much of the conversation about populism came after the 2016/2017 presidential impeachment, as it ignited a fierce debate about whether or not the event should be considered populist and, if so, to what extent South Korea was likely to fall prey to the evils associated with populism. There is especially an extensive amount of literature on the Sewol tragedy and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, even though it has been made clear this tragic incident and her presidential response were not the reasons for her impeachment. Kim states, "...the Sewol tragedy has become a national symbol of collusion between regulators and industry, immoral journalism, and government incapacity in South Korea these last three years," (Kim, A. 2017, 1). There were no grounds for impeachment from this specific incident, but regardless of this fact the Sewol Tragedy became a focal point around which the organization of protests was centered which then led to posing the question: Is the public sphere's intense pressure toward impeachment then reactionary, emotional, and without legal foundation? Worries of this nature were certainly present as many predicted that without the magnitude of the protests, the impeachment would not have taken place (Jang and Kim 2019, 109). These questions about what events should or should not be considered 'populist' are not contained to the South Korean case. Empirical investigation of populist tendencies around the world seems to have brought more confusion than clarity as the definition of populism is often confused with its outcomes.

The South Korean case provides a particularly important case study as this kind of mass political participation is hardly a new phenomenon in the context of South Korean politics. To fully investigate this history, my paper aims to study the role tendencies toward populist attitudes

play in the waves of contentious politics in South Korea based around the idea of a 'narrative of founding' rooted in minjung ideology. From this theoretical basis, I will present how social identities that were highly involved with the minjung movement during the struggle for democracy still perpetuate narratives that support tendencies towards populist attitudes in South Korea. I will then investigate if this bottom-up tendency toward populist attitudes is related to the top-down populist policy and rhetoric used by the Moon administration.

I present my empirical findings as I investigate populist attitudes in South Korea through survey research using factor analysis. As the factor analysis reveals a tendency toward populist attitudes in South Korea, I theorize how pluralist, non-Manichean populist attitudes in South Korea manifested through the collective memory of minjung and a 'myth of founding' that acknowledges corruption. I then argue that social identities that were highly involved with the minjung movement during the struggle for democracy still perpetuate narratives that support tendencies towards populist attitudes in South Korea. Finally, I investigate the relationship between bottom-up populist-tendency in South Korea versus the top-down populist policy used by the Moon administration. In the conclusion, I will argue that the core of populism, and by extension populist attitudes, is people centrism and 'pure' democracy of the people, by the people, for the people rather than a newer typology of populism put forward that positions populism as completely contradictory to pluralism and that populism must bifurcate society into antagonistic groups of the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite'.

Founding Narratives in the Republic of Korea

During the 1980s, the decade that Korea transitioned to the democratic republic that exists today, 'populism' was widely understood in the terms of populist dictatorships. With the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in the recent past, these possible consequences of top-down populism, such as brutal authoritarian leadership, have not been far from the South Korean social consciousness, especially in recent years. Because of the Japanese colonization, the civil war, and the resulting divided Korea, there was a deep rooted collective sense of failure that required acknowledgement and legitimation. Lee proposes that through applying the narrative of 'the people' (or *minjung*, in Korean) to history, South Korea was able to re-conceptualize their past of what could otherwise be viewed as a history of failure; she calls this the "crisis of historical subjectivity" (Namhee Lee 2015, 37) where a nation looks to supply a foundation myth of legitimacy to governance and people. There are three parts to 'min' ideology: first there is minju, which is democracy; second is minjok which is the nation; and finally there is minjung, which is the people. These three dimensions "became the discursive foundation of the democracy movement" (Chang 2015, 102) where the discourse between these concepts became deeply embedded in the myth of founding for the Korean public sphere and can be understood as a populist term in that it represents the common people (Chang 2015, 107).

During the repressive time of the Park Chung Hee dictatorship, the minjung movement was led by students as a part of undongkwŏn. Nambee Lee conceptualizes undongkwŏn as a counter-public sphere[2] that stood in contrast to the issues of corporate capitalism, including "dehumanization, individualization, fragmentation, and alienation" (Namhee Lee 2007, 10). She then presents the ways the minjung movement resisted the influences of capitalism, with one of the key ways being the support intellectuals gave to the workers. She states, "...analysis of the student movement shows how undongkwŏn constituted itself as a movement, the discursive strategies that define its shared visions, languages, codes, and images–its political culture–and how this counter-public

sphere relates to the process of larger societal transformation" (Namhee Lee 2007, 10). For some members of the undongkwŏn, splitting the world into 'good' and 'evil' became rhetoric for their fight for democracy. Lee goes on "The undongkwŏn's 'angry Manicheanism,' the dichotomy of the world into binary categories of friends and enemies, good and evil, betrayed their sense of vulnerability as much as their commitment" (Namhee Lee 2007, 20). However, this fight for democracy has become obscured behind the bold face of American-style liberal democracy that followed the minjung movement.

Unsurprisingly, this has made capitalist ideals hard to counter in South Korea, just as they have been hard to counter in the U.S., because capitalism was so successful in bringing about an increase in wealth for the population, while socialism and communism have become largely synonymous with poverty and dictatorships and this view has been cemented by international news biases. In South Korea, the big news outlets, such as Chosun, Dong-A and JoongAng all are conservative leaning and often have articles that are sympathetic to the ideal of liberal (American style) democracy (Kyung Lee 2014, 65). It is then unsurprising that the deep-rooted myth of American meritocracy has taken root in South Korean society.

With this combination of perceived success of capitalism and conservative news bias, the people's fight for democracy has taken a back seat in the collective consciousness of South Korea. Lee states that in 2007, three out of ten college student participants were able to correctly identify what the 1987 movement was about (Kyung Lee 2014, 66). However, the candlelight protests are still deeply linked to the highly unique Korean struggle for democracy that occurred from the end of the Korean War until the 1980s. As Namhee Lee (2015) states, South Korea is not only post-authoritarian, as a prolific amount of research has focused on, "but also post-minjung, with all that entails" (Namhee Lee 2015, 301). She notes that during the 1997 financial crisis, the country's structure reverted to an almost reflexive strategy of national unity, in a country that was otherwise highly divided by regionalism. However, during this time economic recovery was accepted over social and economic equity (Namhee Lee 2015, 301). To this day, it is the conservatives who push for anti-communism, anti-North Korea, and the American ideal of a liberal democracy (Yoonkyung Lee 2019, 22). While corporate capitalism now has a stronghold in South Korea, and the initial payoff from its economic structure has well legitimized the current economic and governmental system, there is still an undercurrent of resistance that is imperative to understand in order to study the political attitudes in South Korea.

Shin and Park suggest that this resistance has been present because Koreans largely associate democracy with "civil and political liberties and limited government" (Shin and Park 2008, 15) because citizens were greatly repressed by military regimes during industrialization, making it so that Koreans find 'liberty' and 'civil rights' more important than the country's financial situation (Shin and Park 2008, 15-16). This finding in South Korean democracy is well founded: Youngho Cho in a study in 2013 found that 72% of citizens do not feel that the government represents the "will of the people" (Chang 2013, 706). Due to the history of what authors have largely united to call the contentious politics of Korea (Cho et al. 2019; Stent 2019) the spirit of protest and of working people against corruption is strong. Dylan Stent states: "Contentious politics occurs when protestors make claims on authorities; use public performances to do so; draw on inherited forms of collective action (repertoires) and invent new ones; forge alliances with influential members of their respective politics; take advantage of existing political regime opportunist and make new ones; and use a combination of institutional and extra-institutional routines to advance their claims" (Stent 2019, 892). However, it also seems that South Korea's contentious politics have strong populist tendencies as both Yoonkyung Lee (2019) and Sang-Jin Han (2019) have

supported in their writing on the subject. This contention seems to go hand in hand with the public sphere's attitudes towards their idea of democratic functioning.

As Yoonkyung Lee argues, the candlelight protests of 2016/2017 were also about 'economic democratization', meant to put emphasis on the fact that Korea could not reach full democracy until they reached a more equitable economy (Yoonkyung Lee 2019, 29). Following the Candlelight protests and impeachment, the left leaning Moon Jae-in was voted into office, promising to address these concerns. One of the Moon administration's talking points was a promise to raise the minimum wage. Economists recommended that the increase should be done gradually as temporary workers are often all that small shops can employ, and this sector makes up a good portion of the South Korean employment market. However, Moon chose to have sharp increases that forced many small businesses to close. This put those employees who the wage increase was intended to benefit out of a job (Shin 2020, 110). As Yoonkyung Lee sees it, this minimum wage policy was hardly a move towards the core issues of inequality and redistribution, which is what many have argued was at the core of the 2016/2017 protests and that by the time it came into effect, the policy was a 'watered down' version of its original goal. Moon's original promise was two policies aimed at inequality: "an economy of shared affluence" and "a state for social welfare" (Yoonkyung Lee 2019, 41).

In his 2019 article, Sang-Jin Han situates populist attitudes within the history of populist tendencies in South Korea (Han 2019). Han conducts a detailed analysis of South Korean history, tracing populist attitudes back to the Joseon dynasty. The dynasty ranged from 1392 until 1910 and was an era of high inequality and resulted in the Donghak peasant rebellion which Han calls populist (Han 2019, 33). This peasant populism then moved into Nationalist populism during the Japanese colonial period, and finally he states that this accumulation of populist spirit was acted and re-enacted during the minjung populism of the democracy movement. Finally this was re-enacted during the era of, as Han calls it, digital populism (Han 2019: 36). Han also shows a separate form of populism that appeared in Korea that 'breaks' the Korean history of Minjung as populist, which is the anti-communist populist movement (Han 2019, 35). Han uses the following questions from a 2015 survey (Han 2019, 30):

1. Most politicians do not care about the people.
2. Most politicians are trustworthy.
3. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
4. Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.

Han found that 63.4 percent of populists were candlelight populist (progressive leaning) and 8.0 were national flag populist (conservative-leaning). Han then breaks down the groups into different types of populists, neoliberal populist and egalitarian populists. He finds that breaking down those with populist attitudes in this way affects the way individuals feel about many different social justice issues, such as the rights of minorities and taxation policy and income and earnings (Han 2019, 46). Han's first look into populist attitudes in Korea gives a valuable comparison to the findings in this paper, as he makes the argument for populist attitudes but does not investigate the two additional dimensions (homogeneity of the people and a Manichean outlook) that are commonly seen as necessary dimensions of populist attitudes.

Thus, in order to look at populist attitudes in South Korea, I believe there are two concepts that are imperative to take into account for the historical-social environment that produced the Korean

public sphere: (1) the structure of top-down democracy, pro-capitalism and anti-communism on the national and global level (2) minjung as a populist counter-public sphere, as conceptualized by Namhee Lee (2015). Although this articulation is specific to the Korean case, and thus may have a larger impact on populist articulation in Korea, it also represents a larger arena of contention between global corporate capitalism on the one hand, and growing people's movements either centered around cultural or economic grievances.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Populism in general has been defined in many ways, and studied through multiple different analytical frameworks, such as an ideology, thin-centered ideology, discursive frame, political style. As I focus on populist attitudes in this paper, I will need to greatly restrict the definitions and arguments presented. This paper relies on the methodological foundations that Akkerman et al. (2014) have constructed for measuring populist attitudes which rely on the mainstream theoretical definition of populism by Mudde (2004). However, I hope to set us up to re-examine how Akkerman et al. have defined populist attitudes during the empirical section, and question if it would be better to return to a more natural definition of populism by revisiting the core definition of populism, as put forward by Canovan (1999).

Akkerman et al. set up their theoretical base as follows:

> First, populism is people centered (Rooduijn 2014). Populism is about 'government of the people, by the people, for the people' (Canovan 1999, 10).
> (Akkerman et al. 2014, 378)

These two components of populism make up the 'core' of populism (as a general term). This definition is difficult to reconcile with the common understanding of 'populism' as a top-down movement centered around a charismatic leader, as this is one of the most studied forms of populism. However we should ask if this is this the most common form of populism, or if our political systems simply set up the perfect condition for this form of populism. I would argue the latter. As Deiwiks argues, populism goes hand in hand with representative democracy because of the "democratic paradox" (Deiwiks 2009, 9). As the current norm for democratic government, liberal republics, sets up the perfect condition for these leaders to emerge as our ideal of our government is "of the people, by the people, for the people" but often the second statement, "by the people" gets set aside in favor of liberalism and deliberation.

The second section of the theoretical model Akkerman et al. uses continues:

> Second, the notion of the sovereign people in populism is defined in sharp contrast with the status quo in which the people oppose the (corrupt) elites (Mudde 2004). Third, populism is antagonistic, making a (moral) distinction between the 'good' people and the 'corrupt' (or 'bad') elite (Manichean) (Mudde 2004). Fourth, the populist movement or party claims to represent the "general will" of the people (Mudde 2004).
> (Akkerman et al. 2014, 378)

Interestingly, we can see that the entire second portion of this definition comes from a single author, Mudde (2004), who, at the time that he formed this definition, was writing on right-wing populism.

In order to better understand the empirical portion of this paper, we will need to further dive into Mudde's argument about why the Manichean outlook is so important to populism. Mudde states:

> I define populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people. Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism. Elitism is populism's mirror-image: it shares its Manichean worldview, but wants politics to be an expression of the views of the moral elite, instead of the amoral people. Pluralism, on the other hand, rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism, seeing society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with often fundamentally different views and wishes. (Mudde 2004, 543)

This definition is useful as it is clear and concise and puts very clear borders onto the concept of 'populism'. It is problematic however as it does not, I believe, encompass *all* of populism. Rather it shows the consequences of certain forms of populism as they play out within our current representative systems. As research has found that representative democracies empirically respond more to the demands of higher income groups (Lee and McCarty 2019, 4; Gilens and Page 2014), it makes as much sense to automatically consider republics as democratically elite institutions as it does to automatically consider populist democracies as homogenizing and tyrannical. This brings us to one of the key points of contention in populism studies: how to define who is included in the definition of 'the people'. In reactionary populism, there is an argument that only a certain group makes up the people, which leads to continuing forms of xenophobia and hierarchy. However, in populist democracies 'the people' are defined simply by the majority of people within a nation state and, as theorists have shown, this can lead to undesirable outcomes.

Mudde's definition requires us to question the issue of the 'legitimacy' of populism and by extension, populist attitudes. As we can see, Mudde's definition sets up populism to be dismissed as reactionary, irrational and emotional. This reactionary spirit can certainly be an aspect of some forms of populism, but as I will argue with anti-pluralism and the Manichean outlook, I do not think it is inherent to populism. Mudde argues that for a populist "...compromise is impossible, as it 'corrupts' the purity" (Mudde 2004, 544). However, this makes a problematic assumption that populists, under any and every circumstance need to divide the 'good' people from the 'evil' elite opponents. This has undoubtedly happened, especially in nationalist populist movements, but there are also populist movements that did not include this dichotomy. Defining it in this way lends an artificial legitimacy that populist movements must include Manichean outlook in order to be considered populist. For a theoretical definition of populism, it is more useful to say that populists are not necessarily against the elite, but are instead against valuing elitism regardless of whether it is a knowledge or power elite.

From this theoretical definition of populism, and by extension the modified idea of what constitutes populist attitudes, I have three core hypotheses that I will investigate in the following empirical section of this paper. My first hypothesis is that:
1) Populist attitudes will be present in South Korea. However, the populist attitudes will not fit the model made by Akkerman et al. Instead, they will include high levels of pluralism.

Following this, I theorize that social identities that were highly involved with the Minjung movement during the struggle for democracy still perpetuate narratives that support tendencies towards populist attitudes in South Korea. From this, my second hypothesis is that:
2) Those with social identities that correspond with Minjung ideology — I use student/college graduation status, those with high political participation, those who believe citizens shaped democracy, and those with no trust in meritocracy — will rank more in agreement with the

populist attitude questions.

Finally, my theory is that individuals with populist attitudes, especially with bottom-up narratives, are not necessarily supportive of politicians' populism, such as the populist rhetoric used by Moon. My third hypothesis is that:
3) Those with populist attitudes will not be more likely to support the Moon government.

Methodology

The work of Hawkins et al. (2012) and Akkerman et al. (2014) make up the dominant foundation of a relatively small pool of previous research done on measuring populism on the individual level. This guarantees that the majority of studies follow the above theoretical definition put forward by Mudde by default. Although there are other proposed scales, Schulz et al. (2018), Castanho Silva et al. (2018) Oliver and Rahn (2016), Elchardus and Spruyt (2016), and Stanley (2011), none have been widely used compared to Akkerman et al. In a psychometric test of the various scales, Silva et al. (2019) found that when following the three tests they conducted, none of the scales measured well on all dimensions. They named three as the most reliable: Akkerman et al. (2014), Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Schulz et al. (2018). As Akkerman et al. has one of the most reliable models, it is unsurprising that it has been widely used to measure populist attitudes.

The model developed by Akkerman et al. has not gone without criticism; however many of the concerns over the methods are about misrepresenting the data by not breaking down which dimensions are the most important to respondents. As the research done by Silva et al. (2019) cautions, in previous studies the scales, including the scale I am using in this research, did little to measure any dimension other than anti-elitism (Silva et al. 2019, 12-13), and the only scale that seemed to present more than this did not present well on other validity tests. Silva et al. has an additional three critiques of the Akkerman et al. scale which are "the lack of (1) negative-worded items, (2) multidimensionality, and (3) conceptual breadth that captures more than anti-elitism" (Silva et al. 2019, 13). The three dimensions of a populist outlook Akkerman et al.'s scale measures are (1) anti-elitism (2) a Manichean point of view (in some cases this is replaced with homogeneity of the people) and (3) the sovereignty of 'the people.' For this study, I see value in measuring populist attitudes from the standardized model applied to the South Korean case in order to see how it either fits or presents a different picture of what populist attitudes could look like. As this model was crafted with Western (mostly right-wing) populism in mind, it could present important implications for how this model should, or should not be, used in the future. In this study, I will attempt to look at how, and indeed if at all, this construction of a populist attitude holds true for the Korean case. The data was collected independently through an online survey conducted by Hangook Research in December 2020. This study included responses from 302 participants from Seoul, Gyongi, and Incheon, whose ages ranged from 20 to 59. The statistical analysis for Table 1 was conducted in PSPP using an Oblimin factor rotation on the 13 questions.[3]

Quantitative Results

Hypothesis 1

My first hypothesis was that there would be populist attitudes in South Korea that included a favorable view towards pluralism. The factor analysis results in three significant and distinct factors. We can initially see that the elitist dimension loads perfectly on factor 3. The pluralist

Table 1: Attitude scales factor analysis	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Eigenvalues	***3.87***	***1.72***	***1.27***
POP6 정치는 궁극적으로 선과 악 사이의 투쟁이다. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	.13	.73	.01
POP7 정치에서'타협'이라고 하는 것은 한 사람의 원칙을 저버리는 것을 의미한다. What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	-.13	.73	.19
POP4 정치인보다는일반시민에 의해서 나의 정치적 입장이 대변되길 바란다. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	**.42**	.56	-.20
POP2 주요한 정치적 결정은 정치인들이 아니라 국민들이 내려야 한다. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	.55	**.47**	-.21
POP1 대한민국의 정치인들은 국민들의 뜻을 따라야 한다. The politicians of the Republic of Korea need to follow the will of the people.	.58	.05	-.08
POP3 기득권층과 일반 대중들 사이의 정치적 견해 차이는 일반 대중들 간의 차이보다 더 크다. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people	.64	.13	-.15
POP5 정치인들은 말만 많고 행동은 적다. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	.70	.25	.07
POP8 이익 단체들이 정치적 결정에 미치는 영향이 과도하게 크다. Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions.	.70	.23	-.11
PLU1 민주주의에서는각기 다른 관점들 사이에 타협을 이루는 것이 중요하다. In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints.	.74	-.17	.01
PLU2 다른 집단들의 의견(들)을 듣는 것이 중요하다. It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups.	.81	-.02	.10
E1 정치인들은 국민들을 따르는 것이 아니라 이끌어야 한다. Politicians should lead rather than follow the people.	-.14	-.02	.65
E2 우리 국가는 중요 결정 사안들이 성공적인 사업가들에게맡겨질 때 더 잘 통치될 수 있다. Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people.	-.19	.16	.69
E3 우리 나라는 중요 결정 사안들이 독립적(정치적으로 중립적)인 전문가들에게 맡겨질 때 더 잘 통치될 수 있다. Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts.	.23	.03	.66

and populist dimensions present a more complicated picture. Four populist questions all load on factor 1. The mean of this dimension is 1.77, showing that overall, the South Korean population agrees with this profile. This factor accounts for the majority of the cases with an Eigenvalue of 3.87. I will call factor 1 the populist dimension. However, there are two issues with this dimension that I must address before we can come to any satisfactory conclusion about whether it should be considered populist or not: the problem that the Manichean outlook questions do not load on it and the problem that pluralism does.

The fact that these two issues present themselves either shows an error in the model, or one could argue it shows there are not populist attitudes in South Korea. In Akkerman et al.'s case study of the Netherlands, which this study most closely resembles, the findings are strikingly different from the attitudes we find in the South Korean case. In the Netherlands, the pluralist scale is the most differentiated from the populist and elitist questions. Additionally, a few of the questions did not load on any of the factors and were then removed from the analysis. I can now compare my findings to the analysis conducted by Hawkins et al. in 2012 and as this model was developed by Hawkins et al. for this study in the U.S. in 2008, it more or less fit the case perfectly. They also take a strong stance on populism: that those with populist attitudes most likely have more sympathy for authoritarian tendencies. During this time, the authors were mostly concerned with the Tea Party movement. Unsurprisingly, there is no mention of other populist movements such as Occupy Wall Street, which was just emerging when the paper was published but was not present when the data was gathered in 2008. The study in the Netherlands looked at populist attitudes in relation to both right and left wing populist parties. For the US case, populism questions (POP1, POP2, POP8) load on factor 2 with an Eigenvalue of .45, while the pluralist questions (PLU1, PLU2, PLU3)[4] load on factor 1 with an Eigenvalue of 1.7. They further found that POP1 POP2 POP5 POP7 POP8 as their populist scale loaded distinctly when the PCA was run along with the elitist questions E2 and E3. Notably, *POP6 Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil* did not load on either of their factors.

From the fact that these findings differ so greatly to the findings of Akkerman et al. and Hawkins et al., and that these two scales do not match the model, one could argue there are not populist attitudes in South Korea. This was argued for in the case of Japan by Hieda et al. (2019) as the researchers found that support for the Japanese Communist Party (an extreme leftist party) ranked high on the pluralism, anti-elitist and sovereignty of the people dimensions but lacked the anti-pluralism dimension, just as I find in the South Korean case. In fact, those who support the communist party ranked highest overall in support of the pluralism scale in Japan, despite the fact that they also were highly supportive of the other populist questions (Hieda et al. 2019, 9). This led the authors to conclude they did not display populist attitudes (Hieda et al. 2019, 9). However, it seems that it would be better to conclude that there are alternative populist attitudes present that include high levels of pluralism and do not include the Manichean outlook.

In regard to populist attitudes and pluralism, this alternative view is in agreement with the conclusion of Boscán et al. In their comparative study on populist attitudes in Spain, France and Italy, they found that attitudes relating to pluralism (or multiculturalism, as they refer to it in their article) is not correlated with populist attitudes. Rather, they found that populist attitudes were far more likely in left-wing party supporters than right-wing party supporters. This prompted Boscán et al. to investigate how populist attitudes are connected with the divide between culture driven populist attitudes and redistribution populist attitudes. They find that overall there is an apparent correlation between left-wing party supporters that hold redistributive goals and populist attitudes. In contrast to this trend, they find that there is no correlation

between populist attitudes and pluralist attitudes. Boscán et al. state: "...populist attitudes can be attached to totally opposite preferences regarding cultural inclusiveness and universalism of national institutions and policies (Boscán et al. 2018, 12).

This finding suggests that pluralism is usually a left versus right issue rather than a populist one. The case studies on Spain, Italy and France support this argument as well as the findings of Hieda et al. (2019). The fact that, in South Korea, the two pluralism questions *PLU1 In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints*; and *PLU2 It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups*, load along with the core populist questions further challenges how Akkerman et al. and Hawkins et al. have modeled populist attitudes and adds to the argument that populism should not be seen as inherently anti-pluralistic. Rather, as Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) found, the 'cultural prejudice' associated with populism was only observed in the right wing populist parties (79).

To investigate the idea of pluralism in relation to populism, I must begin by making a mini hypothesis about the South Korean case as other cases have shown that populism can often be independent of response to pluralism and more closely correlated with the progressive versus conservative divide as was found by Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018). As the factor analysis has demonstrated, for the South Korean case the core populist questions (anti-elitism and sovereignty of the people) are positively correlated with a pluralistic outlook. This is unsurprising as previous research has suggested that these attitudes are independent of attitudes towards multiculturalism where instead resistance to multiculturalism was linked with conservatism. To further test this argument I will test the mini hypothesis: *those who label themselves as progressive will have more positive attitudes towards pluralism.*



Figure 1: ***Pluralist attitudes and progressive/conservative divide***

The average agreement with the pluralist questions is 1.65, while the progressive average is 1.56 and the conservative average is 1.71. This lends support, although not robust, for this mini hypothesis. We know from Table 1 that those who had a more positive outlook towards pluralism, also were more likely to be in favor of anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty. However, the progressive versus conservative divide does not seem to account for positive versus negative attitudes towards pluralism as there was little difference in how they responded to the questions. We also recall Han's finding in populist attitudes: there are both populist conservative and populist progressives in South Korea, but which 'host' the attitudes are identified with greatly affects how they see key social justice issues. So while the progressive versus conservative divide may not be the best way to view this dichotomy, we do know that left versus right does affect how citizens

treat ideas of justice and fairness. We must now turn to the issue of the Manichean outlook, which may be the most distinctive portion of populist attitudes in South Korea.

The oversimplification of key political issues and polarization of society is often one of the most visibly corrosive elements of populism, and it is often associated with thinking in terms of 'good' versus 'evil'. It results in scapegoating and 'quick fix' solutions to multifaceted problems. So how then can we look at this more negative component of populist attitudes in relation to the Korean case? For Han's conceptualization of populist attitudes we can recall that he did not include this dimension; he simply measured populism attitudes on 1) anti-elitism and 2) sovereignty of the people. However, addressing this is a key element to future research on populism as, for most case studies on populist attitudes, it is seen as an important dimension. To simply ignore it for the Korean case is a missed opportunity in the comparative research on populist attitudes. However, to start with the basics, the fact that this dimension did not load with the other two facets of populist attitudes is then important to the Korean case as we must decide if we can consider these attitudes as populist or not, and second, if the answer is yes to the previous question we must then decide if the the normative description of populist attitudes is appropriate or not. As shown above in Table 1, this research finds that the Manichean outlook is not a component of populist attitudes in South Korea, which then makes our findings further support the work on populist attitudes done by Han that there are alternative populist attitudes in South Korea.

As I have already made the theoretical case that the Manichean outlook is not inherent to all expressions of populism, I can proceed in agreement with Han that South Koreans do display tendencies towards populist attitudes. This conclusion then draws another important comparison with the previously mentioned study on Spain, France and Italy (Boscán et al. 2018). In that study, the Manichean outlook was a component of populist attitudes even for left wing populists. Importantly, Boscán et al. also found and highlighted that populist attitudes were linked with lower levels of education across the board. In South Korea this was not the case. To investigate this further, we must look at the different factor loadings by education level. While those who made up factor 2, where the Manichean outlook is represented, were less educated, the respondents on factor 1, the populist factor, is over-represented by those who hold a college education. Additionally, those who were more likely to agree with the Manichean questions were more likely to be politically apathetic, while those who aligned with the Factor 1 populist dimension were the most likely to be politically active. I will look at education level from another angle in the following section on minjung indicators. The social implications of this are important to look at on two levels as this is interesting to compare to some other populist manifestations around the globe. In Argentina, there was alienation between intellectuals and the leftist populists, while in South Korea there was at least the ideal of students and intellectuals allied alongside the workers, although this alliance was plagued by power imbalances. However, as Lee outlined, the undongkwŏn (from the minjung movement) often dichotomized society and in the act of attempting to undermine the power structures of the corrupt government and chaebol groups ended up creating new norms of domination in the process.

Within the populist attitude, the two dimensions which are at odds are the Manichean outlook—bifurcating good and evil—and pluralism. We can clearly see from the questions how an individual who agrees with the statement *What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles* would be unlikely to agree with the statement *In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints.* In fact, we can clearly see that the pluralism questions are negatively correlated with factor 2, which shows the Manichean outlook dimension. It is of some contention whether they could be considered populist or not: again, if

we can consider movements to be 'populist' that also do not rely on 'othering', then we should also be able to allow for this to be a populist attitude as well. So, in many cases, there is at least one variable that does not load on any of the factors. This was not the case in this study as all questions loaded significantly on at least one of the factors, and although there was some overlap, it did not confuse the profiles. As we must start with the model as it was made, the place to begin is that, according to the theoretical basis of Akkerman et al. and Hawkins et al, South Korea does not display populist attitudes. However, this conclusion fails to take into account the previous research done on populism in South Korea, as well as the definition of populism I have chosen to adhere to for this paper. I argue one can still make the case for populist attitudes when one considers where, and under what case studies, this model was developed and how the authors define the borders of populism. In conclusion, I find support for my hypothesis that there are populist-pluralist attitudes in South Korea. In addition, I found that the Manichean outlook is not a dimension of populist attitudes in South Korea.

Hypothesis 2

My second hypothesis is that those with social profiles highly linked with minjung indicators will be more likely to display populist attitudes as the narrative of the democracy movement surrounding participation and 'the people' will encourage this attitude to be an important part of public discourse. To test these indicators, I will look at educational attainment, those with high political participation, those who believe citizens shaped democracy, and those with no trust in meritocracy (a distrust of the status quo system) to see if these individuals are more likely to display populist attitudes. It is important to look at these alternative forms of political participation, as Hoi Ok Jeong found interesting results around what political participation looks like in South Korea. In some previous studies on other countries, increased civic participation has been linked with increased political participation (Jeong 2013, 1138). Using the World Value Survey data to investigate participation, Jeong finds that "South Koreans who are actively involved in civic associations are more likely to join a demonstration and sign a petition. However, active civic engagement does not appear to translate into joining a boycott or taking part in voting. In particular, voting, as the only mode of electoral participation examined, shows no relationship with civic participation," (Jeong 2013, 1147). The fact that the two modes of political participation that South Koreans with higher civic participation take part in are founded in activism outside of the representation that should support their interests is of key importance, because this form of participation is often linked to feelings of alienation from the political and intellectual elite.

One key finding that we can see in Figure 2 is that those with a university degree are most likely to agree with populist attitudes as I have defined them (which include three dimensions, 1. Anti-elitism 2. Popular sovereignty 3. Pluralism) but I will now further break down how education level seems to impact populist attitudes along with voting, protesting, founding myth, and belief in meritocracy as five indicators for a minjung identity.

The overall 5% trimmed mean for factor 1 is 1.67. I find that the single most likely factor for a person to hold populist attitudes are those who responded they have protested, whereas those who scored lowest on the scale are those who reported they never vote. This connection is especially interesting for the Korean case as protesting is such an important component of the 'tradition' of democracy. We can see that there is a 0.55 difference between the 5% trimmed mean of those who always vote and those who never vote, and 0.45 difference in the 5% trimmed mean between those with a college degree and those with a graduate degree. That these two indicators are able to predict more agreement with populist attitudes lends support to my second hypothesis

as political activity and college ties were central to the undongkwŏn during the democracy movement, contributing to how they were able to circulate political identity. In all other indicators, it continues to support my hypothesis although not quite as dramatically as those who protest, vote, and have a university degree education.



Figure 2: ***Populist attitudes and social identities***

Although those who protest agree the most with the populist statements, those who responded that they always vote are also more likely to hold populist attitudes than those that do not always vote. As some have argued, there is a tendency often to make an assumption that those with populist attitudes will not be politically active (without a populist candidate to vote for) as they view it as pointless to achieve their populist goals. However, in South Korea it seems that

political participation in many forms is quite high for those holding populist attitudes. We can conjecture that the perceived 'success' of the candlelight protests may have encouraged citizens to be more participative in recent years. In 2017, 77.23% voted in the presidential election. This is the highest voter turnout since 1997, although voter turnout also rose in 2012.[5]

We can recall that the general population agreed strongly with statement *POP1 The politicians need to follow the will of the people* and that the general population only slightly less in agreement with the statement *POP2 The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.* If we look at the historical implications of minjung, that participation in both the electoral and non-electoral political arena was of vital importance to the democracy movement, it is unsurprising that Korean citizens are more likely to want to influence politics in this way. As previously mentioned, there seems to be increasing evidence that South Korean citizens support, in Canovan's definition, a populist democracy. In a 2019 study, it was found that 52% of citizens believed that referendums should be decided by popular vote, while 59% responded that the government needed to increase the level of popular participation for citizens (Cho et al. 2019, 287). In a 2017 survey, citizens were asked to identify what statements they associated with democracy; out of the 12 countries studied, South Korea came in the highest at 81% of respondents understanding democracy as 'government by the people'. Of those same respondents, 36% understood democracy as 'government of the people', 46% understood democracy as 'government for the people', finally only 18% understood democracy as all three which would be the correct answer (Shin and Kim 2017, 140). We can further see this pattern reveal itself in the very founding of the Republic of Korea, as the 1987 June Democracy Movement criticized the standing president Chun Doo-hwan for his refusal to allow direct presidential elections. This movement resulted in finally switching to more democratic policies (Kyung Lee 2014, 62). It is interesting as a study by Doh Chull Shin et al. in 2003 found that attitudes ranging from 1982 until 1996 made a significant progression towards, as they define it, libertarian values which was highly correlated with increasing education levels over that time. Other socio-economic factors did not present the same levels of significance (Shin et al. 2003, 108).

As I introduced previously, we may think that South Korea would adhere to the American myth of meritocracy under the guise of free market capitalism as anything that included socialist tendencies was labeled as the evil side of 'communism'. Hyun Kyung Lee and Hyeok Yong Kwon found that the perception of inequality is more important than actual inequality when it comes to political participation. Analyzing data from the Korean General Social Survey, they found that in 2009 only 22.7% of South Koreans believed that promotion opportunities were equal, while in 2014 there was a drop in this belief with only 18.9% (Lee and Kwon 2019, 288). In my own research, I found that of the 302 respondents, 32% agreed with the statement that with hard work anyone can improve their position, while 68% agreed with the statement that hard work is not everything; rather to succeed one needs good connections and luck. Research has found that a heightened sense of injustice had the most impact on whether or not citizens would join in candlelight protests. Additionally, comparatively Korean citizens are more likely to perceive injustice within their own society than other countries (Kang 2019, 56). This would suggest that although Korea has influence from U.S. norms, the impact of minjung and the counter-public sphere is still dominant in citizens' attitudes. We also see that populist attitudes, as I have defined them, have a negative impact on trust in meritocracy, which is important in democracy.

As I outlined in the introduction, I hope to investigate why populism is so susceptible to dictatorship and nationalism. It is quite common to find that researchers will hypothesize that it will be more likely to find populist attitudes among those with lower levels of educational at-

tainment (Spruyt et al. 2016) and multiple studies did find that those with a college education were least likely to maintain populist attitudes (Hawkins et al. 2012; Bernhard and Hänggli 2018). Even the case study by Boscán et al., which separated the issue of multiculturalism from populist attitudes, found that those with lower levels of education and lower incomes were more likely to have populist attitudes (Boscán et al. 2018, 15). This means that populist attitudes have become commonly associated with lower levels of education. As my findings show, this is not a rule. In their comparative analysis on nine countries, Rico and Anduiza (2019) also found that populist attitudes were more frequent among those with lower education only in two countries, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, my findings do align with other studies that found that the overall least likely to hold populist attitudes are those with graduate degrees.



Figure 3: ***Manichean outlook and education level***

As I have mentioned, a noteworthy finding in this data is that those who have at least university level education recorded the strongest agreement with populist attitudes, while those who scored the highest in agreement with the Manichean outlook are those with the least education. To further corroborate this finding that those with minjung identity are most likely to adhere to populist tendencies, this student identity has been linked to the 2016/2017 candlelight protests which I outlined in the form of a 'thick' populist movement and Lee has called horizontal populism. Kang (2019) also finds that college graduates were also the most represented groups at the Candlelight Demonstrations of 2016-2017 at 28.9% (Kang 2019, 53). In conclusion, those with a college degree, those with high political participation (protesting and voting), those who believe citizens shaped democracy, and those with no trust in meritocracy, are more likely to display populist-pluralist attitudes. In contrast to findings in other countries with populist groups, having a college education ups the likelihood of populist attitudes. However, the missing dimension of Mudde's idea of populist attitudes, the Manichean outlook, follows this rule where the less educated the individual, the more likely they are to hold this outlook.

Hypothesis 3

My third hypothesis is that those with populist attitudes will not be more likely to support the Moon administration in its top-down Manichean populist goals as after Moon took office in 2017, he began a campaign to "root out accumulated evils" (Sook Jong Lee 2019, 11) of corruption in government. To measure this, I included the following statement on the survey: *The Moon administration has been successful in rooting out corruption in the governmental system.* Respondents

had the option on a five-point scale from 1 as strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree.



Figure 4: ***Populist attitudes and opinions of Moon's policies***

The data findings support my hypothesis, as there was only slightly more agreement with populist attitudes in those who responded that they thought the Moon administration had been successful in rooting out corruption in the government than those who did not. We can see there is less polarization on this topic compared to the minjung indicators—in other words agreeing with populist attitudes is less correlated with believing the Moon administration has rooted out corruption. This could signal that there is resistance to believing in a top-down populist solution for the inequalities plaguing South Korean society, even in those that hold populist tendencies.

Conclusion

In this paper, I aimed to revisit what constitutes populist attitudes. By breaking down the theoretical foundation of Mudde et al.'s model, I found that their definition is too restrictive to use as a universal model. I laid out the theoretical framework to define populism as people centrism as I believe this can encompass the vast majority of populist definitions and uses. People centrism can take very different forms, but, as my findings demonstrate, we should move away from defining populism by its most infamous outcomes (tyranny of the majority and homogenization of pluralistic society) to recenter 'the people' in populism. As Shin and Kim state, it is unlikely that elitist representative democracy is the 'end of history' (Shin and Kim 2017) for South Korea. Instead, we can anticipate an ongoing process of power shifts within the governmental system. While there is still rampant inequality in South Korea, Korean citizens have proven they are willing to dismantle perceived injustices within the current system when it is believed that guilty parties are not being held accountable. As Jackson argues from one take on democratic theory, there cannot be fair democratic debate until socioeconomic inequality is greatly reduced (Jackson 2018, 4) and from this point of view South Korea's contentious public sphere and perception of inequality may push the nation towards a more just version of democracy.

My results have three main implications. The first is that we should reconsider how to measure populist attitudes by going back to base theories of populism, as empirically I have shown that

anti-pluralism and a Manichean outlook are not essential dimensions of populist attitudes. Although it may seem to be a step backward to reject Mudde et al.'s clear definition of populism for a broader theoretical definition of 'people-centrism', I believe it is important to do so to restore neutrality to the definition. I predict that when authors look back on what Mudde et al. calls the populist zeitgeist, 'the populist era', they will find that his writing highlights the xenophobic, radical right portion of populism. Mudde et al.'s definition brings a political charge that is, naturally, relevant to a portion of the current political arena, but it ignores both the history of differing forms of populist movements as well as leftist populist tendencies which have been dominant over right-wing forces in South Korea. By recognizing that this is what Mudde et al. focuses on, we can agree that populism can be co-opted by charismatic leaders who claim to represent 'the people'; it can be co-opted by nations and, depending on who is included in the definition of 'the people', it can wreak havoc on human rights and freedoms. However, it will also leave room to study the sidelined work on the various expressions of bottom-up, welfare, radical leftist populism that are present in the political arena today. As Mouffe argues, when hegemony is rampant, populist movements can be an important tool to restore a system to equilibrium that is behaving in an un-democratic way (Mouffe 2018, 41). Finally, going into the future, I believe reverting to this definition of populism is important as we begin to imagine ways of participatory and cosmopolitan democracy that respects pluralism in the global public sphere. Rather than expecting Akkerman et al.'s model to 'fit' across countries it is important to study how the model does not fit the attitudes of individuals participating in populist movements across different countries.

The second significant implication of my research involves the narratives that populations maintain and perpetuate which have an impact on their societies as I demonstrated through minjung as a 'narrative of founding'. This suggests that populist attitudes should be studied in relation to social narratives to understand them further. Populist attitudes have often been studied in relation to party preference, mainly to test if there is a high level of correlation between voting for populist parties and populist attitudes, but there has been little research in other parts of the world on the impact of populist attitudes on protesting. By studying the history of democracy in South Korea and the significance of protesting to citizens' involvement in government, I was able to demonstrate the impact of populist attitudes on protesting. Further research on protest patterns and populist attitudes in other parts of the world may reveal alternative populist attitudes that avoid the good versus evil trope that populist leaders utilize in political rhetoric.

The third implication of my research, that those with populist attitudes do not necessarily support populist leadership, was supported as I found virtually no difference in the level of populist attitudes in those who believed the Moon administration was successful in rooting out corruption compared with those who did not. While I have made the argument throughout this paper that we should work to separate populism from the now infamous outcomes across the current global system, it is undeniable that nationalism and xenophobia characterize much of what has been termed 'populism' and cannot be ignored. We should be concerned that Moon's style of politics could put South Korea's democracy on track to the polarization we now see in the United States. However, there is reason to be hopeful for South Korea as moments of crisis have united a large portion of the population. This study suggests that bottom-up populist attitudes may be the driving factor of the contentious political sphere. Introducing populism into the political sociology of South Korea will help researchers understand how Koreans view democracy and want to influence change within the system.

Further research to document the South Korean case is important to diversify a field of research that has overemphasized right-wing populist displays. In doing so, we may be able to see

populism in a more neutral light. By addressing social inequality and viewing populism from a neutral foundation, it will leave space to further explore the complicated relationship among populism, pluralism and democracy. While the call to consider pluralism as compatible with populist attitudes is not original to my findings, the issue of the Manichean outlook, both the fact that it loaded on its own factor and its correlation with education, deserves further research as it is unique to this paper. Perhaps the most significant finding in this research is the relationship between education and the dimensions of populist attitudes. While previous research found populist attitudes among the least educated, this was not true for the Korean case. This study indicates that rather than those with populist attitudes having lower levels of education, it is those who hold a Manichean outlook that have the lowest levels of education. I began this research hoping to investigate why populism is susceptible to polarization and dictatorships. Currently there is a lack of comparative research on the dimensions of populist attitudes, and on the Manichean dimension which I have shown is not an essential component of populist attitudes. These are important gaps in the literature which need to be filled in order to begin to investigate effectively what researchers have termed as the destructive elements of populism.

Appendix

Table 2: Election Guide	Votes	Registered Votes	Turn Out Percentage
2017-05-09	32,807,908	42,479,710	77.23%
2012-12-19	30,721,459	40,507,842	75.84%
2007-12-19	23,732,854	37,653,518	63.03%
2002-12-19	24,784,963	34,991,529	70.83%
1997-12-198	26,042,633	32,290,416	80.65%

Table 3: Survey Demographic Data	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Female	150	49.7%
Male	152	50.3%
TOTAL	302	100.0%
City/Region		
Seoul	128	42.4%
Gyungi	139	46.0%
Incheon	35	11.6%
TOTAL	302	100.0%
Monthly income		
200,000 won	80	26.5%
200,000-300,000 won	64	21.2%
300,000-400,000 won	56	18.5%
400,000-500,000 won	39	12.9%
500,000-600,000 won	26	8.6%
600,000-700,000 won	24	7.9%
700,000-1,000,000 won	10	3.3%
1,000,000-1,500,000 won	1	0.3%
2,000,000 won	2	0.7%
TOTAL	302	100.0%
Education		
High school or less	117	38.7%
Attending university	18	6.0%
University degree	141	46.7%
Attending graduate school	4	1.3%
Graduate degree or higher	22	7.3%
TOTAL	302	100.0%
Religion		
Protestant	64	21.2%
Catholic	33	10.9%
Buddhist	34	11.3%
None	171	56.6%
TOTAL	302	100.0%
Birth year		
1961-1969	70	23.2%
1970-1979	78	25.8%
1980-1989	81	26.8%
1990-1999	67	22.2%
2000	6	2.0%
TOTAL	302	100.0%

Table 4: Pluralism scale and pro/con divide	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Progressive	1.66	**1.56**	1.50	1.83
Conservative	1.79	**1.71**	1.39	2.09

Table 5.1: Factor 1 and education	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High school or less	1.79	**1.70**	1.46	2.02
College Student/ College Degree	1.69	**1.59**	1.38	2.04
Graduate Student/ Graduate Degree	2.13	**2.04**	1.64	2.98

Table 5.2: Factor 1 and voting	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Always vote	1.68	**1.58**	1.43	1.94
Usually vote	1.88	**1.81**	1.47	2.30
Never vote	2.20	**2.13**	1.40	3.11

Table 5.3: Factor 1 and protesting	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Have protested	1.62	**1.52**	1.23	2.04
Might protest	1.78	**1.69**	1.46	2.11
Would never protest	1.84	**1.76**	1.48	2.28

Table 5.4: Factor 1 and founding	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Citizens' shaped Korean democracy	1.67	**1.62**	1.34	1.94
Elites' shaped Korean democracy	1.85	**1.76**	1.17	2.43

Table 5.5: Factor 1 and meritocracy	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Don't trust meritocracy	1.72	**1.62**	1.43	2.03
Trust meritocracy	1.87	**1.79**	1.52	2.28

Table 6: Factor 2 and education	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High school or less	2.51	**2.47**	1.64	3.04
University	2.74	**2.73**	1.99	3.32
Graduate	2.72	**2.69**	2.13	3.28

Table 7: Factor 1 and Moon administration	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
The Moon administration has been successful.	1.76	**1.67**	1.27	2.14
The Moon administration has not been successful.	1.77	**1.68**	1.51	2.06

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Notes

[1]Sophia Harris is a PhD student at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Her research interests are political and social inequality and the sociology of science, knowledge, and technology.

[2]Relating to Habermas's definition of 'the public sphere', 'the subaltern counter-public sphere' forms in resistance to the dominating class within a society. Fraser, N. 1990. Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text*, 25/26, (56-80).

[3]The original scale included 14 questions. The third pluralism question, PLU3 *Diversity limits my freedom*, was not included in the survey as it is not relevant for the Korean case.

[4]The pluralism questions used by Hawkins et al. (2012) are slightly different than those used in this study. Hawkins et al. used the following: *PLU1 Democracy is about achieving compromise among differing viewpoints. PLU2 When our opposition presents new and challenging viewpoints, there is something we can learn by listening. PLU3 Freedom depends on diversity.*

[5]Table 2 in appendix.