Globalization and War: Four Paradigmatic Views

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1. Introduction

Any adequate analysis of globalization and war necessarily requires fundamental understanding of the worldviews underlying the views expressed with respect to globalization and war. This paper is based on the premise that any worldview can be associated with one of the four basic paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. It argues that any view expressed with respect to globalization and war is based on one of the four paradigms or worldviews. This paper takes the case of globalization and war and discusses such relationship from four different viewpoints, each of which corresponds to one of the four broad worldviews. The paper emphasizes that the four views expressed are equally scientific and informative; they look at the phenomenon from their certain paradigmatic viewpoint; and together they provide a more balanced understanding of the phenomenon under consideration.

These different perspectives should be regarded as polar ideal types. The work of certain authors helps to define the logically coherent form of a certain polar ideal type. But, the work of many authors who share more than one perspective is located between the poles of the spectrum defined by the polar ideal types. The purpose of this paper is not to put people into boxes. It is rather to recommend that a satisfactory perspective may draw upon several of the ideal types.

The ancient parable of six blind scholars and their experience with the elephant illustrates the benefits of paradigm diversity. There were six blind scholars who did not know what the elephant looked like and had never even heard its name. They decided to obtain a mental picture, i.e. knowledge, by touching the animal. The first blind scholar felt the elephant's trunk and argued that the elephant was like a lively snake. The second bind scholar rubbed along one of the elephant's enormous legs and likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The third blind scholar took hold of the elephant's tail and insisted that the elephant resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth blind scholar felt the elephant's sharp tusk and declared it to be like a great spear. The fifth blind scholar examined the elephant's waving ear and was convinced that the animal was some sort of a fan. The sixth blind scholar, who occupied the space between the elephant's front and hid legs, could not touch any parts of the elephant and consequently

asserted that there were no such beasts as elephant at all and accused his colleagues of making up fantastic stories about non-existing things. Each of the six blind scholars held firmly to their understanding of an elephant and they argued and fought about which story contained the correct understanding of the elephant. As a result, their entire community was torn apart, and suspicion and distrust became the order of the day.

This parable contains many valuable lessons. First, probably reality is too complex to be fully grasped by imperfect human beings. Second, although each person might correctly identify one aspect of reality, each may incorrectly attempt to reduce the entire phenomenon to their own partial and narrow experience. Third, the maintenance of communal peace and harmony might be worth much more than stubbornly clinging to one's understanding of the world. Fourth, it might be wise for each person to return to reality and exchange positions with others to better appreciate the whole of the reality.[1]

Social theory can usefully be conceived in terms of four key paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are founded upon different assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each generates theories, concepts, and analytical tools which are different from those of other paradigms.

The functionalist paradigm has provided the framework for current mainstream academic fields, and accounts for the largest proportion of theory and research in academia.

In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should be fully aware of assumptions upon which their own paradigm is based. Moreover, to understand a new paradigm one has to explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. No attempt should be made to criticize or evaluate a paradigm from the outside. This is self-defeating since it is based on a separate paradigm. All four paradigms can be easily criticized and ruined in this way.

These four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject. Each of the four paradigms implies a different way of social theorizing.

[1] This parable is taken from Steger (2002).

Before discussing each paradigm, it is useful to look at the notion of "paradigm." Burrell and Morgan (1979)[2] regard the:

> ... four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorizing and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasize the commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same problematic.
> The paradigm does ... have an underlying unity in terms of its basic and often "taken for granted" assumptions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental way from theorists located in other paradigms. The "unity" of the paradigm thus derives from reference to alternative views of reality which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarily even be recognized as existing. (pages 23–24)

Each theory can be related to one of the four broad worldviews. These adhere to different sets of fundamental assumptions about; the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change), as in the Exhibit[3].

Exhibit: The Four Paradigms
Each paradigm adheres to a set of fundamental assumptions about the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change).



[2] This work borrows heavily from the ideas and insights of Burrell and Morgan (1979).

[3] See Burrell and Morgan (1979) for the original work. Ardalan (2008) and Bettner, Robinson, and McGoun (1994) have used this approach.

Assumptions related to the nature of science are assumptions with respect to ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology.
The assumptions about ontology are assumptions regarding the very essence of the phenomenon under investigation. That is, to what extent the phenomenon is objective and external to the individual or it is subjective and the product of individual's mind.

The assumptions about epistemology are assumptions about the nature of knowledge - about how one might go about understanding the world, and communicate such knowledge to others. That is, what constitutes knowledge and to what extent it is something which can be acquired or it is something which has to be personally experienced.

The assumptions about human nature are concerned with human nature and, in particular, the relationship between individuals and their environment, which is the object and subject of social sciences. That is, to what extent human beings and their experiences are the products of their environment or human beings are creators of their environment.

The assumptions about methodology are related to the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain knowledge about the social world. That is, to what extent the methodology treats the social world as being real hard and external to the individual or it is as being of a much softer, personal and more subjective quality. In the former, the focus is on the universal relationship among elements of the phenomenon, whereas in the latter, the focus is on the understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies, and interprets the situation which is experienced.

The assumptions related to the nature of society are concerned with the extent of regulation of the society or radical change in the society.
Sociology of regulation provides explanation of society based on the assumption of its unity and cohesiveness. It focuses on the need to understand and explain why society tends to hold together rather than fall apart.

Sociology of radical change provides explanation of society based on the assumption of its deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination, and structural contradiction. It focuses on the deprivation of human beings, both material and psychic, and it looks towards alternatives rather than the acceptance of status quo.

The subjective-objective dimension and the regulation-radical change dimension together define four paradigms, each of which share common fundamental assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each paradigm has a fundamentally unique perspective for the analysis of social phenomena.

The aim of this paper is not so much to create a new piece of puzzle as it is to fit the existing pieces of puzzle together in order to make sense of it. Sections II to V, first, each lays down the foundation by discussing one of the four paradigms. Subsequently, each examines globalization and war from the point of view of the respective paradigm. Section VI concludes the paper.

2. Functionalist Paradigm

The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete existence and follows certain order. These assumptions lead to the existence of an objective and value-free social science which can produce true explanatory and predictive knowledge of the reality "out there." It assumes scientific theories can be assessed objectively by reference to empirical evidence. Scientists do not see any roles for themselves, within the phenomenon which they analyze, through the rigor and technique of the scientific method. It attributes independence to the observer from the observed. That is, an ability to observe "what is" without affecting it. It assumes there are universal standards of science, which determine what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is observed. It assumes there are external rules and regulations governing the external world. The goal of scientists is to find the orders that prevail within that phenomenon.

The functionalist paradigm seeks to provide rational explanations of social affairs and generate regulative sociology. It assumes a continuing order, pattern, and coherence and tries to explain what is. It emphasizes the importance of understanding order, equilibrium and stability in society and the way in which these can be maintained. It is concerned with the regulation and control of social affairs. It believes in social engineering as a basis for social reform.

The rationality which underlies functionalist science is used to explain the rationality of society. Science provides the basis for structuring and ordering the social world, similar to the structure and order in the natural world. The methods of natural science are used to generate explanations of the social world. The use of mechanical and biological analogies for modeling and understanding the social phenomena are particularly favored.

Functionalists are individualists. That is, the properties of the aggregate are determined by the properties of its units. Their approach to social science is rooted in the tradition of positivism. It assumes that the social world is concrete, meaning it can be identified, studied and measured through approaches derived from the natural sciences.

Functionalists believe that the positivist methods which have triumphed in natural sciences should prevail in social sciences, as well. In addition,

the functionalist paradigm has become dominant in academic sociology and mainstream academic fields. The social world is treated as a place of concrete reality, characterized by uniformities and regularities which can be understood and explained in terms of causes and effects. Given these assumptions, the individual is regarded as taking on a passive role; his or her behavior is being determined by the economic environment.

Functionalists are pragmatic in orientation and are concerned to understand society so that the knowledge thus generated can be used in society. It is problem orientated in approach as it is concerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems.

In Exhibit 1, the functionalist paradigm occupies the south-east quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Objectivism, Social System Theory, Integrative Theory, Interactionism, and Social Action Theory.
Functionalist paradigm's views with respect to globalization and war are presented next[4].

At this time, the major developed countries have been at peace with each other for the longest continuous period of time since the Roman Empire. This is probably the greatest nonevent in human history.

For decades, the United States and the Soviet Union had dominated international politics and had engaged in an intense, desperate, rivalry with respect to political, military, and ideological issues. Yet despite their enormous mutual hostility and their massive armed forces, they never went into war with each other. Moreover, their few occasional engagements in confrontational crises took place only in the first one-third of that period. They moved farther away from getting into armed conflict with each other, in contrast to what happened after earlier wars.

This long peace, which started after World War II, is the result of the culmination of a substantial historical process. During the last two or three centuries, major war – i.e., war among developed countries – has gradually fallen into total disrepute because it has been perceived as repulsive and futile. This is in contrast to either the view that regards the long peace as a product of recent expansion and extension of weaponry with the reasoning that peace has been the result of nuclear terror; or the view that regards the long peace as a result of luck with the reasoning that countries are perpetually on the brink of a cataclysmic war, depending on a fragile balance.

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[4] See, for example, Doyle (2000), Ikenberry (2000), Rostow (1960), Rummel (1983), and Toffler and Toffler (1994). This section is based on Mueller (1989).

This long peace has not been importantly impacted by nuclear weapons because these have not played a crucial role in postwar stability, and they do not seem to disturb it severely. They have affected rhetoric (e.g., we are continually reminded that we live in the atomic age, in the nuclear epoch), and they have affected defense budgets and planning. But, they have not deterred major wars, or forced the leaders of major countries to behave cautiously, or determined the alliances that have been formed. Instead, matters would have taken place much the same if nuclear weapons have never been invented.

The long peace cannot be explained by the nuclear terror because of the fact that there have been numerous non-wars since 1945 in addition to the non-war that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. During this period, there have been no wars among the forty-four wealthiest (per capita) countries, except for the brief Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Almost all of the many wars since World War II, some of them enormously costly by any standard, have taken place within the third – or more accurately the fourth – world. If the developed countries have participated in these wars they have been occasionally and from a far distant, but not directly against each other.
Several specific non-wars are more extraordinary than the one between the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, France and Germany had previously spent decades – even centuries – either actually fighting each other or planning to do so, and World War II served as the war to end war. As for another example, Greece and Turkey have had the creativity to find a reason for war even under an overarching nuclear umbrella, yet they have been living as neighbors for decades, perhaps with bitterness and recrimination, but without any thoughts about war. As for still another example, Japan formerly was an aggressive major country, but now it has fully embraced the virtues and profits of peace.

Indeed, any kind of warfare has lost its appeal within what is customarily called the first and second worlds. These countries have neither had international wars with each other nor had civil wars. The only exception is the Greek civil war of 1944-49, which was related to World War II rather than an independent event. The sporadic violence in Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain did not last long enough to be considered civil wars. The scattered terrorist activities carried out by small bands of independent revolutionaries elsewhere in Western Europe have stayed scattered and small.

Peace is so quiet that it can be passed by unnoticed and unremarked. It is customary to delimit epochs by wars; and denote periods of peace for the wars they separate, but not for their own character. This explains why for every thousand pages written on the causes of wars there is less than a page published on the causes of peace. At this time, with the long peace enjoyed by a large proportion of the world, effort ought

to be made to explain this unprecedented cornucopia. This is the first time in history that so many well-armed, important countries have not used their arms against each other for such an extended period of time. The long peace can be explained by examining the changing attitudes toward war in the developed world. Starting in 1800, countries such as Holland, Switzerland, and Sweden left the war system, while war was still generally accepted as a natural and inevitable phenomenon. Beginning in 1815, for the first time in history, the concept of war came under organized and concentrated attack. War opponents argued that war was repulsive, immoral, and uncivilized, and that it was futile, especially economically. They remained a minority for the next century compared to war proponents who still argued that war is noble, thrilling, progressive, manly, and beneficial. The devastation of World War I drastically increased the number of peace advocates such that they became a pronounced majority in the developed world and almost destroyed war romanticism. If it were not for the successful machinations of Adolf Hitler and the anachronism of Japan, World War I might have been the last major war.

Major war has gradually moved toward final discredit, without being formally renounced or institutionally superseded; and without being undercut by notable changes either in human nature or in the structure of international politics. Whereas once war was seen as beneficial, noble, and glorious, or at least as necessary or inevitable; it is now widely seen as intolerably costly, unwise, futile, and debasing.

Over the centuries war opponents have stressed that war is tremendously costly consisting of two types: (1) psychic costs: because war is repulsive, immoral, and uncivilized; and (2) physical costs: because war is bloody, destructive, and expensive.

The physical costs of war have been enormous. World War I was terrible; World War II was the most destructive in history; and World War III, even if it were not a nuclear war, could easily be worse. Rising physical costs have helped to discredit war. But, there has been the other factor operating as well.

Wars have had devastating personal consequences. Over time, an increasing number of people in the developed world have found that wars are not only physically devastating but also that wars are repulsive. In this way the opposition to war has been growing.

Cataclysmic wars are not an invention of the recent history. In 146 B.C., Romans used weaponry – which was primitive by today's standard – and annihilated ancient Carthage. In 416 B.C., the Athenians invaded Melos and among those whom they took, they killed all the men and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently displaced five hundred colonists and lived in their places.

The Thirty Years War of 1618-48 annihilated the wealthy city of Magdeburg and its 20,000 inhabitants. Germany's population in that war, based on accepted 1930s estimates, declined from 21 million to under 13.5 million. The absolute amount of such a loss is far larger than what Germany suffered in either world war of the twentieth century. Moreover, and more importantly, in the minds of most people, as reflected in a legend, Germany had suffered a 75 percent decline in its population, from 16 million to 4 million. Despite the belief that war could cause enormous devastation, war was not abandoned. War remained endemic in Europe even after the Thirty Years War. In 1756, Prussia fought the Seven Years War, with an estimated loss of 500,000 lives, i.e., one-ninth of its population. This proportion is higher than that of any warring country in the nineteenth or twentieth century.

Wars have also caused economic devastation and revolt. Destruction was the consequence of the Thirty Years War. Virtual bankruptcy was brought to Austria as a result of the Seven Years War, which also weakened France and established the conditions for revolution. The degree of costliness of war has not shown any discernible long-term growth, when the economic costs of war are measured as a percentage of the gross national product of the warring countries.

The sheer pain and suffering of earlier wars were far more intense than wars fought more recently by developed countries. In 1240, 1640, or 1840, wounded or diseased soldiers mostly died slowly and in intense agony. Medical knowledge and medical aid were inadequate, and they often made matters worse. Indeed, war was hell. By contrast, in more recent wars, for instance the Vietnam War, a wounded American soldier could be in a sophisticated, sanitized hospital within a half hour.

Consequently, the revulsion toward war that has grown in the developed world is partly due to the rise in war's physical costs and partly due to the war's increased psychic costs. Over the last two centuries, in the developed world, war has increasingly been regarded as repulsive, immoral, and uncivilized. There is a mutually reinforcing effect between psychic and physical costs of war: If for moral reasons people place a higher value on human life – even to have some reverence for it – the physical costs of war will, in effect, rise as people's cost tolerance declines.

When people increasingly believe that war is obnoxious, then war as an accepted, time-honored activity that serves an urgent social purpose will become obsolescent and over time disappear. What will happen to war is analogous to what happened to the once-perennial activities of dueling and slavery, which were virtually eradicated over time.

It is possible that enthusiasm for war will subside in countries outside the developed world as it has in the developed world. Furthermore, it is

also possible that with a perceived decline in the likelihood of war in the developed world, the arms budgets will decrease and the arms race will atrophy.

If the recent absence of war in the developed world is a reflection of a long-term trend, the scores of war outside the developed world might eventually decline as it has within the developed world. The developing, third world countries are more likely to emulate advanced, developed countries. For instance, during the past few decades, South Korea has become more similar to Canada; and Ivory Coast has become more similar to France. If the developing, third world countries follow the advanced, developed countries, perhaps the developing world, in the same way that it pursues the luxury and lifestyle of the advanced world, it will gain an understanding of the developed world's war aversion as well. Thus, there are good reasons to foresee that war-aversion, which is so popular in the advanced world, will eventually spread globally. Indeed, such a process may already be taking place.

3. Interpretive Paradigm

The interpretive paradigm assumes that social reality is the result of the subjective interpretations of individuals. It sees the social world as a process which is created by individuals. Social reality, insofar as it exists outside the consciousness of any individual, is regarded as being a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings. This assumption leads to the belief that there are shared multiple realities which are sustained and changed. Researchers recognize their role within the phenomenon under investigation. Their frame of reference is one of participant, as opposed to observer. The goal of the interpretive researchers is to find the orders that prevail within the phenomenon under consideration; however, they are not objective.

The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the world as it is, at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanations within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity. Its analysis of the social world produces sociology of regulation. Its views are underwritten by the assumptions that the social world is cohesive, ordered, and integrated.

Interpretive sociologists seek to understand the source of social reality. They often delve into the depth of human consciousness and subjectivity in their quest for the meanings in social life. They reject the use of mathematics and biological analogies in learning about the society and their approach places emphasis on understanding the social world from the vantage point of the individuals who are actually engaged in social activities.

The interpretive paradigm views the functionalist position as unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, human values affect the process of scientific enquiry. That is, scientific method is not value-free, since the frame of reference of the scientific observer determines the way in which scientific knowledge is obtained. Second, in cultural sciences the subject matter is spiritual in nature. That is, human beings cannot be studied by the methods of the natural sciences, which aim to establish general laws. In the cultural sphere human beings are perceived as free. An understanding of their lives and actions can be obtained by the intuition of the total wholes, which is bound to break down by atomistic analysis of functionalist paradigm.

Cultural phenomena are seen as the external manifestations of inner experience. The cultural sciences, therefore, need to apply analytical methods based on "understanding;" through which the scientist can seek to understand human beings, their minds, and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions. The notion of "understanding" is a defining characteristic of all theories located within this paradigm.

The interpretive paradigm believes that science is based on "taken for granted" assumptions; and, like any other social practice, must be understood within a specific context. Therefore, it cannot generate objective and value-free knowledge. Scientific knowledge is socially constructed and socially sustained; its significance and meaning can only be understood within its immediate social context.

The interpretive paradigm regards mainstream academic theorists as belonging to a small and self-sustaining community, which believes that social reality exists in a concrete world. They theorize about concepts which have little significance to people outside the community, which practices social theory, and the limited community which social theorists may attempt to serve.

Mainstream academic theorists tend to treat their subject of study as a hard, concrete and tangible empirical phenomenon which exists "out there" in the "real world." Interpretive researchers are opposed to such structural absolution. They emphasize that the social world is no more than the subjective construction of individual human beings who create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning, which is in a continuous process of reaffirmation or change. Therefore, there are no universally valid rules of science. Interpretive research enables scientists to examine human behavior together with ethical, cultural, political, and social issues.

In Exhibit 1, the interpretive paradigm occupies the south-west quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the

objective-subjective continuum. From left to right they are: Solipsism, Phenomenology, Phenomenological Sociology, and Hermeneutics.
Interpretive paradigm's views with respect to globalization and war are presented next[5].
In wars no one wins, but all lose to varying degrees. Unfortunately, attempts to eliminate war, even those that have been nobly inspired and assiduously pursued, have brought only short periods of peace among states. There has been a disparity between effort and product, between desire and result. The wish for peace runs strong and deep among all people, but the history and current events make it hard to believe that the wish will father the condition desired.
It would have been nice if there were known-ways of decreasing the incidence of war, i.e., increasing the chances of peace. Then, in the future there will be more often peace than what was experienced in the past. In order to alleviate a condition one would need to have some idea of its causes. Therefore, in order to explain how peace can be achieved one needs to have an understanding of the causes of war. This understanding depends on the philosophical mode of inquiry, i.e., the assumptions which are made and their effect on the final understanding. The root cause of war has variously been associated with human nature; state and society; and/or international state system.

Some people view human miseries to be the inevitable products of human nature. That is, man is the root of all evil, including war. There are many other people who agree that men must examine man in order to understand social and political events, but who also see what man's nature can become. There are still many other people who believe that it is not the case that man makes society in his image but that his society makes him. They believe that it is not the case that man is a social animal, and therefore his behavior in society can be explained based on his animal passion and/or his human reason. They believe that a born man in his natural condition remains neither good nor bad, but it is society that is the degrading or moralizing force in men's lives. They believe that man's nature and behavior are to a large extent a product of the society in which he lives, this is in contrast to those who regard human nature as the cause of events in society. They believe that society is intertwined with political organization, and in the absence of an organized power, with adjudicating authority, men cannot live together with even a fleeting peace. They believe that the study of society cannot be isolated from the study of government, and the study of man cannot be isolated from either. They believe that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity makes men good. They believe that the explanation of a consequence or the cause of an effect, such as the

[5] See, for example, Doyle (1997), Gilpin (1981), Graham (2000), and Waltz (1999). This section is based on Waltz (1954).

cause of war, should be found by understanding the various social relations of men, which in turn requires the understanding of politics.
Of course, the best way to understand man in society is to study both man and society, rather than study either man or society. However, on the one hand there are some people who start their study and explanation with man and consider the effect of society on man either non-existent or light and superficial in comparison with those deeper seated causes of impurity that corrupt the man and negatively affect the whole human life. On the other hand, there are other people who look at the same world and the same range of events, but start their study and explanation with society and arrive at the opposite conclusion.

The foregoing discussion of the cause of war focused on the fact that men live in states. Now the discussion of the cause of war can be continued in a parallel fashion with attention focused on the fact that states exist in a world of states. Similar to the foregoing discussion, on the one hand there are some people who emphasize and start with the role of the state, with its social and economic content as well as its political form, in their explanation of the cause of war. They explain the cause of war by reference to the evil qualities of some or of all states. That is, bad states make wars, but good states live at peace with one another.

On the other hand, there are other people who concentrate primarily on and start with the society of states, or state system, in their explanation of the cause of war and arrive at a different conclusion. They believe the cause of war is neither in men nor in states, but in the state system. They see an analogy between the man and the state. Among men in a state of nature, one man cannot begin to behave as a good man unless he is to a large extent certain that others will not be able to destroy him. This idea similarly applies to states that operate within the states system and explains the prevailing condition of anarchy within the states system. In the states system, although a state may want to be at peace with other, it has to consider starting a preventive war when the conditions are favorable, otherwise it may be struck later when the advantage has shifted to the other side. Furthermore, the behavior of a state depends of on its relation to others. Indeed, this is the analytic basis for both the balance-of-power approach to international relations and for the world-federalist program. It is also a critique of those who believe that the internal structure of states explains their external behavior and, therefore, peace will follow from the improvement of states.
Of course, the best way to understand state in society of states is to study both the state and the society of states.

As was noted above, in order to make the discussion of the major causes of war manageable, attention has been focused on the following

three headings: (1) within man, (2) within the structure of the separate states, and (3) within the state system. These three claims of the causes of war will alternatively be referred to as images, where each image is defined based on where that image locates the origin of the cause of war. Accordingly, each image makes its own separate policy recommendation.

Any claim about the causes of war is based on presuppositions as much as world events. A systematic study of the claimed causes of war provides a direct connection to the conditions of peace. That is, the primary concern is not with building models that underlie peace-promoting policies, but with examining the presuppositions that underlie such models. This has a broader relevance because both the policies of statesmen and the interests and procedures of scholars are products of a conjunction of temper, experience, reason, and event. The images which the politicians entertain greatly influence the politics which they practice.

The argument that all causes are interrelated counters the assumption that there is a single cause that can be isolated by analysis and eliminated or controlled by policy. It is also against working with one or several hypotheses while ignoring the interrelation of all causes.

Any single image produces prescriptions which are incomplete because they are based on partial analyses. The partial nature of each image leads one toward the inclusion of the other images. With the first image the direction of change is from men to societies and states. The second image relates both elements. Men make states, and states make men. But, even this is a limited view. A more inclusive view would also notice that states are shaped by the international environment as are men by both the national and international environments. That is, images can be interrelated without distorting any one of them.

The first image implies that since some states, and perhaps some forms of the state, are more peacefully inclined than others, their multiplication at least raises the hope that the period between major wars might be lengthened. The third image, by emphasizing the relevance of the framework of action, points to the mistaken quality of such partial analyses and the misleading hopes that they generate. The third image indicates that the behavior which is applauded based on individual moral standards, may invite war when performed by a state. The third image, which stresses the conditioning role of the state system, indicates that, in the context of increasing the chances of peace, there is no act good in itself. That is, on the international level, a partial solution, such as one major country becoming pacifistic, can act as a real contribution to world peace; but it can alternatively act as a hastening factor in the coming of a major war.

The third image starts with the framework of state action and analyzes its consequences. Accordingly, in the final analysis, it sees the origin of war among states to be within the international state system. It is not based on accidental causes – such as irrationalities in men, or defects in states – but it is based on a theory of the framework within which any accident can lead to a war. It disagrees with the viewpoint that sees war to be a consequence of state A wanting certain things that it can get only by war. It disagrees because such a desire may or may not lead to war. Someone's wanting a million dollars does not cause that one to rob a bank, but the easier the bank robbery, the more that one will rob banks. Of course, in remains true that some people will and some will not try to rob banks no matter how strict is the law enforcement. The third image emphasizes both motivation and circumstance in the explanation of individual acts. Nonetheless, other things being equal, weaker law enforcement leads to an increase in crime. From the point of view of the third image, a crucial role is played by the social structure – institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests. This crucial role should not be treated as or be called cause. For instance, what causes a man to rob a bank include a desire for money, a disrespect for social proprieties, or a certain boldness. But, if there are severe obstacles to the operation of these causes, nine out of ten prospective bank robbers will attend to their legitimate trades. Even if the framework is to be called cause, it should be distinguished as a permissive or underlying cause of war. This implies that in international politics wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.

The three images together provide a better explanation of the causes of war. War may occur at any moment, but the structure of the state system does not directly cause war. Whether or not state A attacks state B depends on especial circumstances – such as location, size, power, interest, type of government, past history and tradition – that influence the actions of both states. If they enter into war with each other it is because of how each of them especially defines the occasion. These special definitions of the occasion become the immediate, or efficient, causes of war. These immediate causes of war are the focus of the first and second images. That is, states are motivated to enter into war with each other by the reason or passion of a few people who set policies for states or many people who influence the few. Furthermore, some states are more proficient in waging war and are more willing to test their proficiency. Indeed, variations in the factors included in the first and second images are crucial in causing war because the immediate causes of every war is either the acts of individuals or the acts of states.

The third image implies that each state defines its own interests and pursues them in the best ways it judges. Conflicts of interest inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy which exists among

states. Therefore, there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling conflicts of interests among states. Consequently, force becomes a means of achieving the external ends of states. The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images it lacks the knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image they lack the ability to assess their importance or to predict their results.

4. Radical Humanist Paradigm

The radical humanist paradigm provides critiques of the status quo and is concerned to articulate, from a subjective standpoint, the sociology of radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality. Based on its subjectivist approach, it places great emphasis on human consciousness. It tends to view society as anti-human. It views the process of reality creation as feeding back on itself; such that individuals and society are prevented from reaching their highest possible potential. That is, the consciousness of human beings is dominated by the ideological superstructures of the social system, which results in their alienation or false consciousness. This, in turn, prevents true human fulfillment. The social theorist regards the orders that prevail in the society as instruments of ideological domination.

The major concern for theorists is with the way this occurs and finding ways in which human beings can release themselves from constraints which existing social arrangements place upon realization of their full potential. They seek to change the social world through a change in consciousness.

Radical humanists believe that everything must be grasped as a whole, because the whole dominates the parts in an all-embracing sense. Moreover, truth is historically specific, relative to a given set of circumstances, so that one should not search for generalizations for the laws of motion of societies.

The radical humanists believe the functionalist paradigm accepts purposive rationality, logic of science, positive functions of technology, and neutrality of language, and uses them in the construction of "value-free" social theories. The radical humanist theorists intend to demolish this structure, emphasizing the political and repressive nature of it. They aim to show the role that science, ideology, technology, language, and other aspects of the superstructure play in sustaining and developing the system of power and domination, within the totality of the social formation. Their function is to influence the consciousness of human beings for eventual emancipation and formation of alternative social formations.

The radical humanists note that functionalist sociologists create and sustain a view of social reality which maintains the *status quo* and which forms one aspect of the network of ideological domination of the society.

The focus of the radical humanists upon the "superstructural" aspects of society reflects their attempt to move away from the economism of orthodox Marxism and emphasize the Hegelian dialectics. It is through the dialectic that the objective and subjective aspects of social life interact. The superstructure of society is believed to be the medium through which the consciousness of human beings is controlled and molded to fit the requirements of the social formation as a whole. The concepts of structural conflict, contradiction, and crisis do not play a major role in this paradigm, because these are more objectivist view of social reality, that is, the ones which fall in the radical structuralist paradigm. In the radical humanist paradigm, the concepts of consciousness, alienation, and critique form their concerns.

In Exhibit 1, the radical humanist paradigm occupies the north-west quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From left to right they are: French Existentialism, Anarchistic Individualism, and Critical Theory.

Radical humanist paradigm's views with respect to globalization and war are presented next[6].
The task of war prevention pursued by most political leaders throughout the history of the modern state system has been very limited in scope. This is because the task has been pursued without regard to the broader and more fundamental task of changing the structure of the international system and its accompanying, war-legitimizing code of international conduct. The separation of war prevention from system change has consequently produced unsatisfactory results. Wars continually recur as a result of the anarchical international system, in which strict emphasis on national priorities leads to the competitive build-up of military might. Wars have horrendous economic, political, and environmental costs, and result in the unnecessary poverty and death of millions of people.

A more appropriate approach recognizes that war prevention and international system change are inseparable tasks. The change in the system should be implemented through the growth of global constitutionalism based on the values of human dignity. Global constitutionalism and war prevention are closely intertwined such that progress cannot be made in one domain without significant

[6] See, for example, Gill and Law (1988), Hoogvelt (1997), Kellner (2002), Mann (1988), Sivard (1993), Vayrynen (1994), and Wallensteen, Galtung, and Portales (1985). This section is based on Johansen (1993).

achievement in the other. These interconnections were remotely recognized by various architects of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the League of Nations Covenant, and the United Nations Charter. The need to change the international system in order to achieve a durable peace was vaguely sensed by people in the period immediately following each of the two world wars. The trauma of the wars made people unhappy about politics and diplomacy, but it never became a day-to-day guide to policy. Over time and in practice, leaders ignored the short-lived intellectual and moral recognition that the balance of military power had fatal flaws, which would lead to war. The advocates of arms control sought the particular goal of reducing the numbers of particular weapons rather than seeking the general goal of reducing the role of military power in international relations.

Peace has always been at risk within the international system, which was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This is because this system leads to a decentralized balance of military power, in which war prevention carries only a secondary priority, not the primary purpose. States have maintained this system, which has resulted in repeated use of military force. However, a more durable peace can be maintained through a departure from the current international system and its gradual transform into a legally-constituted balance of political power. Within this evolving global constitutional order, security is no longer based on military self-help. A move toward that goal is a genuine progress towards both global constitutionalism and war prevention simultaneously.

The prevention of war by advancing global constitutionalism is based on the values of human dignity. To be politically effective, this process must necessarily give high priority to ensuring the consent of the governed. This priority requires the strategy of war prevention to include deliberate efforts to institutionalize governmental accountability to people. However, the primary focus on a national government's accountability to the people who live within the confines of its national territory is intellectually misleading and politically ineffective in this age of complex interdependence.

A national government may appear to be internally very democratic, but an increasing number of its decisions have undemocratic consequences. This is because, under conditions of interdependence, the decisions made in a country affect people who live outside the borders of its domestic "democratic" political processes. That is, the outsiders have not had the opportunity to cast their votes with respect to decisions that affect them. In other words, the people living in one country are affected by decisions made by people in other countries, i.e., those who live outside that country's domestic political process. For instance, the United States with its enormous political economy is deeply affected by decisions made in Tokyo or Brussels.

Democracy has been traditionally thought of within the limited national boundary that in practice encourages people to ignore the rights of other people living in other nations. When the government of one country decides to go to war, its decision and action constitute an extreme denial of democracy. This is because the lives of the people living in the targeted country are deliberately taken by a government that has not represented them in its decision to bomb, burn, and destroy them. The democratic accountability – suggested by global constitutionalism and required by war prevention – means that more responsible and principled governing authority must be developed not only "vertically" within domestic societies from the local to the national level, but also "horizontally" across national boundaries, and "vertically" to encompass global society.

The promotion of system change is needed in order to advance war prevention seriously. However, there has never been a sustained diplomatic program to support positive system change. For instance, when the United States president's policies summarized by the "new world order" are closely examined, they reveal that in practice they merely seek global endorsement of the U.S. military policy, rather than the U.S. endorsement of and commitment to a global policy towards demilitarizing the code of international conduct. The United States president's "new world order" does not promote system change towards global constitutionalism.

The United States' policies have missed several unprecedented opportunities for the worldwide security enhancement and the global constitutionalism implementation. First, reforms in the former Soviet Union, the success of anti-authoritarian revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War have provided ample opportunities for negotiating a more cooperative code of international conduct; for strengthening the UN's capabilities for peacekeeping; and for increasingly integrating the political economies of former adversaries – which played a major role in bringing about the Franco-German peace after almost a century of military hostility.

Second, global environmental and economic problems have demonstrated the need for more international governance. Such international governance can take place not only on a bilateral basis but also through regional and global organizations. These organizations can be endowed with sovereignty that can be shared with the more traditional national governing authorities. Both the transnational environmental interconnections and the fact that the only lasting national security is common security have been changing the nature of sovereignty, despite the avoidance of governments in formally recognizing the factual changes in their sovereignty.

Third, "people power" has arisen and reshaped politics in Iran, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Burma, Poland, Hungary, the former German Democratic Republic, Czech and Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, most republics of the former Soviet Union, China, Albania, and elsewhere. Although these movements have not always yielded satisfactory results, overall they have weakened the forces of pro-military "anti-constitutionalists" at home and abroad.

Fourth, a small but growing number of people from many countries have begun to take action on the basis of the understanding that the utility of the national use of military force has fallen below the utility of multilateral peacekeeping for the purpose of maintaining peace and bringing justice in many areas. It is very useful to examine ways to seize these unprecedented opportunities and to enhance UN peacekeeping in encouraging a new code of international conduct that would promote system change.

The proposal consists of six measures that promote war prevention and global constitutionalism. It is to be implemented by the United Nations, its member governments, and the world's publics.

First, the UN system in general and the UN Security Council in particular would benefit from reorienting their priorities. They need to engage in anticipatory peacekeeping and preventive conflict resolution, rather than reacting to crises that threaten to erupt into violence. The Security Council can act as the world crisis monitoring center. The Council and the UN Secretary General can set up official fact-finding missions to gather information and make recommendations for alleviating conflicts. The Council gains visibility and credibility if the foreign ministers of all the Council's members met periodically at the UN to discuss possible crises and their resolution. The Council can also organize standing regional conflict resolution committees. For quick response to crises, the Security Council can give the Secretary General pre-authorization to dispatch unarmed UN observation forces to tense international borders or to any place that their presence would contribute to peace. With this in place, the Council can press more vigorously and successfully for the negotiated resolution of outstanding problems.

Second, the UN peacekeeping capacities need to be strengthened. The United Nations needs its own permanent peacekeeping force. The United Nations can recruit individuals from volunteer citizens of all countries, who are not subject to charges of bias and ad hoc personnel selection now drawn from the national armed forces of UN members. It should have naval or coast guard capability to enforce economic sanctions. Its permanent force can be immediately available; it can be more effectively trained, organized, and commanded; it can be equipped with specialized units, and employed to perform the delicate tasks of peacekeeping, which are different from conventional military

action. Its availability and successful operations can reduce the temptation for the use of military power and international arms trade.
Third, the UN needs a permanent monitoring and research agency in order to maintain its both peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. The UN needs it own aircraft, satellites, and other advanced surveillance technologies to stay informed of the secret movement of military forces, tests of missiles or nuclear weapons, and violations of economic sanctions. Consequently, it can prevent covert military operations and attack.

Fourth, the UN needs to have more sophisticated instruments of enforcement. The Security Council can develop preplanned enforcement measures and be prepared to implement them it can deter military aggression and strengthen economic sanctions. Preplanned enforcement measures should reflect the concerns of the world community, rather than one or two dominant powers.

Fifth, the UN needs to ensure that it remains faithful to the spirit of the Charter so that it can remain a more effective peacemaker and agent of global constitutionalism. Its processes must be multilateral, its decisions must be principled, and its policies must minimize violence.

Sixth, the UN should bring scholars and officials together to discuss ways of holding public authorities individually responsible for actions that violate peace. This is one of the most effective deterrents to war because officials would know that the world community will hold them personally accountable for planning or carrying out acts of aggression.
These six areas greatly enhance the utility of UN peacekeeping and promote an influential international learning process that can help people adopt more compassionate world views and more realistic security policies towards demilitarizing the code of international conduct. The use of these ideas in developing an international political program goes very far in the abolition of war.

5. Radical Structuralist Paradigm

The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete, as it is rooted in the materialist view of natural and social world. The social world, similar to the natural world, has an independent existence, that is, it exists outside the minds of human beings. Sociologists aim at discovering and understanding the patterns and regularities which characterize the social world. Scientists do not see any roles for themselves in the phenomenon under investigation. They use scientific methods to find the order that prevails in the phenomenon. This paradigm views society as a potentially dominating force. Sociologists working within this paradigm have an objectivist standpoint and are committed to radical change, emancipation, and potentiality. In their analysis they emphasize structural conflict, modes

of domination, contradiction, and deprivation. They analyze the basic interrelationships within the total social formation and emphasize the fact that radical change is inherent in the structure of society and the radical change takes place though political and economic crises. This radical change necessarily disrupts the status quo and replaces it by a radically different social formation. It is through this radical change that the emancipation of human beings from the social structure is materialized.

For radical structuralists, an understanding of classes in society is essential for understanding the nature of knowledge. They argue that all knowledge is class specific. That is, it is determined by the place one occupies in the productive process. Knowledge is more than a reflection of the material world in thought. It is determined by one's relation to that reality. Since different classes occupy different positions in the process of material transformation, there are different kinds of knowledge. Hence class knowledge is produced by and for classes, and exists in a struggle for domination. Knowledge is thus ideological. That is, it formulates views of reality and solves problems from class points of view.

Radical structuralists reject the idea that it is possible to verify knowledge in an absolute sense through comparison with socially neutral theories or data. But, emphasize that there is the possibility of producing a "correct" knowledge from a class standpoint. They argue that the dominated class is uniquely positioned to obtain an objectively "correct" knowledge of social reality and its contradictions. It is the class with the most direct and widest access to the process of material transformation that ultimately produces and reproduces that reality. Radical structuralists' analysis indicates that the social scientist, as a producer of class-based knowledge, is a part of the class struggle.

Radical structuralists believe truth is the whole, and emphasize the need to understand the social order as a totality rather than as a collection of small truths about various parts and aspects of society. The financial empiricists are seen as relying almost exclusively upon a number of seemingly disparate, data-packed, problem-centered studies. Such studies, therefore, are irrelevant exercises in mathematical methods.

This paradigm is based on four central notions. First, there is the notion of totality. All theories address the total social formation. This notion emphasizes that the parts reflect the totality, not the totality the parts.
Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus is upon the configurations of social relationships, called structures, which are treated as persistent and enduring concrete facilities.

The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, or social formations, contain contradictory and antagonistic relationships within them which act as seeds of their own decay.

The fourth notion is that of crisis. Contradictions within a given totality reach a point at which they can no longer be contained. The resulting political, economic crises indicate the point of transformation from one totality to another, in which one set of structures is replaced by another of a fundamentally different kind.

In Exhibit 1, the radical structuralist paradigm occupies the north-east quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Russian Social Theory, Conflict Theory, and Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism.

Radical structuralist paradigm's views with respect to globalization and war are presented next[7].
Although politics engender wars and determine their aims, it is neither primary nor self-contained. It is determined by the vital interests of different classes which are evolved by the socioeconomic system of the exploiter state. This system has given rise to wars. It is characterized by the domination of private ownership, the concentration of the ownership of the means of production by the exploiter classes, whose existence depend on the appropriation of the surplus product created by the working people. This is common among all class antagonistic formations. It is the common cause of wars, no matter how varied they are.

All wars in the past and present have been caused by private ownership relations and the resultant social and class antagonisms in exploiter formations. They have been wars that took place between exploiter states that followed the selfish interests of slave owners, feudal lords, and the bourgeoisie; as well as the uprisings and wars of the working people against their exploiters because of their increasingly unbearable position and their worn out patience. Within this general framework, the specific differences in the causes of wars are not ignored. Wars have had specific causes during each of the above formations and in definite historical epochs. Capitalism brought in a new epoch in the history of wars. The production of surplus value is the basic law of capitalism. The capitalist production takes place for the continuous, unlimited accumulation of profit. Capitalists are not content with the surplus value generated by the proletariat of their own country. They have insatiable appetites. They carefully search the world for high profits. Capitalists

[7] See, for example, Bukharin (1972), Callinicos, Rees, Harman, and Haynes (1994), Duffield (2001), Hilferding (1910), Luxemburg (1913), Magdoff (1969, 1992), and Rosenberg (1994). This section is based on Falk and Kim (1980).

use wars as a means of their rapid enrichment. Therefore, wars are close companions of capitalism. In capitalism there is both the exploitation of man by man and the destruction of man by man. Bourgeoisie uses war as a means to obtain new raw material sources and markets, rob foreign countries, and make easy profits.

For the first time in history, capitalism created a world market and expanded the number of objects over which wars were waged. Of these, the most important were colonies, which were the sources of cheap raw materials and labor power, areas for the export of goods and capital, and strongholds on international trade routes. For several centuries, bourgeois European states – such as Holland, Britain, France, and Portugal – waged wars against less-developed countries in order to make them their own colonies. Also, there were wars among the capitalist countries for a new division of the world.

Some of the wars under capitalism were caused also by other factors. In many countries, the development of the productive forces of capitalism was contained due to national oppression and political decentralization. During the period between the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-1794 and the Paris Commune of 1871 bourgeoisie was progressive and fought national liberation wars among other types of war. These wars had the main content and historical role of overthrowing absolutism and foreign oppression.

When capitalism moved to its imperialist stage, the bourgeois states became much more aggressive. This is a result of the economic features of imperialism, which is a period during which capitalism is decaying and disappearing. At the turn of the century, capitalism's rapid development and expansion was replaced with its somewhat regular spread over the globe. In the latest state of capitalism, the slow expansion of capitalism led to an unprecedented amalgamation and intensification of all the contradictions – economic, political, class, and national. The increasing struggle of the imperialist powers for: markets and spheres of capital investment; raw materials and labor power; and world domination gathered an extremely high momentum. This ongoing struggle inevitably led to destructive wars, despite the fact that imperialism ruled undividedly. The root cause of these wars was the deepening conflict between the modern productive forces and the economic – and also political – system of imperialism. This constituted the main cause of the armed clashes among imperialist powers.

Capitalism overthrew feudalism through the formation of national states. However, it became too constrained within the confines of national states. The productive forces of capitalism surpassed the limited framework of bourgeois states. The whole world merged into a single capitalist economic system while it was divided up among a small set of major imperialist powers. This resulted in a contradiction which

reflected the striving of the bourgeoisie: to export capital; to gain markets for their production which they cannot sell at home; to conquer raw material sources and new colonies; to defeat competitors on world markets; and to establish world domination. The contradiction unleashed wars.

The conflict between the potential for the growth of productive forces (with the national limits imposed on their development) and the capitalist relations of production finds expression in the uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries under imperialism. Thus, at the start of the twentieth century, bourgeois countries that had embarked on industrial development found themselves in a favorable situation and outstripped the old industrial capitalist states in a relatively short period of time. After the Second World War, the relative position of capitalist states changed again and their relative economic development became further uneven. Uneven development certainly leads to major changes in the alignment of forces within the world capitalist system. This major change manifests itself as a sharp disturbance to the equilibrium of the system. The distribution of the spheres of influence among the monopolies which was compatible with the old alignment of forces in the world clashes with the new alignment of forces in the world. The alignment of the distribution of colonies with the new balance of forces inevitably requires new division of the previously-divided world. Under capitalism, war is the only way for gaining new colonies and spheres of influence.

Capitalism has concentrated the worldwide wealth to a few states and has divided the entire world among them. In general, the enrichment of one can take place only at the expense of others. In particular, the enrichment of one state can take place only at the expense of at least one other state. This matter can only be settled by force and, therefore, war among the world capitalists becomes inevitable. The First and the Second World Wars were ignited on this economic basis. These wars were catastrophic for the international bourgeoisie because they resulted in the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism.

Another reason for the growing aggressiveness of modern imperialism is the aggravated contradiction between the imperialist states, on the one hand, and the colonies and recent colonies, on the other. The popular masses have launched national liberation revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Deep antagonisms exist between the imperialist states and the countries that have gained national independence or are still fighting for liberation. The imperialists resort to any means to preserve and strengthen the possession of their colonies. They use the force of arms to suppress the national liberation struggle of the African peoples. They unleash wars in the Southeast Asian countries. They set up reactionary coups in the Latin American

states. Their colonial and neocolonial policies are the direct and indirect causes of many conflicts that threaten to force mankind into new wars.
The third cause of war is the worsening of the internal contradictions of capitalism after the Second World War. This is the continuing exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism. That is, the main contradiction of capitalist society – that between labor and capital – continues to grow. The transition from monopoly capitalism to state-monopoly capitalism involves the merger between monopolies and the state. This transition intensifies the exploitation of the working people and directs science, technology, and productive forces to increasingly enrich a small set of monopolists. Exploitation becomes increasingly hideous over time. State monopoly capitalism increasingly intensifies militarism, in both the economic and ideological fields. Militarization permeates the bourgeois society. The production of weapons of mass destruction takes an enormous portion of the national income of the bourgeois states. The growth in the production of weapons in the main imperialist states forces other countries to spend large sums of money on strengthening their defense too.

The fourth reason responsible for the greater aggressiveness of the imperialist states is as follows. The drastic reduction in the sphere of activity of the imperialist forces and the extreme aggravation of the contradictions under state-monopoly capitalism result in a more uneven economic and political development of the bourgeois countries. In recent history, Germany and Japan have made drastic changes in their relative political position within the capitalist world, and this process is continuing. This deepened the contradictions between the United States, on the one hand, and the Western European capitalist countries and Japan, on the other hand. In addition, within Western Europe, the competitive struggle has become more intense by the formation of European Union and other state-monopoly associations. These contradictions and competitive struggles have resulted in new forms of international economic associations and new ways of dividing markets, which in turn have resulted in new hotbeds of contradictions. All these developments must be taken into consideration when the economic reasons for wars are investigated.

The contradiction between imperialism, on the one hand, and liberation movements and independent countries, on the other hand, is stronger than the inter-imperialist contradictions. It is the major contradiction of the epoch and leaves its mark on all major international events. The upsurge in the national liberation struggle and the growth of the number of independent countries have prompted the growing aggressiveness of the monopoly bourgeoisie, which fights social progress by all means and at all costs in order to preserve its class privileges and riches.

The liberation movements and independent countries exert a dual influence on inter-imperialist relations. On the one hand, they strengthen the will of the imperialist powers to unite: through military, political, and other alliances. On the other hand, they deepen the contradictions among imperialists. That is, they make the alliance of all the imperialists inevitable while placing the imperialists in opposition to each other. The first tendency was stronger, after the Second World War, when imperialist powers waged struggle against the socialist system. At present, the inter-imperialist contradictions are dampened by the existence of the even more important class antagonisms. That is, the war among the big imperialist states, though still possible, is far less likely now than it was before.

Thus, the world imperialist system is entangled in severe antagonisms. These are contradictions between labor and capital; between the people and the monopolies; and between the young national states and the old colonial powers. The result has been the disintegration of the colonial system and the growth of militarization. Until the economic basis of wars and their only source – imperialism – continues to exist, until imperialist policy and ideology of preparing and unleashing military conflicts continue to exist, wars will continue to exist.

6. Conclusion

This paper briefly discussed four views expressed with respect to globalization and war. The functionalist paradigm believes that individuals in advanced countries are rational, have performed a cost-benefit analysis, and have found war to be too costly and therefore do not enter war with each other. The interpretive paradigm believes that war is an uncertain phenomenon and may take place as a result of any combination of factors emanating from the individual, state, or international state system. The radical humanist paradigm believes that war is caused by the current arrangement of the international state system and therefore to avoid war there is a need for a new interstate system implemented through global constitutionalism based on human dignity, i.e., the consent of the governed, such that the governments act democratically both nationally and internationally. The radical structuralist paradigm believes that all wars in the past and present have been caused by private ownership relations and the resultant social and class antagonisms in exploiter formations, some wars took place between exploiter states, and some wars were waged by the working people against their exploiters.

The diversity of theories presented in this paper is vast. While each paradigm advocates a research strategy that is logically coherent, in terms of underlying assumptions, these vary from paradigm to paradigm. The phenomenon to be researched is conceptualized and studied in many different ways, each generating distinctive kinds of

insight and understanding. There are many different ways of studying the same social phenomenon, and given that the insights generated by any one approach are at best partial and incomplete[8], the social researcher can gain much by reflecting on the nature and merits of different approaches before engaging in a particular mode of research practice.

All theories are based on a philosophy of science and a theory of society. Many theorists appear to be unaware of, or ignore, the assumptions underlying these philosophies. They emphasize only some aspects of the phenomenon and ignore others. Unless they bring out the basic philosophical assumptions of the theories, their analysis can be misleading; since by emphasizing differences between theories, they imply diversity in approach. While there appear to be different kinds of theory, they are founded on a certain philosophy, worldview, or paradigm. This becomes evident when these theories are related to the wider background of social theory.

In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. The four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject.

Scientists often approach their subject from a frame of reference based upon assumptions that are taken-for-granted. Since these assumptions are continually affirmed and reinforced, they remain not only unquestioned, but also beyond conscious awareness. The partial nature of this view only becomes apparent when the researcher exposes basic assumptions to the challenge of alternative ways of seeing, and starts to appreciate these alternatives in their own terms.

Researchers can gain much by exploiting the new perspectives coming from the other paradigms. An understanding of different paradigms leads to a better understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon researched. Although a researcher may decide to conduct research from the point of view of a certain paradigm, an understanding of the nature of other paradigms leads to a better understanding of what one is doing.

The plea for paradigm diversity is based on the idea that more than one theoretical construction can be placed upon a given collection of data. In other words, any single theory, research method, or particular

[8] For instance, the mainstream Economics and Finance limit their perspective to the functionalist paradigm. On this matter see Ardalan (2008).

empirical study is incapable of explaining the nature of reality in all of its complexities.

It is possible to establish exact solutions to problems, i.e., truth, if one defines the boundary and domain of reality, i.e., reductionism. For instance, functionalist research, through its research approach, defines an area in which objectivity and truth can be found. Any change in the research approach, or any change in the area of applicability, would tend to result in the break-down of such objectivity and truth. The knowledge generated through functionalist research relates to certain aspects of the phenomenon under consideration. Recognition of the existence of the phenomenon beyond that dictated by the research approach, results in the recognition of the limitations of the knowledge generated within the confines of that approach.

There is no unique evaluative perspective for assessing knowledge generated by different research approaches. Therefore, it becomes necessary to get beyond the idea that knowledge is foundational and can be evaluated in an absolute way. Researchers are encouraged to explore what is possible by identifying untapped possibilities. By comparing a favored research approach in relation to others, the nature, strengths, and limitations of the favored approach become evident. By understanding what others do, researchers are able to understand what they are not doing. This leads to the development and refinement of the favored research approach. The concern is not about deciding which research approach is best, or with substituting one for another. The concern is about the merits of diversity, which seeks to enrich research rather than constrain it, through a search for an optimum way of doing diverse research. The number of ways of generating new knowledge is bounded only by the ingenuity of researchers in inventing new approaches.

Different research approaches provide different interpretations of a phenomenon, and understand the phenomenon in a particular way. Some may be supporting a traditional view, others saying something new. In this way, knowledge is treated as being tentative rather than absolute.

All research approaches have something to contribute. The interaction among them may lead to synthesis, compromise, consensus, transformation, polarization, completion, or simply clarification and improved understanding of differences. Such interaction, which is based on differences of viewpoints, is not concerned with reaching consensus or an end point that establishes a foundational truth. On the contrary, it is concerned with learning from the process itself, and to encourage the interaction to continue so long as disagreement lasts. Likewise, it is not concerned with producing uniformity, but promoting improved diversity.

The functionalist paradigm regards research as a technical activity and depersonalizes the research process. It removes responsibility from the researcher and reduces him or her to an agent engaged in what the institutionalized research demands. Paradigm diversity reorients the role of the researchers and places responsibility for the conduct and consequences of research directly with them. Researchers examine the nature of their activity to choose an appropriate approach and develop a capacity to observe and question what they are doing, and take responsibility for making intelligent choices which are open to realize the many potential types of knowledge.

It is interesting to note that this recommendation is consistent, in certain respects, with the four paradigms: (1) It increases efficiency in research: This is because, diversity in the research approach prevents or delays reaching the point of diminishing marginal return. Therefore, the recommendation is consistent with the functionalist paradigm, which emphasizes purposive rationality and the benefit of diversification. (2) It advocates diversity in research approach: This is consistent with the interpretive paradigm, which emphasizes shared multiple realities. (3) It leads to the realization of researchers' full potentials: This is consistent with the radical humanist paradigm, which emphasizes human beings' emancipation from the structures which limit their potential for development. (4) It enhances class awareness: This is consistent with the radical structuralist paradigm, which emphasizes class struggle.

Knowledge of Economics and Finance, or any other field of the social sciences ultimately is a product of the researcher's paradigmatic approach to the multifaceted phenomena he studies. Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of social science is seen as much an ethical, moral, ideological, and political activity as a technical one. Since no single perspective can capture all, researchers should gain more from paradigm diversity.

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