

Irrigating a Socialist Utopia: Disciplinary Space and Population Control under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979

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Abstract

The article shows how the Khmer Rouge’s restructuring of the environment into a socialist utopian space could be explained as an attempt to establish and tighten control over the populace and the factionalized movement. By inscribing power structures into the environment, the Khmer Rouge tried to ‘create’ loyal and faithful subjects. Michel Foucault’s concepts of a ‘disciplinary space’ and panoptical control help to understand the massive environmental reshaping and its connection to the regime’s struggle for legitimation and control. Measures like the nationwide reconstruction of the irrigation system, sending the populace to the rice fields for a ‘thought reform’ through productive labor as well as an all-encompassing system of terror aimed at the transformation of the deviant populace into perfectly socialist people, whose daily life in the collective and personal necessities were planned down to the very last detail. The deviant nature of space and the deviant people populating it had to be rebuilt and disciplined until every little gesture, every thought, every construction in the nation’s irrigation system corresponded to the socialist model. This attempt to construct an ideal socialist environment and its neglect of the diversity of topological requirements, furthermore, resulted in crop failures playing a significant role in the occurrences of famines leading to subsequent starvation in the populace. Moreover, it also helps to explain the spiral of mistrust of the party’s upper echelon against local leaders, which led to factional purges. The article, thereby, also highlights the complex and irreducible interplay between space and the micropolitics of power.

Keywords: *Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, disciplinary space, population control, Michel Foucault*

1 Introduction

On the 17th of April 1975, after decades of civil war, the Khmer Rouge captured the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh. It was an “unexpected victory” (Carney, 1989) of an unlikely coalition between the Communist party and the former king and archenemy Norodom Sihanouk, who was toppled five years earlier (cf. Chandler, 2008; Kiernan, 2004). The Khmer Rouge incorporated many different

groups into a 'United Front' in order to win a military victory over the Republican regime led by General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak. After their departure from Southeast Asia in 1973, the US army left a military vacuum behind. Due to the incorporation of different military wings (cf. Etcheson, 1984), a recruitment strategy focused on nationalism and the charismatic king (cf. Frieson, 1993), the US departure, and strict secrecy on the side of the Communist leadership; the coalition managed to defeat the old regime. The military victory, however, was achieved despite a lack of legitimation in the movement's own ranks and the populace, which was far from faithfully socialist.

In order to build an ideal socialist society without exploitation and inequality, Angkar ('the Organization') expelled all townspeople and forced everyone to work on paddy fields and in irrigation projects all over the country. Faced with a two-sided legitimation deficit, the Khmer Rouge leadership believed that their rule and the new socialist society could only be established by 'transforming' the populace into "new people":

"To build a new society, there must be new people." (Party slogan cited in Locard, 2004: 293)

Therefore, most of the measures of state terror implemented by the Khmer Rouge can be understood as an attempt to gain control over their own movement and the populace, and to transform them into loyal socialists through a 'thought reform' in an ideal socialist environment. Hence, the following article argues that the Khmer Rouge attempted to create a 'disciplinary space', an ideal socialist environment, which would 'create' ideal socialist subjects loyal to the party and thereby also optimizes the collective work performance of the populace. The text focuses solely on spatial aspects of control and transformation through disciplinary power techniques – leaving aside other possible aspects of population control under the Khmer Rouge. Michel Foucault's concepts of disciplinary space and panoptical control (cf. 1991) help to understand the massive environmental reshaping for example through huge irrigation projects and its connection to the regime's struggle for control. The attempt to construct a disciplinary space, furthermore, resulted in crop failures, which played a significant role in creating a situation of famine and led to subsequent starvation in the population. This attempt can also explain the mistrust of the leadership against local leaders, which led to factional purges. About 1.7 million people didn't survive this massive transformation of society and space due to starvation, exhaustion, sickness or execution¹.

This text is divided into four parts. The first part will briefly introduce Michel Foucault's concept of disciplinary space and power techniques. While the second part deals with measures taken by the Khmer Rouge to control and re-educate its populace, the third part analyses the construction of the irrigation system and the utopian economic and environmental project elaborated in the party's 'Four-Year Plan', aimed at the construction of an ideal socialist space. Finally, part four will develop

the connection between the attempt to build a utopian socialist space and the breakdown in the crop harvest as well as the regime's factional purges of local leaders.

2 Disciplinary Space

Disciplinary power techniques are centered on the production of obedient subjects. Power, according to Foucault (cf. 1991), is a productive force – it produces the 'subject' in both senses of the word. Disciplinary power aims at the subjugation of the individual body in order to make it docile. Its primary function is to bring the individual into line, educate it and engraft it into a spatial and temporal order, in which it can be controlled. The panopticon, Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) architectural concept for the construction of prisons, serves as a condensed form of disciplinary power. The panopticon enables to implement a feeling of being constantly watched. Instead of actually being observed all the time, the prisoner starts to internalize the gaze through the implementation of a 'coercive view' (1991, p.171).

In essence, Bentham's plan consists of a circular arrangement of prison cells. Put into isolated cells, the prisoners aren't able to contact each other. In the center of the circle, then, is the guard's observation tower. Due to a complex system of light and shade, the inmates see that they are being watched from the guard's tower; however, they can't see whether the observation rooms are actually occupied or not. Therefore, they always have to assume that they are being watched, which makes the watchful eye of the guards omnipresent. Precisely because of the invisibility of the sovereign, the inmate feels highly visible and internalizes the watchful eye – taking over the duty of his own control.

Disciplinary power establishes an analytical space: "Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient units." (1991, p.170) Sovereignty inscribes itself into territory. Through the 'parceling of individuals', their localization in an uniformed, partitioned space, knowledge about and productivity of the individual can be increased: "Each individual has its own place, and each place its individual." (1991, p.143) The construction of a uniform and normed 'disciplinary space' opens the subject up for the watchful eye of the sovereign, who is now able to measure and increase work performance and note deviations from the norm. As in factories, the unorganized mass can be dispersed and arranged into spatially and temporally standardized working processes.

Discipline, thus, operates in an empty, artificial and completely constructed space (Foucault 2007, pp.1-23). A goal-oriented and 'utilitarian' utopia, which is build as mere realization of its specific functions. Territorial space serves entirely disciplinary functions of control, the suppression of deviation and disorder as well as optimizing work performances. For this purpose, space and time

are divided into artificial and normed units that guarantee the exact functioning of disciplinary regulation and rule. It is exactly this abstraction from ‘worldly’ conditions and the local milieu, in which the disciplinary space is supposed to operate, which makes it utopian: placeless. The environment and its natural diversity are treated as mere wax for the imprint of a ‘disciplinary space’.

3 Population Control and Thought Reform

“The red, red blood splatters the cities and plains” – National anthem of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)

The eviction of the city dwellers was the first measure of territorial control adopted by the Khmer Rouge in order to build a pure socialist environment. Between two and three million people were expelled from the cities all over the country. The procedure was planned long in advance and the regime gave several reasons for its decision. Besides fearing a US bombing of the capital, the leadership pointed to the threat of starvation in the city, whose population swelled up due to fighting and bombing in the countryside during the preceding civil war. Although at least starvation was a real danger, it wasn’t the only reason to empty the cities. The rejection of foreign support, the export of large amounts of rice to China and the long-term strategy of expelling the residents of cities, all point towards yet another reason. Due to the lack of cadres and the splits inside the party, it was impossible for the Khmer Rouge to control populated centers. The expulsion, thus, was a strategical instrument, which was also confirmed by foreign secretary Ieng Sary:

“By removing the population to the countryside – including thousands of spies and agents – the counter revolutionary networks would be destroyed.” (cited in Burgler, 1990, p.71)

Hence, the eviction served as a measure of spatial control and a first step in the construction of a socialist environment. Moreover, in order to gain control over the populace, soldiers and officials from the old regime were sorted out and killed at checkpoints on their way to the countryside: “Dry up the people from the enemy.” (Party slogan cited in Kiernan, 2004, p.385) Killing the representatives of the former regime and forcing everyone, including the old and sick from the hospitals, on the march towards the countryside, resulted in tens of thousands of deaths on the way.

Arriving at the countryside, Angkar immediately began with its transformation of society and its spatial configuration. People were forced to work in collectives and ‘working brigades’ under harsh conditions in order to harvest rice or to build large dams for irrigation. Throughout the whole

day, people were subjected to the actual and imagined watchful eye of Angkar as a popular saying illustrates: “Angkar has the eyes of a pineapple.” The eyes of the sovereign, monitoring the degree of loyal socialist performance, became omnipresent:

“All revolutionary laws and regulations were promulgated in the name of Angkar; all transgressions were known to and were punished by Angkar. Angkar was everywhere, a pervasive presence that none could escape. ‘Angkar has more eyes than a pineapple’, the cadre said. Husbands and wives spoke of Angkar only in private, in a whisper, fearful of being overheard. No one criticized Angkar in public; even the most minimally critical passing allusion could be enough to ensure arrest, interrogation, and subsequent disappearance for re-education. Danger was ever present; at no time did one know whether the spies of Angkar were listening.” (Stuart-Fox and Ung, 1998, p.54)

People had the feeling of being constantly supervised and started to internalize control. With a security chief for each village and their mostly young and male spies, who even listened under the wooden houses to conversations, the threat of being imprisoned and interrogated for even the slightest violation including disproportionate grave outcomes was always present. The spies’ job was to collect as many information as possible, no matter how (ibid, pp.54-55). However, it was not only the village chief’s spies but also the spies from the district chief, who were assigned to collect information over longer periods on heavier offenses. Furthermore, during work a party cadre, who was recording work performance and behavior, exposed people to constant surveillance. Thereby, people became isolated among many.

It was difficult to figure out, where the eye of the sovereign could appear. Angkar could appear in everyone; even the closest relatives couldn’t be trusted. Speaking in front of one’s own children, for example, could be dangerous: “[C]hildren of six to eight years of age had to spy on their parents.” (DeNike, et al., 2000, p.137) On all occasions extreme caution was paramount. Bunheang Ung reported about a typical incident, which warned him to remain very watchful:

“It was all too easy to comment in disgust, while working in an irrigation ditch: ‘Oh this filthy work! I’m sick of it!’ Once when he made this mistake, the response was immediate. A well-know toady of the hamlet committee turned on Bun immediately demanding, ‘Why did you say that? Don’t you like the revolution? Don’t you like Angkar? Would you like to rebel against Angkar?’ After that he was more careful.” (Stuart-Fox and Ung, 1998, p.56)

Mutual distrust isolated the population: “Practically and in daily life, each member has the duty of checking on his fellow man. This duty is reciprocal.” (Ith Sarin, 1977, p.40) Therefore, everybody

had at least to act like a good and faithful revolutionary. No one knew whether the ‘place’ of the sovereign (the panoptical guard’s room) in the eye of the fellow men is actually occupied. Real and imagined control merged. The only way to avoid punishment was to act and at best even to think as if ‘big brother’ (bong thom) knew everything.²

For the party center it was clear:

“Understanding will come after having been through schooling. [...] Where there is a leadership core, there will be strength. Therefore, we must pay attention to educating; that is, educating according to the party line.” (party magazine “Revolutionary Flags”, Anon., 1989, pp.295-296)

Besides a complex and nationwide system of prisons and ‘reeducation centers’ (cf. Ea, 2005; Locard, 1996) as well as daily ‘political meetings’ with criticism and self-criticism sessions (cf. Em, 2002), Angkar also believed in the educational effect of work in a pure and original socialist environment. Working in the fields and in collectives was thought to educate deluded subjects into becoming obedient socialists. Following the Maoist notion of a ‘thought reform’ through productive labor, it was expected that people would learn to be good revolutionaries through harvesting crops and digging dams and dikes; and that ‘Revolutionary praxis’ led to revolutionary minds and attitudes. Thus, as the propaganda stated: “The spade is your pen, the rice field your paper. [...] Work must be your teacher, but don’t be at all the teacher of work.” (Locard, 2004, pp.96, 225) Embedding the population in a socialist environment with collective work, collective dining, isolation from individualistic and traditional structures like the family and abolishing trade and money, was supposed to lead to a transformation of the society into a ideal socialist society. Radical collectivism in daily life that was built into the environment was supposed to free the populace from its individualist habits: “Destroy individualism; built the collective spirit.” (Boua, et al., 1988, pp.193-194) The leadership envisioned an ideal socialist environment, which would suppress deviation from the socialist line and and the population would learn to be a good, loyal and revolutionary.

4 Planning and Constructing a Socialist Utopia

“The system of dikes in the rice fields means a new worldview.” (Party slogan cited in Locard, 2004, p.247)

The aim of the Khmer Rouge was to build a perfect socialist space, which on the one side would prevent ‘individualism’ to rise again – meaning resistance against the party line. And on the other side, this ‘disciplinary space’ was supposed to guarantee the perfect exertion of socialist functions – creating an unprecedented model society: „Beginning in 1980, the Angkar will create a model

society that exists nowhere else in the world, where everyone will eat his fill three times a day, where everyone will live well, in villages and towns, where there will be no more classes.” (cited in Locard, 2004, p.293) This ideal space had to be a collective, uniform socialist environment free from individualistic features that could seduce the populace.



Figure 1: National Emblem of “Democratic Kampuchea”

Source: Documentation Center of Cambodia

The national emblem, with its checkered dikes, canals and a factory on top, visualizes quite clearly the utopian idea of the regime (see fig. 1) and its “placelessness” (Tyner, 2008). The idea was to construct a nationwide irrigation system with a chessboard of 1x1 ha paddy fields and standardized 1x1 km rectangular grids of canals and dikes (cf. Pijpers, p.1989). The land was divided into strictly uniform parcels of land, freed from any ‘individualistic’ patterns. The existing diversity of structures and long-lasting irrigation systems were to be dismantled and replaced by this functional grid. However, not only the space was normed but also the output, which had to emanate from the new collective structure. The regime demanded three kilos of rice per hectare. Thereby, enabling a close supervision of the work performance of the individual ‘collectives’ all around the country. The new directives tripled the pre-war average of the entire country (cf. Himel, 2007). The aim was to build an irrigation system that would be similar but larger and more advanced than the ancient Angkorean system. The regime believed that the source of the Angkorean wealth lay in its superior irrigation system.

Rice was the sole foundation of the utopian project. Everything flows from the production of rice: “With water we can have rice, with rice we can have everything.” (Pol Pot cited in Kiernan, 2001, p.194) The Party’s “Four-Year Plan” (Boua, et al., 1988, pp.36-118) detailed the construction of the ideal socialist society for the years from 1977 until 1980. By constantly optimizing the rice harvest,

according to the plan, all the socialist institutions will be established and all material necessities will be provided step by step. A calculation, which was, to simplify matters or due to old habits, calculated using US dollars:

“For 100,000 tons of milled rice, we would get \$20 million; if we had 500,000 tons we’d get \$100 million.” (ibid., p.51)

The Four-Year Plan envisioned the perfect division of spatial and temporal units serving the socialist cause. Model villages, which already achieved the target before, were placed as role models for the others: “Choose as models, districts which have increased production to three tons per hectare so that they can fly the flag of the ‘Great Leap Forward’” (Pol Pot cited in Himel, 2007, p.42) The Four-Year Plan was planning every detail of the people’s life down to the structure and content of daily life. For example, it fixed the material necessities for every subject:

“Material Necessities for the People

- On a co-operative, family, and individual basis • Clothing – scarves • Bed supplies – mosquito nets, blankets, mats, pillows
- Materials for common and individual use: water pitchers, water bowls, glasses, teapots, cups, plates, spoons, shoes, towels, soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs, medicine (especially inhalants) writing books, reading books, pens, pencils, knives, shovels, axes, spectacles, chalk, ink, hats, raincoats, thread, needles, scissors, lighters and flint, kerosene, lamps, etc.” (Boua, et al., 1988, p.111)

People were to be provided with 50-100 percent material necessities from 1977 on. The plan even contained a “People’s Eating Regime” determining when, what and how much people would eat during the day (ibid, p.112). Villages were also planned from the scratch:

- There must be maps and diagrams as clear plans to begin with, and start work, step-by-step each year. • Build a neat, clean, and proper house for each family. • With watering places for people and for animals. • Place for animals to live in, have roofs • hygienic toilets • sheds for fertilizer • carpentry workshops • kitchens and eating houses • schools and meeting places • medical clinics • vegetable gardens, large and small. Villages and homes must be located in the tree glades and among all sorts of crops; villages and homes must not have just the sky above and the earth below them. • barbers (and hairdressers) • rice barn/warehouses • a place for tailoring and darning, etc.” (ibid, pp.110-111).

Many scholars felt like reading the product of a ‘brainstorming session’ removed from reality or like a shopping list (e.g. Himel, 2007), always concluding with an ‘etc.’:

“V. Tourism (importantly Siem Reap – Angkor) [...] Must organize: • hotels, water, electricity • communication routes – especially aviation, Siem Reap airfield • places to relax and visit – the regions of Angkor (Wat), Angkor Thom, Banteay Srei, the system of dikes, irrigation channels, canals, rice fields, vegetable gardens, fishing areas, Bareay Tuk Thla, etc.” (Boua, et al., 1988, pp.104-105).

There is a kernel of truth to it. It is definitely not just the product of a ‘brainstorming session’ but the lists speak of the planning of an ideal space without any local or environmental constraints.

In this ideal socialist environment, the ideal shape and functional structure of space and a collective society with all its processes and necessities is fixed and realized without ‘natural’ constraints. Nature, for the Khmer Rouge, was a mere distorting nuisance to the ideal form and had to be ‘defeated’: “Let us be master of the water, master of the nature.” (Party slogan cited in Locard, 2004, p.246) Technology can be left aside for the ongoing struggle against nature “because technology is not the decisive factor; the determining factors of a revolution are politics, revolutionary people, and revolutionary methods.” Hence, absolutely everything can be achieved using a correct revolutionary stance and the correct insights of the leadership: “We do not blame the objective conditions.” (cf. Himel, 2007, p.49) According to the plan at least, the aim was to build an environment defeating nature and operating purely in line with socialist functions, inhabited by pure socialist people, using pure revolutionary methods. This ideal socialist space aimed to operate beyond natural conditions, geographical specifics and environmental diversity.

5 The Return of Diversity: Nature and Mistrust

“Let us not be defeated by nature.” (Party slogan cited in Locard, 2004, p.249)

The result of the newly established irrigation system, however, was disastrous – having a significant share in crop failures and the deep mistrust inside the leadership against local leaders and their loyalty to the party center. The nationwide construction of a uniform irrigation system with checkered paddy fields, dikes and canals was highly inappropriate for the local conditions (cf. Himel, 2007; Pijpers, 1989). Due to the neglect of the diversity of topological requirements, major flaws in the whole system occurred. Fueled by the regimes’ neglect of local expertise from villagers and the technical expertise of educated ‘new people’, crop failures followed in many areas leading to a worsening of starvation in the populace.

As Jeffrey Himel in his in-depth analysis of the hydrology of the canal system stated: “The irrigation works were built anywhere it was possible without consideration of the overall water requirements or stream capacity.” (2007, p.45) The new dikes and canals first and foremost caused flaws in the

irrigation and drainage system. The results were overflows, major repairs and the need for constant maintenance: “The dikes were built in flat areas, so often flooded as much area as they were meant to irrigate.” (ibid) Thus, the irrigation system had to be constantly repaired and supplemented with auxiliary constructions. Lack of communication between the local cadres responsible for the different parts of the system did increase the uncoordinated and destructive effects of the canal system. Mostly, local cadres used the irrigation according to their immediate needs leading to unexpected flows and an additional worsening of the overall situation: “The natural drainage patterns were badly disrupted and the new routes caused unexpected flows to occur that could not be predicted by the local people who had lived there for their entire lives.” (Himel, 2007, p.45)

The leadership tried to solve occurring problems hastily, largely without coordination or in-depth knowledge: “[on improvement of rice varieties] we must set up a meteorological station... [on coal] we start thinking about our own coal from now on...if there’s any we’ll find it. We must set up factories to refine them... [on the problem of fertilizers] The possibility of using human urine hasn’t been exhausted either. Urine has yet to be collected. We collect thirty percent. That leaves a surplus of seventy percent. There’s also the urine of cows and buffaloes. We could make enclosures for them and at night they could urinate into troughs and we could gather the urine. In this way we could fulfill the 1977 plan.” (cited in Himel, 2007, p.47)

But who was to blame for the crop failure? The “correct and clear-sighted line” of the party couldn’t be blamed (cf. Locard, 2004, p.112). Instead, the leadership suspected sabotage within its own ranks. Especially zones with bad yields were suspected to consciously undermine the rule of the regime by manipulating the harvest. From the regime’s point of view, the occurrence of shortcomings in the actual implementation of the Four-Year Plan were directly linked to a resistance against the sovereign power behind the plan. For example in 1977, immediately after the numbers of the low rice harvest and famines in the northwestern zone became known to the party center, a wave of factional purges occurred in the zone (cf. Chandler, 2008, p.268). Alleged ‘traitors’ had to confess that they deliberately undermined the Four-Year Plan. For example Phok Sary, a sector official, was forced to confess his economic treason in the regime’s central prison Tuol Sleng (S-21) in Phnom Penh:

“I gave instructions to wreck the paddy harvest by harvesting it unripe. There was also to be wrecking when it was threshed. I designated Chaet to burn paddy ... and a lot of already harvested paddy was burnt. I told forces in the districts that robbers and new people were burning the paddy. My goal was to create turmoil among the people, between the base people and the new people. This stymied the Party’s [Four-Year] Plan. ... When the paddy was being farmed, the only action was to wreck it along with the equipment used for planting and harvesting. In addition, the forces attached to the district secretary were instructed to starve the people of rice, to make them eat gruel, so as to get them to make demands on the Organization.” (Confession cited in Chandler,

1999, p.70)

6 Conclusion

For the party leadership it was clear that enemies were sabotaging Angkar's economic plans. In a radio broadcast hidden enemies were blamed for the economic failures: "in the past, enemy running dogs of all stripes planted within our cooperatives sabotaged the target set by our Party and cooperatives of three tons per hectare." (Anon., 2008, p.17) The regime's mistrust is also a typical result of the socialist mode of planning, which operates from top-down and ignores local diversities due to the, in relation to natural and economic diversity, necessarily insufficiently complex plans. Michael Masuch (1981) pointed to the fact that centrally planned economies face the problem of 'undercomplex' planning. Plans can never encompass the diversity of the 'natural' and economic reality, which is why they have to fail – forcing local actors to fulfill the demands of the plan with auxiliary constructions or to build up stocks as safety in order to be able to fulfill future demands. This in turn, sparks the mistrust of the leadership even more.

According to Masuch, Communist leaderships have two opportunities to deal with the failure of their command economy. They can either raise the complexity of the plans leading to a swelling of the bureaucratic system or they stick to the plan and suspect manipulation – or both. The Khmer Rouge knew that they had a problem of control and legitimation: "Our party is not acceptable to the public yet. [...] Our policy is to further extend friendship." (Pol Pot, 2000, p.43) In their view, the cause of the problem was not the simplistic nature of the Four-Year Plan but rather the lack of control they were facing in front of their own movement: "each region constituted a small kingdom (that) ran its own affairs." (Ieng Sary cited in Burgler, 1990, p.327) Again and again the Communist party was complaining about the 'low revolutionary moral' within lower party ranks, where cadres didn't have 'ideals and clear revolutionary goals' and thus needed to be 'corrected' (e.g. Anon., 2001). Factional purges, reeducation centers, political indoctrination hours including self-criticism sessions and a 'thought reform' through productive labor in an ideal socialist environment were the measures of state terror intended to solve the regime's control and legitimacy deficit.

This article argued that the Khmer Rouge's restructuring of the environment could be explained as an attempt to establish and tighten control over the populace and the factionalized movement. Inscribing power structures into the environment served as a means to 'create' loyal and faithful subjects. Embedded in a socialist utopia, new and perfectly socialist people were supposed to arise, whose daily life in the collective and personal necessities were planned down to the very last detail. Michel Foucault's concept of disciplinary space proved very useful for the understanding of the Khmer Rouge's struggle for power. However, the construction of a utopian space seems to create a paradox: This utopian environment, amongst others, excludes its own natural embeddedness, local

diversity and typological conditions. The devastating effect of this neglect, the crop failures and the regime's suspicion of treason in its own ranks highlight the handling of multiplicities in the disciplinary space in contrast to the space in biopolitics. While biopolitics work on and with the multiplicity and contingency of a given milieu, disciplinary space works against natural and social multiplicity in order to create obedient unity (Foucault, 2007, pp.11-21). Thereby, the placelessness of the utopian non-place becomes an uncontrollable force.

Notes

¹ The number 1.7 millions can be called a shaky consensus at best. Precise investigations are still pending (cf. Etcheson, 1999).

² Pol Pot was also called 'big brother'.

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