

# Social inequality and housing policies in Rio de Janeiro: The impacts of the 2016 Olympic Games

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**Abstract:** The relationship between social classes and occupied territory in the city of Rio de Janeiro can be understood through the analysis of how they fought for space and formed the urban environment as we know it today. We can find the goal of increasing the spatial distance between social classes in the recent history of the city, which has formed a unique configuration of segregation and unequal access to the most needed urban goods. Such pattern of segregation was produced by authorities in favor of powerful actors, like the construction companies, by the removals of *favelas* in valued areas. The activities brought by the 2013 Olympic Games aggravated this scenario, removing communities, as *Vila Autódromo*, in new disputed lands. The interest of big companies in valued areas of the city has provoked the removal of almost 67.000 of people between 2009 and 2013. According to this, we seek to understand how the mega-events preparations followed the historical patterns of urban policies of the city's most important events. We argue that the preparations reinforced these local patterns and, as a result, left more social exclusion as an "Olympic Legacy". To explain the relations between political actors and urban configuration are provided: i) a historical review of the main events of the city; ii) a theoretical chapter explaining the concepts used; iii) a chapter of data, clarifying the divisions between social classes in the city; and, finally, iv) the case study, explaining the connections between the mega-events and the urban policies in Rio de Janeiro. Understanding the Olympic Games through the history of the city will clarify the relations between global and local economic interests, and their capacity to shape domestic politics.

## Introduction

When the city of Rio de Janeiro was chosen as the host city for the 2016 Olympic Games, a great mood of optimism took the city, people from different social backgrounds and opposite political opinions believed that the mega-events would bring participation and prosperity to the city. Barcelona was the leading example of how a mega-event can bring wealth, well-being, inclusion and participation for a city, leaving a positive legacy to its citizens (Blanco, 2009). Besides of other experiences of global events, such as the Olympics in Beijing or London, with their particularities, the "Barcelona Model" always represented the transformations that should occur in Rio.<sup>2</sup> The optimism lasted only until the first removals take place and bring, with them, an extremely authoritarian way of dealing with people. But, what was not clear to Rio's population was: Why the same mega-events that brought peace and prosperity all over the world would increase social inequalities once in Rio?

To understand how a global event can impact in local politics, we must look to historical patterns of policies in the local level. The manner of how public authorities deal with political actors can bring to light what happens when global investments are added to the context. In

the case of Rio, basically, the relations between the municipal government and influent economic interests – such as the industries and the construction companies<sup>3</sup> – have shaped the city during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As the physical distance between social classes is a value for the construction companies, the governments have sought to segregate them into territories, according to economic interests. This way to implement housing politics has created patterns of segregation and also of authoritarianism, since the government was much more concerned with the companies' interests than to the citizen's ones. And that is why the “Olympic Legacy” has not brought social development for most of Rio's population, but instead, it has increased the problems in their every-day life (Magalhães, 2013). The attacks towards citizen's rights were not brought *ex nihilo* by the mega-events (including the preparations for the Pan-American Games in 2007 and the World Cup in 2014). In fact, they constitute an essential feature of the urban history of the city, being accentuated by global investments during these world events.

Our objective is to show how the preparations for the mega-events have happened according to these local historical patterns and how they are implemented by the same actors that shaped the city during the last century. By doing so, we intend to explain how private interests were linked to the government, in spite of the citizens, during the most important events of the city. In other words, we are looking to understand how the “political construction of the space” (Bourdieu, 1999: 129) in Rio de Janeiro has been carried out in spite of its citizens, by authoritarian ways and maintaining the institutional channels of participation closed for the most of part of its population.<sup>4</sup> Some events had a significant impact on Rio's urban policies, and especially, four of them could be consider to explain the relations among political actors, such as: i) the Pereira Passos reforms; ii) the resistance of the *favelas* in the 50s; iii) the Removals in the 60s; and, iv) the Olympic Games in 2016. These four examples had a significant impact in the city, shaping its configuration according to the interests of influential political actors at the local level. To understand properly these events, the analysis should focus on the actions of these actors, such as: *the Municipality; the Industrial Capital; the Construction companies; and the Social Movements.*

By much, the preparations for the Olympic Games have repeated how housing politics were implemented through the history of Rio, even though they were not directly linked to this issue. The mega-events were used to build the infrastructure needed in strategic places in order to raise the value of the land<sup>5</sup>, which could be higher if the poor were evicted. This last point is significant to understand the social divisions in Rio. Most of the land now valued had previously been occupied by workers who sought to live near their workplaces. Once these areas were valued by the expansion of the city, these *favelas* were removed to give rise to buildings for the middle and high classes. The principal means of resisting the removals of its inhabitants was to organize themselves in the territory, acting outside the institutional channels. These patterns will be repeated during the preparations for the mega-events. In a context marked by precarious urban infrastructure, the place occupied is also a matter of *distinction* between classes. By mapping social classes, it will become clear how space was not occupied by them according to their amounts of capital, as a liberal-competitive model would assure, but, in fact, it was largely produced by the State (Abreu, 2013). So, proximity must be taken not as by “vicinity effects”<sup>6</sup> (Kaztman, 2001), where conviviality would benefit the lower classes, but as “site effects” (Bourdieu, 1999), where spatial proximity does not mean social closeness.

In order to identify social classes accurately, the work of Jessé Souza (2009, 2012 and 2018) is useful, allowing us to divide them into: i) the popular class; ii) the workers; iii) the middle class; and iv) the dominant class, which shall be identified in the 2010 census of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Thus, understanding the “struggle over places” (Bourdieu,

1999: 129) in the city of Rio de Janeiro can clarify the interests and the process of preparation for mega-events in a city like Rio. The article is structured in four sections: *first*, a historical chapter, where the four decisive moments are presented; *second*, a theoretical chapter, where the concepts of social class and political construction of space are introduced; *third*, a data chapter, where the numbers referring to class and territories are presented; and *fourth*, the case study, where the Olympic Games are finally explained by previous historical, theoretical and statistical considerations. In doing so, it should become clearer to us how a global event was able to raise the historical patterns of segregation and heteronomy in Rio de Janeiro.

## Key-events in the history of Rio de Janeiro

The city of *São Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro* was founded in 1565 in order to defend the Guanabara Bay from French colonizers and their alliance with the local *Tupinambás* tribes, which habited and controlled the *Guanabara* Bay for hundred years. After defeating their enemies with the help of the *Termininós* tribes, the Portuguese re-founded the city in 1567 where is, nowadays, the downtown or the “centro”<sup>7</sup> (Silva: 2015). The city became an important center of commerce during the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Being one of the main ports of Brazil, it has developed a distinct kind of economic and political centrality in the colony (Rodrigues, 2002). It became the capital of the Colony of Brazil in 1763, partly for a control better from Portugal, partly because of its growing economic importance. In 1808, the city became the capital of the Portuguese Empire in the Americas, modifying its whole structure to adapt to the manners of a European-like city. As a royal court and, at the same time, a slave-hold society with a colonial past, Rio developed contradictions and *dualities* in its social structure to adapt modernization with tradition (Barra, 2008)<sup>8</sup>.

The city, as the capital, was the main stage for the principal political events in Portuguese and Brazilian politics during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such as the Independence of Brazil in 1824, the abolishment of slavery in 1888 and the proclamation of the Republic in 1889. From a “tight city, bounded by Hills of Castelo, São Bento, Santo Antônio and Conceição” (Abreu, 2013: 35)<sup>9</sup>, which conquered its space by draining marshes and swamps at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the city became a large capital with urban issues at the end of that century. During these times the city was overcrowded, its population has grown by 90% between 1872 and 1890 (Carvalho, 1987: 27). A big part of them was living in *cortiços* old colonial houses rented by rooms for low prices. Not only housing but also health was the main urban problems of those times.

At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the political life of the city was intense, marked by numbered riots, revolts and street protests, despite the closure of the institutional channels for almost all its population<sup>10</sup>. The local elite sought the need to regenerate and modernize the central zones, which must be used as a business center. Named mayor in 1903 by Rodrigo Alves, Pereira Passos seemed to be the perfect candidate to cease the continued diseases the stroke the city<sup>11</sup>, which was related to the poor conditions of housing, and also modernize the infrastructure of the ways that lead to the Sea Port. A technique view of the Engineers Club prevailed against more cultural perspective for reforms and the downtown began to be remodeled for the interests of the exporter elite (Oakim & Rodrigues, 2013). Even though the intention was not to imitate Paris, the reforms waged by Georges-Eugène Haussmann seemed a good inspiration for the intents of the elite’s interests. Haussmann, as the prefect of Seine department, sought not only to improve the city of water supply, traffic circulation and to demolish popular houses, but also to put an end to the quarters where numbered of revolutions was taken place. It was not just about architecture, hygiene and beauty, but also to discipline the classes and make avenues large enough for

the passage of the army (Benchimol, 1992). These characteristics were also implemented in Rio. Passos has demolished 1.681 houses, which housed almost 20.000 of people (Carvalho, 1995: 69), generating a huge need for housing policies and raising the price of urban land downtown.

Acting with full powers, while the Municipal Assembly was closed, Passos implemented a massive reform that has improved the already present patterns of socio-spatial segregation. Social classes became even more divided through space, which became even more specialized. The historical center of the city became a business center, while neighborhoods near of it, in the so-called South Zone - as *Botafogo*, *Glória* and even the outlying *Vila Ipanema* - became to be well structured to house the elite (see annex 1). On the other hand, the workers and the popular classes had to look for new homes in the new neighborhoods of the North Zone, now opened by the new railway systems and the process of allotment (see annex 2). In this sense, the first decisive moment of Rio de Janeiro is the largest urban reform of the city and has provided a visible urban configuration to this day. The destruction of the *cortiços* by the Municipality left no other option for the poor, but to occupy the hills near of their workplaces in the central zones. The suburbs were not an option for most of them, as being far and been linked by a precarious transport system. These occupations became the first *favelas* and very soon were assumed as the new main problem of the city, as once were the *cortiços*. The total eradication and removal of the *favelas* became the official urban policy of the mayors during the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as stated in the first Director Plan of the City<sup>12</sup>. Removals only were stopped when Getúlio Vargas rose to power in 1930, with a clearly populist discourse.

In the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Rio was the major industrial city of Brazil and became even more important during Vargas government. Industries were present both in the remote neighborhoods of the South Zone, such as Gávea, Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas and Ipanema, and in the North Zone, such as São Cristóvão and suburban neighborhoods of Maria da Graça, Jacaré, Méier. However, the elites begin each time more to live in the South Zone, as the ideology of living near the beach as a synonym of status became stronger, and the industries became each time more centralized in the North Zone. In 1946, a great avenue in the North Zone was opened, the *Avenida Brasil* should be the principal avenue to link the industries to the Seaport. The emergence of industries was accompanied by the emergence of *favelas* in their surroundings. With the appreciation of land in the South Zone, these *favelas* became a problem to the construction companies. This also happened in the middle class neighborhood of Tijuca, in the North Zone. Many *favelas* in the region became threatened with removal. The inhabitants of the Borel *favela* organized to resist the removals in the Democratic Center<sup>13</sup> of the *favela*. Soon, they became articulated with other *favela* centers and created the greatest social movement in Rio's history: The Favelas Workers' Union (*União dos Trabalhadores Favelados*, UTF), in 1954, with both economic and territorial characteristics. The Union not only stopped the attempts of its removal, but also initiated a network of self-help and collaboration among numbered of *favelas*' associations<sup>14</sup> (Lima, 1989).

The resistance of the Union is the second decisive moment and can explain how popular social movements can also change the configuration of a city, maintaining poor people in high valued lands. It is also an example of how *favelas* dwellers and peripheral workers could participate politically outside the institutional channels of the State. The Union used both juridical and political actions, using clientelistic deputies of the Labour Party of Brazil (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* PTB) in favor of them, but also direct action, occupying public spaces when needed, always maintaining its autonomy (Lima, 1989). It became a problem to the governments that sought the construction business as a source of money and power and put UTF in lawlessness

in 1957, arresting its leaders, such as Antoine Margarino Torres. After the UTF, other social movements were created to protect the inhabitants of *favelas*<sup>15</sup>, but never again with its power and autonomy. Because of its resistance, Tijuca is still today a neighborhood with great proximity between the popular and the middle/high classes. With the strengthening of the *favela* associations and Democratic Centers, the Catholic Church, assisted by the authorities, created the Leo XIII Foundation (Fundação Leão XIII) in 1947 and the Cruzada São Sebastião in 1955. Both institutions sought to stop communist influences in the *favelas* and impose a great discipline for its inhabitants. This struggle against communism in the *favelas* was called by Carlos Lacerda, a famous right-wing journalist, as the “Battle for Rio de Janeiro” (Gonçalves, 2013: 143).

In the 60s, the political context has changed entirely with the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Lacerda was elected the first Governor of the State of Guanabara<sup>16</sup> with a speech against populism and corruption. Once in power, Lacerda began a plan to urbanize the *favelas*, delegating to José Arthur Rios the task to achieve this goal. Rios put into practice participatory plans with the leaders of the local *favelas* association. However, partly because of pressure from construction companies, and partly wishing vast amounts of capital of the US-AID<sup>17</sup>, Lacerda started the greatest removal plan in the city, dismissing Rios and placing Sandra Cavalcanti as social services secretary. Lacerda controlled the *favelas* associations with the apparatus developed for urbanization. Many *favelas* in the North Zone, such as the *favela* of Esqueleto, have been removed to implement infrastructure improvements, such as road avenues, the Maracanã Stadium and the University of the State of Guanabara. During his administration nearly 42.000 people were removed from their homes, between 1962 and 1965, with a total or partial eradication of 27 *favelas* (Gonçalves, 2013: 218).

Negrão de Lima, former mayor of the city, was elected governor in 1965 against the removals of Lacerda, reinforcing participatory urbanization plans. After the floods of 1966, however, Negrão de Lima restarted the removals with high pressure of the military regime, which rose to power in 1964. A large number of *favelas* of South Zone were removed, with a significant impact in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, which was all occupied by *favelas* in those times (see annex 3). The *favelas* associations were brutally suppressed by the military regime, their leaders arrested and tortured after trying to resist (Oakim, 2014). The removals during Carlos Lacerda and Negrão de Lima state governments correspond to the third decisive moment. They are one the most important moment of the city’s recent history, being crucial to understanding the current configuration of Rio de Janeiro. During the administrations of Carlos Lacerda, Negrão de Lima and Chagas Freitas between 1962 and 1974, almost 140 thousand people were removed from their homes (Gonçalves, 2013: 258). It is by far the greatest moment of removing people of the city, and expressive even compared to “slums clearances” around the world (Greene, 2014).

Concerning the means, this moment also has increased the undemocratic path to lead with housing issue in Rio. If there was a strong movement towards a democratization of urban policies, with greater participation of *favelas* associations (as the Favelas Workers Union) and left-wing politics during the 40s and the 50s, after 1964 this movement was halted (Burgos, 1998). All the attempts of building a more inclusive city were put down by the state and the federal governments, which finished the associations and started an even more authoritarian way to deal with housing and urban policies, influencing the future governments. The removal policies only stopped in 1977 with the resistance by the inhabitants of the *favela* of Vidigal, with help of the Catholic Church. During the 80s, Leonel Brizola, as the state governor, improved the situation in the slums of the city, providing light, water supply and property regularization. In 1992, Cesar Maia was elected as mayor of the city of Rio and started campaigns to host international events, which restored

the plans to remove *favelas* from valued lands. The removals restarted during the preparations for the Pan-American Games in 2007<sup>18</sup>. In 2007, Rio de Janeiro was announced as a host city for the 2014 World Cup, and in 2009, it was chosen as the host city for the 2016 Olympic Games.

## Struggle over places and social classes

In order to understand how urban policies are felt by the different groups of the city, we must divide them into social classes, highlighting how different is the perception of politics is in relation to the social position in society. To conceptualize social classes we use a framework inspired by the works of Jessé de Souza as a contribution to understanding social inequality, not only in terms of economy, but also of domination (Souza, 2009, 2012). Through the claims to be meritocratic and morally legitimate, the class structure shows individual failure or success as a result of someone's effort, when in fact is the result of incorporation of long-term class dispositions, required to act as expected (Souza, 2009). According to this, the social classes cannot be seen only by its economic features, but also by its social and symbolic characteristics.

The class structure of societies also has a past. It was not created by capitalism, in fact, is much older than it. Its present form maintains the characteristics of the past structures of domination. In Brazil, this past is closely related to the slavery system, which may explain not only the actual ethnic divisions, but also the behavior between members of different classes. According to Souza, class structure in Brazil is divided into four classes: the *ralé*, the *batalhadores*, the middle class and the dominant. Among them are three division lines of: dignity, expressivity and aloofness (see annex 4). Their position in the social hierarchy is referred by their amounts of economic capital, mainly income and wealth; symbolic capital, measured by the educational level; and social capital, measured by one's social networks (Jodhka, Rehbein & Souza, 2018: 86).

The first group is the *ralé* - a provocative word for "unworthy people" - which is excluded from a decent and moral life by the other classes. The *ralé* receives an income of 0 to 1 minimum wage<sup>19</sup>, are excluded from the formal labor market and have difficulty entering even in the informal market. They comprise up to 40 percent of Brazilian society (Jodhka, Rehbein & Souza, 2018: 85). Above the *ralé* and separated by the line of dignity are the *batalhadores*, unskilled labors with a more stable life, better social connections and better indicators of education titles. They are perceived as more disciplined than the *ralé* by the other classes, living in a more stable family and with better social conditions. These characteristics provide them a place in the labor market, even though with precarious work conditions. Both classes have their roots in the past of slavery, with the *batalhadores* being those who have successfully acquired more economic, social and cultural capitals and have ascended in class society. They comprise 30% of the Brazilian population and receive 1 to 2 *salários mínimos*.

The middle class is divided from the workers by the line of expressivity, or sensibility, perceptible in their *habitus* traits in many manners, as in relation to food, drink and literature. They occupy the middle strata of the society, "between the moneyed dominant elite and those majority of society who have no privileges", and are responsible for the services well-paid to the dominant class (Jodhka, Rehbein & Souza, 2018: 85). They have an income between 2 and 40 SM and are responsible for 25 percent of society. The dominant class are those above the line of aloofness, their stability as a class has much to do with social networks and marriages. They are the owners of the national capital, receive more than 40 SM and correspond to a tiny percentage of the population. As the social class is not only defined by economic capital, income can vary, so, there

are many workers who receive 5 to 20 SM, while the majority of the middle class receives 5 to 20 SM. The two extreme classes (*ralé* and dominant) are very distinct and defined in the statistics, while the middle classes have some overlaps.

Social differentiation between classes can also be seen in the urban configuration, since they intend to distinguish themselves not only socially but also spatially. This leads to a struggle over places, not only for spatial position, but also for the *distinction* between established groups, in other words, those who are better situated in social structure, and the *outsiders*, which are considered inferior by them (Elias & Scotson, 1965). So, human beings are not only situated in the physical space where they occupy a place, but also as social agents, they are situated in a site of the social space, where their localization is defined by mutual exclusion and distinction. Thus, “social space translates into physical space, but the translation is always more or less blurred. [...] An agent’s position in social space is expressed in the site of physical space where that agent is situated” (Bourdieu, 1999: 124). The distance between classes means greater dominance of the best urban goods and services, and becomes natural by the incorporation of the spatial experiences repeated indefinitely.

The ability to dominate space, notably by appropriating (materially or symbolically) the rare goods (public or private) distributed there, depends on the capital possessed. Capital makes it possible to keep undesirable persons and things at a distance at the same time that it brings closer desirable persons and things (made desirable, among other things, by their richness in capital), thereby minimizing the necessary expense (notably in time) in appropriating them. Proximity in physical space allows the proximity in social space to deliver all its effects by facilitating or fostering the accumulation of social capital and, more precisely, by allowing uninterrupted benefits from the meetings at once fortuitous and foreseeable that come from frequenting well-frequented sites (Bourdieu, 1999: 127).

According to Bourdieu, the places of the reified social space are stakes of a struggle for appropriation, which can assume individual or collective forms. The first one depends on the capital held (economic, symbolic and social) by an individual, while the second is highly influence by governmental policy. The collective form of the struggle over places is decisive to understand how urban policies can favor the distribution of land for specific social classes, creating urban segregation. The results of these struggles can shape the configuration of a city. In this way, the “political construction of space” (Bourdieu, 1999: 129) can explain how economic groups and social movements, for example, can interfere in public policies, creating proximity or segregation between classes. In the case of Rio, the State was the main actor responsible for reordering the urban space in accordance with the interests of the economic groups, with a great influence of the construction companies, reinforcing the social inequalities through the concentration of goods and services in the most privileged areas of the city (Abreu, 2006).

## Territories of a Divided City

The 2010 Census of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*IBGE*) can clarify how social classes are divided through the space of Rio de Janeiro. The data is focused on the economic capital, and more specifically in the income, of people with more than ten years old in the city of Rio de Janeiro, divided by its 160 neighborhoods. The total population was of 5.560.655 people. The population is divided into nine groups according to the Census (see annex 5). For a better use of the data, we must fit it into six groups, being the middle class divided into four strata: low,

middle, high and established. So the six groups are: i) the popular class, with an income of 0 to 1 SM; ii) the workers, people who receive 1 to 2 SM; iii) the low middle class, 2 to 5 SM; iv) the middle middle class, 5 to 10 SM; v) the high middle class, 10 to 20 SM; vi) the established, 20 to 30 SM and; v) the dominant, more than 30 SM. By this data, the dominant will be considered those who receive more than 30 SM and not with an income above 40 SM as according to Jodhka, Rehbein and Souza (2018: 88).

The classes were mapped in the neighborhoods of the city, as pointed out by map 1, according to its 16 Planning Regions. The downtown (1.1) is where the first decisive moment took place. The suburbs of *Grande Leopoldina* (3.1 and 3.5) were occupied after the opening of the *Avenida Brasil* in 1946. The classical, or the Machadean<sup>20</sup>, suburbs (3.2 and 3.3) were occupied in the late nineteenth century. Both suburbs were industrial areas. The region of Tijuca (2.2) was the scene of the second decisive moment, and also where the Lacerda's removals took place. The *favelas'* inhabitants of Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, in the South Zone (2.1) were removed during the Negrão de Lima's administration and sent to the far neighborhoods of *Bangu* (5.1) and *Cidade de Deus*, in Jacarepaguá (4.1).

The popular class – up to 1 SM – are successfully identified on map 3. They are located in neighborhoods of the north zone with significant presence of *favelas*, such as: Mangueiros (33,98%), Jacarezinho (31,10%), Acari (29,83%), Maré (28,08%) and Complexo do Alemão (27,62%). They are also present in the favelas of the central zones, such as: Saúde (29,33%) and Caju (28,78%), in the south zone, such as: Rocinha (27,60%) and Vidigal (25,88%) and in the west zone, such as Cidade de Deus (25,96%). Therefore, we can see from map 3 that this class is more concentrated in the suburbs with a large presence of *favelas*. However, they are also in almost all the regions of the city, marking their territories in all places where the presence of *favelas* is high. On the other hand, its presence is minimal in the richest neighborhoods of the south zone, such as Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas (2,57%) and Leblon (3,44%), and in Barra da Tijuca (2,77%).

The workers (see Map 4), are surprisingly found not in the North Zone, but in the neighborhoods of the West Zone, near or within the *Jacarepaguá* lowlands, such as: Gardênia Azul (32,3%), Itanhangá (29,15%), Jacarepaguá (28,15%), Vargem Pequena (27,97%) and Cidade de Deus (27,72%). They also have a strong presence in South Zone favelas, such as Rocinha (30%) and Vidigal (26,88%), and the neighborhoods of Centro, such as Saúde (27,95%) and Catumbi (27%). This is the most numbered sector of the population of Rio, with an average of 20,52%. They are also less numbered in the rich regions of South Zone, such as Lagoa (6,68%), and in Barra da Tijuca (7,18%). Despite the social segregation in Barra, the fact is that the Jacarepaguá lowlands occupy a strategic area in the city, near the rich region of Barra da Tijuca. It seems that this territory of workers in the Jacarepaguá lowlands should be the new area desired by the construction companies to allocate the middle class.

In turn, the lower middle class (see Map 5) also has its territories: They are present in the classical, or “machadean” suburbs, which start at the Centro (27,64%) and continue along the D. Pedro II Railroad in neighborhoods as: Cachambi (26,24%), Praça da Bandeira (25,85%), Todos os Santos (25,85%), Méier (24,66%), Maria da Graça (24,38%) and Abolição (23,57%). They are also present in Glória (27,13%) and other regions of the suburbs, such as Vista Alegre (25,72%), Vila da Penha (24,92%) and Higienópolis (24, 74%), three neighborhoods in the suburbs region near of Madureira, but apparently (and also surprisingly) more similar of machadean's one. They are present also in Ilha do Governador, in the neighborhoods of Praia da Bandeira with 27% and

Moneró, with 25,34% being part of the low middle class.

It is also surprising how the lower middle class is segregated from the middle strata. Despite its economical proximity, spatially they are very distant. The income of 5 *salários mínimos* seems to be a kind of divisor line between two cities inside Rio de Janeiro. The first one is located in the North and West Zone, as well as the *favelas* of the South Zone, and is poorly equipped with public areas, good libraries, schools and hospitals. In this first Rio the popular class, the workers and the low middle class struggle among themselves for the best places and face an every-day violence, with numbers similar to those of war zones. On the other side of this Divided City, there is a Rio created by the urban policies, so well structured, that one can misplace it with a European city. In this Rio live the middle and high middle class, as well as the established and the dominant, with the best schools, the best hospital and much more secured. The concept of a Divided City, or a “Broken City”<sup>21</sup> means not only a simple relation of center-periphery, but also that people who live in both sides of the city are divided by strong social, symbolic and physic characteristics. It means not only social barriers to access to places and services, but also physical ones, for example, “checkpoints” to control who is not allowed to visit the south zone by the police blitz. (Leite & Machado da Silva, 2016). It means not only a city with different patterns of spatialization but also a “spatiality fragmented by violence” (Souza, 2006: 466), with closed condominiums, completely structured and distant from every-day life, from one side, and the *favelas*, treated by laws of a “State of Exception” (Agambem, 2005) by the state agents, on the other.

Map 6 shows the territories of the middle middle-class, neighborhoods near of the Centro in the South Zone, as: Humaitá (22,98%), Flamengo (22,55%), Laranjeiras (21,17%), and Glória (20,12%); the central neighborhoods of the North Zone, as Maracanã (20,83%), Tijuca (18,55%) and Grajaú (17,63%); and rich neighborhoods of Ilha do Governador, as Moneró (19,74%) and Jardim Guanabara (19,61%). Barra da Tijuca is also the territory of the middle middle class with 18,49% of it. These territories are well structured of urban services and goods, but not are the more valued places of the city, staying in a middle position. The high middle class (Map 7), by its turns, is concentrated in the richest neighborhoods of the city, located in the South Zone, as Lagoa (20,07%), Leblon (17,34%), and Barra da Tijuca (17,30%), but also can be seen in the territories of the middle middle-class as Maracanã (11,17%) and Tijuca (10,01%).

The established (Map 8), those who receive between 20 and 30 SM, are concentrated in the richest neighborhoods of the city, mainly five: Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas (9,99%), Leblon (8%), Barra da Tijuca (7,19%), Ipanema (7,1%) and Joá (6,68%). The average of the city for this income is 0,86%. The dominant (Map 9), those who receive more than 30 SM, are located in the same neighborhoods: Lagoa (8,41), Joá (7,27%), São Conrado (6,21%), Leblon (5,30%) and Ipanema (5,16%). The average for this income is 0,51% in the city. The 17 neighborhoods with more presence of the established are located in the South Zone. Thus, the established also have their territories, which are the South Zone and Barra da Tijuca, by large the best-structured neighborhoods of the city, concentrating the public investment.

The case of *Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas* is the perfect example of how urban policy operates in the city of Rio de Janeiro to create urban segregation in an authoritarian way. The residents of the *favelas* of this neighborhood were removed of their homes and sent to needy communities, such as *Cidade de Deus* and *Cidade Alta*. Today, *Lagoa* is by far the territory of the established class, with a tiny percentage of popular class and workers, while these neighborhoods now concentrate the poor and are badly structured of urban goods. The explicit segregation in this case shows

how social classes and, mostly, the economic groups have struggled for territory in Rio. The intermediation of the State through urban policy has been the principal instrument to concentrate services and goods, “despoiling” even more the poor and the workers, and making poverty even worse in the neighborhoods poorly structured (Kowarick, 1979). This pattern to deal with the housing issue has shaped the city in order to create these territories and it was also present in the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.

## 2016 Olympic Games: Analysis and findings

The project of hosting global mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, began in the Cesar Maia's first administration (1993 - 1997) as mayor of Rio de Janeiro. The idea of the cities as political actors competing among each other for resources was strong at those times (Borja & Castells, 1996) and Barcelona was the leading example of successful urban reordering for an Olympic Games. Rio de Janeiro hosted the Rio 92, and Maia tried to host the Olympics in 1993. In the late 80s and 90s, Barra da Tijuca was in a great expansion as Housing politics became each time more linked to the financial capital (Rolnik, 2015). The sub-mayor of Barra, Eduardo Paes sought to remove the remained *favelas* (as *Vila Autódromo* and *Arroio Pavuna*) to give place to middle and high class buildings, as well as, structures to host the forthcoming mega-events.

During the 80s and 90s, the city of Rio de Janeiro as well as in Brazil, in general has suffered from neo-liberal reforms, which has caused unemployment, deindustrialization, poverty, and an increase of violence. Hosting mega-events, which meant a high inflow of capital to the city, seemed to be perfect opportunity to restore Rio's economy. In 2007, the city hosted the Pan-American Games during Cesar Maia's second administration (2001-2009), which brought back the removals to its preparation. According to Magalhães, the removal policy as a *political repertory* was reintroduced by the media and the Municipality, using images of violence and landslips of the floods in 2010, showing removals as a solution for the *favela's* inhabitants (Magalhães, 2013).

Eduardo Paes was elected as mayor in 2008, with the mission of structure the city to host the 2014 World Cup and after the 2016 Olympic Games. His candidacy for the elections received R\$ 11 million, financed by huge construction companies, metallurgic firms and real estate agencies (Azevedo & Faulhaber, 2015: 30). For the upcoming elections, the companies which financed his party were mainly the same, and they were the responsible for building the structures for the Olympics, such as: OAS (*Porto Maravilha* and BRTs<sup>22</sup>), Carvalho Hosken (Olympic Park), Cyrela (Golf Camp), Odebrecht. Paes' administration was characterized by concessions of public services to private companies through public-private partnerships in culture, education, public health, transports and also in infrastructure, which were made possible by the 2009 Municipal Program of Public-Privates Partnerships (PROPAR-RIO).

Programs of public-private partnerships, such as the Company of Urban Development of the Port Region (CDURP), were responsible for building in strategic areas for the mega-events, exactly in the areas where the local communities had to be removed. To guarantee the investors' profit the city had to be remodeled and people were removed from their homes in many places. To revitalize the downtown, Paes created the *Porto Maravilha*, in the North Zone, was created two new parks, such as the *Parque de Madureira* and the *Parque Olímpico* of *Deodoro*, the Maracanã and Engenhão Stadiums were reformed. To link these structures to the Athletes Village and airports were build the Bus Rapid Transit lines, such as: TransOlímpica, TransOeste, TransCarioca and TransBrasil.

To secure these investments were settled Pacificator Policies Unities (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora UPP*) in the *favelas* near of the structures. The removed families were sent to apartments of the social housing program *Minha Casa, Minha Vida*<sup>23</sup>, with numbered cases of infrastructural problems. The Map 10 shows the location of these apartments in neighborhoods of the West Zone, such as Bangu, Santa Cruz and Campo Grande, distant from their workplaces and sometimes without the adequate urban structure. Furthermore, these territories are controlled by militias, groups of former policies and firemen, which charge taxes to provide services, such as television, gas and, mostly, security. The militias control these territories politically, maintaining the population “mute” and providing support for the government.

The urban soil had reached the apex that turned impossible to live in the city paying the same price as before, eating in the same places, and doing the same things as before to people who were living in the new valued areas. A process of gentrification happened in the *favelas* of the central zones and in the South Zone. The original residents could not anymore afford the costs of urban services that increased and the companies now could charge, such as light and gas, and with the valuation of the land, they sold to middle class people and foreigners. Expensive hostels for tourists became to multiply in *favelas* of South Zone, such as Vidigal and Dona Marta, changing its social characteristics completely and serving for a limited version of the *favelas*.

To resist to the forced removals imposed to the preparation to the mega-events was created the Popular Committee for the Pan-American Games in 2005, uniting neighborhoods associations, non-governmental organizations, social movements, academics and groups linked to sport<sup>24</sup>. The Committee sought to inspect the production of the so-called Legacy of Pan-American Games, which should be the total urbanization of *favelas* until 2012. Not only, it did not happen, but also the housing deficit was increased by the removals near of the Stadiums. In 2007, this became the Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympic Games, uniting the social movements against the new removals. The symbol of popular resistance was the community of *Vila Autódromo*, which fought to remain in his valued lands.

Much of the strength united during the uprisings of June 2013, within the middle class and popular movements, was crushed during the 2014 World Cup by Dilma Rouseff’s federal government. The main left party (Labour Party, or *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) was allied to Paes’ administration, with Adilson Pires, a former resident of *Vila Aliança*, as the vice-mayor. The acts of the “left hand” of the State (Bourdieu, 1998) only reinforced the historical need of autonomy by the popular movements in relation to the political parties, and to resist in their territories, a pattern which was present in the other three decisive moments seen here. It was the case of many communities, such as *Vila Autódromo* and *Horto*, like many others (Mendes & Cocco, 2016), which resisted to the attempts of removals by the municipal government.

Despite it, between 2009 and 2013, Eduardo Paes successfully removed more than 20.000 families, about 67.000 people, from their homes (Azavedo & Faulhaber, 2015: 36). Most of the city was remodeled under his administration and the West Zone became more valued than ever. The alignment between government and the construction companies, the overbilling of the real state firms and the incapacity to the population to opine in this process lead to a sensation of lack of democracy and voice. Thus, the fourth decisive moment is the greatest example of how urban policy works in Rio de Janeiro, in order to expel the poor from their lands once it becomes valued, in order to house the middle and high classes. This fourth event also shows how the municipality is linked to the construction companies, while the territorial social movements represent the main resistance to them.

## Conclusions

Analyzing the history of the struggle for places in Rio, we can better understand how the land was appropriated by social classes, and by what interests and means. It also allows us to think of alternatives, whether at the local level, in building a city for more inclusive and democratic urban policies, or internationally, to be aware of how government and business are implementing the preparations for mega-events in other countries. In Rio, preparations for the World Cup and the Olympic Games were implemented by historical patterns of segregation and authoritarianism, which could be increased by the large influx of people and capital in the city, and it is likely that historical patterns will influence urban reforms in other cities as well.

The first decisive moment produced the great differences between the North Zone, where the unskilled workers and the low middle class moved, and the South Zone, where the established and dominant moved, creating high social and spatial divisions. The Passos' Reforms were the first great attempt to produce a divided city, dividing zones with different levels of public investments. The second moment, however, is an example of how social movements can also transform urban configuration and influence in the spatialization of social classes in the city. In this case, the territorial movement of Favela's Workers Union succeeded in maintaining a great number of *favelas'* workers near of their workplace in a territory of the middle and high middle class in *Tijuca*.

The third and fourth decisive moments pointed out how this influence can be limited when governments are legitimated to attack citizen's rights. Whether in a dictatorial regime in the 60s, or in a democratic one, such as the Paes' administration, when the residents do not have strength enough to face the economic groups, segregation can be increased. Therefore, the autonomy and relational power of the associations and movements are crucial to maintaining a democratic and inclusive city.

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## Notes

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<sup>2</sup>The influence of this model in Rio can be seen in in the Strategic Planning of the City of 1993 during Cesar Maia's municipal administration and in all the next administrations, after him (Oliveira, 2009).

<sup>3</sup>The construction companies are one of the most important economic groups of the city and they are present in the whole history of Rio, shaping its territories. They will also be referred to as real estate capital. Selling valued lands was one of the most profitable branches in the growing of the city during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the construction companies were the most interested in the valued lands of the South Zone, with great weight to influence housing politics. They are still one of the biggest economic groups nowadays, consisting of companies as Odebrecht, Carvalho Hosken, OAS, Camargo Correa, etc.

<sup>4</sup>Souza (2006) seeks to understand the heteronomic and autonomic levels in urban politics, in terms of a continuum, where policies and actors can improve or decrease the capacity of people to decide about the city's principal issues.

<sup>5</sup>For example, in the case of the Madureira neighborhood, after the inauguration of Madureira Park in 2012, from January to October of that year, the value of land increased by 30%, much more than other neighborhoods close to it. (Ximenes, 2018: 156)

<sup>6</sup>Kaztman (2001), based on Latin American and Uruguayan experiences, argues that proximity between social classes in public spaces might decrease the social segregation between them. Against this hypothesis, Ribeiro (2003) points out how social classes in Rio, even though their spatial proximity (as in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas), are extremely divided and segregated according to their social places.

<sup>7</sup>See Annex 1. The Rio de Janeiro downtown, which is also the historical center, is the area 1.1.

<sup>8</sup>The contradiction here is exactly the attempts to modernize the country maintaining its tradition, basically, slavery. Schultz (2008) explores the dualities between politics, reserved for the high nobility and landowners, and policies, which maintained the disciplinary order in the city through the police. Therefore, it is possible to see two cities cohabiting, with their own ways and sociabilities in Rio. (Barra, 2006) Martins and Abreu (2004) seek to understand how modernization was carried out by different temporalities, in relation to other countries in the world, in the same moment in Rio.

<sup>9</sup>Free translation from Portuguese: "Cidade apertada, limitada pelos Morros do Castelo, de São Bento, de Santo Antônio e da Conceição".

<sup>10</sup>Even though numbered of revolts, such as the Revolt of Vintém 1880, Revolt of the Armada 1893 and the Revolt of Vaccine in 1904, institutionally the greatest part of the population were denied to vote. The political openness during the Second Empire (1848-1889), with the indirect election of representatives, has reached 10% of total population (Carvalho, 1987: 43). After the military coup that started the Republican regime, only 1,3% has voted for the presidential elections in 1894, and in 1910 only 0,9% of the population of the State of Rio de Janeiro has voted (Carvalho, 1987: 86).

<sup>11</sup>The city passed through great waves of diseases, such as Tuberculosis, during the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Two major views on public health were particularly strong in Rio, first Sanitarism, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which believed that the miasms were the font of the diseases and after, the Hygienism, that saw the unhealthy conditions of the collective and poor habitations as their origin. See Fridman (2017) and Picon (1991).

<sup>12</sup>Alfred Agache was hired to produce the "Plan Agache", which can be considered as the first Director Plan of the City (Rezende, 1982). It had an organicist view of the city, considering its aspects as organs of the human body, using perspectives of zoning. It was a great influence of his times and also the next plans for the city. See Agache, Alfred (1930).

<sup>13</sup>The Democratic Centers in favelas were organized by the Communist Party of Brazil, after 1946, when it was declared illegal and could not organize itself in workers' union as before.

<sup>14</sup>According to the newspaper O Dia, the assembly to create the Favelas' Workers Union had the presence of eight associations of favelas' dwellers, with its headquarters in the favela of Borel (O DIA, 1954). According to Pestana (2013: 63) in the early of 1958, the Union had already centers in 42 favelas.

<sup>15</sup>Such as the Coalition of Favelas' Workers of the City of Rio de Janeiro (*Coalização dos Trabalhadores Favelados da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro*, CTFRJ) and after, the Federation of Favelas' Associations of the State of Guanabara (*Federação das Associações de Favelas do Estado da Guanabara*, FAFEG) and the Federation of Favelas of the State of Rio de Janeiro (*Federação das Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*, FAFERJ). For a more complete review, see: Gonçalves, 2013).

<sup>16</sup>The capital of Brazil was changed to Brasília in 1960, after being for 197 years in Rio. To avoid the fear of an economic decline of the city, President Juscelino Kubitschek created the new State of Guanabara, composed only by the city of Rio de Janeiro. The rest of the State of Rio de Janeiro had its capital in Niterói. In 1975, the two states were united again in the present state of Rio de Janeiro, with capital in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

<sup>17</sup>Agreement between the governments of the United States and Brazil, in the context of Cold War, to foster Brazilian development.

<sup>18</sup>See Freire, 2013.

<sup>19</sup>This is the minimum wage which bases the payment of the workers in Brazil and will be the principal economic measure to find the classes in the territories here. By the Census of 2010, the *salário mínimo* was 510,00 BRL. In 2018 it corresponds to 954,00 BRL. It will be referred henceforth by its initials SM.

<sup>20</sup>Classical, or “machadean”, because this is the suburbs expressed in the romances of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as of Machado de Assis, Aluísio de Azevedo and Lima Barreto.

<sup>21</sup>Created by Ventura (1994) in a very stigmatized approach to the north zone and favelas.

<sup>22</sup>Three systems of Bus Rapid Transit (BRTs) were constructed under Paes’ administration: TransCarioca, TransOlimpica and TransOeste.

<sup>23</sup>Created by the former president Lula in 2009, the program aimed to give credit for people with low income and for the middle class to buy apartments with discounts. In practice, it benefited not only these segments, but also the construction companies, which ordinarily chose where, how and for who they would be sold (Rolnik & Nanako, 2009).

<sup>24</sup>See Freire, 2013.


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## Annex

### *Annex 1*

*Map 1: Rio de Janeiro - Planning Regions*





*Annex 3**Picture 1: The favela of Praia do Pinto in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas (AGCRJ)**Annex 4**Board 1: Social Classes in Brazil according to Souza*

Social classes	Income	Wealth	Educational title	Occupation	% of population	Division Lines
Ralé	Up to 1 SM	None	Fundamental	None, informal	40%	Dignity line
Batalhadores	1 to 2 SM	Low-medium	Médio	Many, informal	30%	Expressivity line
Middle Class	2 to 40 SM	Medium-high	Superior	Skilled	25%	Aloofness line
Established Middle Class	20 - 40 SM	High				
Dominant Class	more than 40 SM	Very high	Superior	Capitalist	Tiny portion	

*Annex 5*


*Board 2: Average of social classes of the city of Rio de Janeiro (IBGE, 2010)*

	Up to ½	½ to 1 SM	1 to 2 SM	2 to 5 SM	5 – 10 SM	10 – 20 SM	20 – 30 SM	More than 30	Without income	To tal
<b>Average</b>	1,2 3%	15,3 4%	20,5 2%	16,3 4%	7,8 3%	7,8 3%	0,8 6%	0,5 1%	33,91 %	10 0%

*Annex 6*

*Map 3: Popular Class. Income of 0 to 1 SM*


*Map 4: The Workers. Income of 1 to 2 SM*



*Annex 7*


*Map 5: Income of 2 to 5 SM*

*Map 6: Income of 5 to 10 SM*



*Annex 8*


*Map 7: The high middle class. Income of 10 to 20 SM*



*Annex 9*

*Map 8: Income of 20 to 30 SM*

*Map 9: Income of more than 30SM*



*Annex 10*

*Map 10: Map of the removals (Azevedo & Faulhaber, 2015: 30)*

